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Abstract 
 
 My dissertation presents a comprehensive rethinking of the Kantian imperative, 
articulating it on the basis of what I call originary sense.  Calling primarily upon the 
works of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Gilles Deleuze, and Jean-François Lyotard, I show (1) 
that sense constitutes the ontologically most basic dimension of our worldly being and (2) 
that the way in which this sense happens is determinative for our experience of the ethical 
imperative.  By originary sense I mean to name something that is neither sensible sense 
(sensation) nor intelligible sense (meaning), but rather a kind of unity of these two that is 
ontologically anterior to their separation. 
 In the first chapter I follow Merleau-Ponty’s argument in Phenomenology of 
Perception that sensible sense and intelligible sense belong originarily together at the 
level of the lived body.  We are able to intend the meaning of worldly situations 
(Husserl’s Sinngebung) only insofar as we are responsive in an embodied way to the 
imperatives that are given in the sensible itself.  The intelligible lawfulness so 
characteristic of the Kantian imperative is thus shown to be grounded in a more 
fundamental unity of intelligible and sensible sense.  The second chapter follows 
Merleau-Ponty’s later works, especially The Prose of the World and The Visible and the 
Invisible, showing how the sensibility that is inseparable from the imperative introduces 
important limitations to the universalizing tendencies of Kant’s moral philosophy, 
drawing us back to the irreducible situatedness of ethical situations. 
 In the third chapter I turn to the very different articulation of sense given by Gilles 
Deleuze, primarily in his Logic of Sense.  I show there that Merleau-Ponty’s 
phenomenological conception of sense does not allow us to think the singularity of the 
imperative, the fact that the ethical command weighs on a me that cannot be grasped in 
terms of the generalities of my public identity.  This singularity corresponds broadly to 
the idea of dignity in Kant’s moral philosophy.  I argue that Deleuze, who conceptualizes 
sense as an event, gives us the resources to think singularity and to understand what it 
entails for our ethical practice. 
 Finally, I attempt in the fourth chapter to think these two sides of the 
imperative—its demand for universality and its emphasis on singularity and dignity—
together in the idea of libidinal sense.  Calling on Jean-François Lyotard’s Libidinal 
Economy and, to a lesser extent, on Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus, I show that 
these two apparently incompatible requirements of the imperative have a common source 
in the event of libidinal investment (cathexis).  In thus locating the source of the 
imperative in originary, libidinal sense, I hope both to shed some light on the irreducible 
complexity of our ethical being and to present a more humane, less moralizing version of 
the imperative than is typically articulated in moral philosophy. 
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 Sense does not have a sense.  That is not to say that sense is nonsensical or that it 
is senseless.  It is rather to say that sense always exceeds itself: we can never hope to 
produce a signification that would definitively fix its sense.  And sense exceeds itself in 
this way precisely because it precedes itself.  At the moment when we broach the 
question of the sense of sense for the very first time, we find ourselves already oriented 
within a world of sense, in accordance with which the question makes sense.  Sense, then, 
in this excessive, non-signifiable sense, is originary.  It is not an object in the natural 
world, nor even a noema, an intended object.  For even to intend some particular sense 
presupposes that one find oneself already oriented within sense as such.1  Borrowing the 
language of phenomenology, we might say that there can be no epoché of sense.  We can 
never suspend or bracket our natural orientation toward sense, since the very act of 
bracketing would already be responsive to the question of sense, which itself makes 
sense.2  Sense, then, cannot even in principle be eliminated as a presupposition.  We are, 
at the most originary dimension of our opening out onto the world, always already given 
over to a sense whose sense we can never appropriate. 
 My project in this dissertation, stated most broadly, will be to describe originary 
sense as rigorously as possible.  I will attempt to show how three of the most important 
movements in twentieth-century Continental philosophy, viz., phenomenology, 
Saussurian linguistics, and psychoanalysis, can contribute to this description.  In addition, 
I will attempt to show how our anchorage within this inappropriable sense, our finding 
ourselves responsive to it always already, is determinative for our experience of the moral 
                                                
1 Cf. John Sallis, Force of Imagination: The Sense of the Elemental (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 2000), 30. 
2 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Sense of the World, tr. Jeffrey S. Librett (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1997), 18-19. 
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imperative.  I will begin in this introductory chapter by setting out the terms of the 
problematic as precisely as possible.  I will describe in a preliminary way how the 
different senses of sense—significant or intelligible sense and sensible or sensuous 
sense—are understood in Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology, Saussurian linguistics, and a 
kind of psychoanalysis articulated in the early work of Jean-François Lyotard.  I will then 
describe, again in a preliminary way, how the idea of originary sense can contribute to a 
reconceptualization of the imperative as it is articulated in the moral philosophy of 
Immanuel Kant. 
  
 
I. Ambiguous Sense: The Phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty 
 
 Maurice Merleau-Ponty writes in the Preface to his Phenomenology of Perception 
that “because we are in the world, we are condemned to sense, and we can neither do nor 
say anything without its acquiring a name in history.”3  As a whole, Phenomenology of 
Perception can be read as a demonstration of the ineluctable ambiguity of that sense to 
which we are constitutively given over.4  On the one hand, Merleau-Ponty refuses the 
empiricist reduction of sense to sensation, i.e., to the atomic, mute impressions that the 
subject would experience entirely without mediation.  He shows, with the help of Gestalt 
psychology, that even the most elementary sensation “announces more than it contains” 
                                                
3 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, trans. Colin Smith (London: Routledge & Kegan 
Paul, 1962), xix (Hereafter PP); Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phénoménologie de la Perception, (Paris : 
Gallimard, 1945), xiv (Hereaftrer PP-Fr). Translation modified.  Emphasis in original. 
4 Renaud Barbaras, The Being of the Phenomenon: Merleau-Ponty’s Ontology, trans. Ted Toadvine and 
Leonard Lawlor (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004), 8.  “The central intention of 
Phenomenology of Perception is this power of meaning, of escape, this sense always already at work, 
which is not distinguished from its own accomplishment, and which, in this way, cannot be opposed to the 
factical foundation from which it would emerge.” 
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and is thus “already charged with meaning [sens].”5  On the other hand, Merleau-Ponty 
also refuses the intellectualist reduction of sense to the acts of judgment that would first 
grant meaning to otherwise meaningless sense data.  For intellectualism, any 
understanding of things that we cannot simply read off from mute sense impressions is 
attributed to a purely mental, extra-worldly act.  But this abstract reconstruction of our 
consciousness of objects misses entirely “the primordial operation which infuses meaning 
[sens] into the sensible.”6  The thing is never given in actual perception as a collection of 
sense data that are subsumed under an ideal unity accessible only to the understanding.  
Rather, “the meaning [sens] inhabits the thing as the soul inhabits the body: it is not 
behind the appearances.”7  Intelligible sense, then, always already inhabits sensible sense, 
and conversely it is sensible sense itself that opens out into intelligible sense.8 
 Having shown that both the subjectivist reduction of sense in intellectualism and 
the objectivist reduction in empiricism fail to do justice to our actual experience of the 
world, Merleau-Ponty attempts to “unveil a third dimension in which this distinction 
becomes problematic.”9  This third and more originary dimension, which is simply the 
level of perception, is concealed from us precisely by the knowledge to which it gives 
rise.  Merleau-Ponty points in this regard to “the tacit thesis of perception,” which 
maintains that “at every instant experience can be co-ordinated with that of the previous 
instant and that of the following, and my perspective with that of other consciousnesses    
. . . [and] that what is now indeterminate for me could become determinate for a more 
                                                
5 Merleau-Ponty, PP, 4; PP-Fr, 9.  Translation modified. 
6 Merleau-Ponty, PP, 34; PP-Fr, 43.  Translation modified. 
7 Merleau-Ponty, PP, 319; PP-Fr, 369.  Translation modified. 
8 “The passing of sensory givens before our eyes or under our hands is, as it were, a language which 
teaches itself, and in which the meaning is secreted by the very structure of the signs, and this is why it can 
literally be said that our senses question things and that things reply to them.” Merleau-Ponty, PP, 319. 
9 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Signs, trans. Richard C. McCleary (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 
1964), 162. 
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complete knowledge. . . .”10  That is to say, perception points beyond itself “quasi-
teleologically” to a fully developed science in which all objects and all of the 
interrelations between them would be rendered completely determinate.11  The level of 
perception is passed over as such when we attempt to read back into it the clarity and 
determinacy that characterize its promised result. 
 How are we to understand this originary level of perception if not in the clear, 
determinate concepts made possible by the subjectivist and objectivist reductions?  In The 
Primacy of Perception Merleau-Ponty suggests that we approach this question by means 
of a paradox of immanence and transcendence that is proper to the level of perception.12  
This paradox can be formulated as follows: On the one hand, the object perceived must, 
in some sense at least, remain immanent to the perceiving subject.  In other words, that an 
object is perceived at all entails that it is perceived by somebody.  It is this basic insight 
that is taken up in an exaggerated and one-sided way in the intellectualist thesis.  One of 
the works that laid the foundation for this thesis is Descartes’ Meditations.  In his attempt 
to discover truths whose certainty could be established beyond doubt, Descartes arrives at 
the Cogito.  On the basis of this discovery he introduces an ontological gulf between what 
exists within him and what exists outside him, or in Merleau-Ponty’s more 
phenomenological language, between what is immanent and what is transcendent.  
Owing to the clarity and distinctness that characterize the idea of the Cogito, all truth 
comes to be anchored to the subjective, immanent side of experience.  Any object, then, 
insofar as it is a known object, is strictly immanent to the consciousness of the knower.  
                                                
10 Merleau-Ponty, PP, 54; PP-Fr, 66. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Primacy of Perception, ed. James M. Edie (Evanston: Northwestern 
University Press, 1964), 16. 
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The same object considered as transcendent, or as outside the subject, is obscure and 
confused, and as such untrue. 
 On the other hand perception, and the knowledge that issues from it, refers to 
something that transcends the perceiving subject him- or herself.  This becomes evident 
in our actual experience of the world and in our actual attempts to acquire knowledge of 
it.  The things that we encounter are never given to us with the transparency that 
characterizes the clear and distinct ideas of the understanding.  In fact it is only because 
things are opaque, because they give themselves only in adumbrations and against 
backgrounds, that we are motivated to reduce them to flat, self-present conceptual 
significations.  From this perspective, then, the truth of things is firmly anchored on the 
objective, transcendent side of experience.  The exaggerated form of this perspective is 
the empiricism described above. 
 Merleau-Ponty’s own characterization of the originary level of perception, 
anterior to the one-sided subjectivist and objectivist abstractions of intellectualism and 
empiricism, stems from his refusal to recognize the two sides of the paradox as 
contradictory.13  In our experience as we live it, there simply is no ontological gulf 
between immanence and transcendence, between being-for-us and being-in-itself.  As 
M.C. Dillon demonstrates, if there were such a gulf, then we would be thrown back into a 
version of Meno’s paradox.  Either pure being-for-us would be immediately intelligible 
or else pure being-in-itself would remain wholly transcendent and unthinkable.  In either 
case the phenomenon of coming-to-know would be impossible.14  But experience just is 
this ongoing process of coming-to-know.  Perception for Merleau-Ponty is always the 
                                                
13 Ibid. 
14 M.C. Dillon, Merleau-Ponty’s Ontology (Bloomington : Indiana University Press, 1988), 1-2, 35-50. 
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experience of somebody who nonetheless encounters the thing in-itself.  As such, the 
perception of things “poses the problem of a genuine in-itself-for-us.”15  The level of 
perception, then, which is characterized by the co-presence of subjectivity and 
objectivity, immanence and transcendence, being-for-us and being-in-itself, is to be 
understood not as contradictory but rather as essentially ambiguous. 
 Importantly, the ambiguity that characterizes our most fundamental being-in-the-
world is not to be understood, as Hegel put it, “simply by running together what thought 
has put asunder.”16  Subject and object, significant sense and sensible sense, are not to be 
thought as immediately identical.  Instead, Merleau-Ponty insists on the ontological 
priority of the phenomenon, and of the level of perception at which we encounter it.  
Perception puts us in direct contact with a world that shows itself as “the sense of all 
senses and ground of all thinking.”17  The worldly phenomenon appears only in profiles, 
each inviting the motility of our bodies to investigate the sides that remain concealed.  
The thing, whether conceived in terms of its ideal signification or of its sensible presence, 
is never given all at once.  Rather signification emerges as we follow the sensible thing’s 
lead and perceive it as it demands to be perceived.  Significant sense, in other words, 
happens not simply when we perceive something, but rather when we perceive according 
to it.  This most common, everyday act reveals the irreducible ambiguity and 
excessiveness of the sense, i.e., of the world, in which we find ourselves always already 
anchored.  “The miracle of the real world,” Merleau-Ponty insists, “is that in it sense and 
                                                
15 Merleau-Ponty, PP, 322; PP-Fr, 372. 
16 G.W.F. Hegel, Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A.V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1977), 5. 
17 Merleau-Ponty, PP, 430; PP-Fr, 492.  Translation modified. 
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existence are one, and that we see the latter lodge itself in no uncertain terms in the 
former.”18 
 The ambiguity between the different senses of sense that characterizes the 
originary world of perception is equally and necessarily an ambiguity between 
subjectivity and objectivity.  The phenomenology of perception “discloses subject and 
object as two abstract ‘moments’ of a unique structure which is presence.”19  One of the 
most persistent themes of Phenomenology of Perception is that our openness to the world 
happens in corporeal intentionality.  Intentionality names the transcendence of an active, 
knowing subject toward a known object whose being is wholly in-itself.  But, according 
to Merleau-Ponty, the fact of corporeality has always already complicated this otherwise 
straightforward structure of phenomenality.  In order for the phenomenon to appear at all 
it must be the case that the depth and opacity of the object already exist right at the heart 
of subjectivity.  Our active, knowing relation to things presupposes our bodily 
receptiveness to them.  Prior, for example, to the known quality of blueness there is the 
blue as obscure invitation addressed to the motility of the perceiving body, which must 
orient itself in the way appropriate to seeing the blue successfully.20  In any act of 
perception, then, it is impossible to sort out what is attributable to the subject and what to 
the object.  And this is not owing to any correctable limitation of our knowledge; rather it 
is the consequence of an irreducible ambiguity at the level of our most fundamental 
openness to the world.  
 This ambiguity between the subjective and the objective is intimately related to 
the ambiguity between the different senses of sense.  The paradox of immanence and 
                                                
18 Merleau-Ponty, PP, 323; PP-Fr, 374.  Translation modified. 
19 Merleau-Ponty, PP, 430; PP-Fr, 492. 
20 Merleau-Ponty, PP, 214; PP-Fr, 248. 
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transcendence, of a self-transparent being-for-itself and an unknowably opaque being-in-
itself, is solved by the thesis of ambiguity.  Perception is not for Merleau-Ponty the act of 
a subject that would transcend itself into the wholly alien sphere of brute, self-identical 
being.  The supposed poles of experience are rather always already mediated at the most 
originary level.  Importantly, though, this originary mediation must not be understood 
with reference to any completed synthesis that would reduce the ambiguity to intelligible 
theses.21  Any attempt to articulate our most basic openness to the world must leave an 
opaque remainder.  And this is just because the knowing subject who would attempt such 
an articulation always arrives too late on the scene.  Merleau-Ponty’s own description of 
this irreducible opacity merits quotation at length: 
Each time I experience a sensation, I feel that it concerns not my own being, the one 
for which I am responsible and for which I make decisions, but another self which has 
already sided with the world, which is already open to certain of its aspects and 
synchronized with them.  Between my sensation and myself there stands always the 
thickness of some primal acquisition which prevents my experience from being clear 
of itself.  I experience the sensation as a modality of general existence, one already 
destined for a physical world and which runs through me without my being the cause 
of it.22 
 
The subject, then, who would thematize the world in an act of reflection always finds 
him- or herself pre-reflectively and irreducibly committed to the world.  Indeed that pre-
reflective commitment to the world is the necessary condition of any thematic reflection 
at all.   
 But world should not be understood only as the pre-reflective ground of our 
experience; it is just as much that ground as reflectively thematized.  The world, in which 
we find ourselves always already, is “a perpetual pregnancy, a perpetual parturition, 
                                                
21 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Evanston: Northwestern 
University Press, 1968), 94-5. Hereafter VI. 
22 Merleau-Ponty, PP, 216; PP-Fr, 250. 
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generativity and generality.”23  Sensible sense, in which we are constitutively rooted, 
expands itself with the aid of our corporeal intentionality in the direction of intelligible 
significations.  The face of the cube, for example, presents itself to my body as one 
profile among many; as I respond to the invitation of that profile and explore the 
concealed sides, I approach the ideal signification of a cube.  The term sense refers 
exclusively neither to the sensible face of the cube nor to its geometrical idealization.  It 
refers to both, and to the orientation of each to the other, simultaneously and 
ambiguously.  Merleau-Ponty expresses this ambiguity of sense concisely: “In all the 
uses of the word sens, we find the same fundamental notion of a being oriented or 
polarized in the direction of what he is not, and thus we are brought back to a conception 
of the subject as ek-stase, and to a relationship of active transcendence between the 
subject and the world.  The world is inseparable from the subject, but from a subject 
which is nothing but a project of the world, and the subject is inseparable from the world, 
but from a world which the subject itself projects.”24 
 
II. The Two Heterogeneous Orders of Sense: Discours, figure 
 
 This idea of an originary sense irreducible to any one sense is taken up and 
radicalized by Jean-François Lyotard in his first major book of philosophy, Discours, 
figure.  Lyotard insists from the very beginning of the book “that the given is not a text, 
that there is a thickness in the given, or rather a difference, which is constitutive and 
                                                
23 Merleau-Ponty, VI, 115. 
24 Merleau-Ponty, PP, 430; PP-Fr, 491. 
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which is not to be read, but to be seen.”25  This thickness, this difference that is proper to 
the sensible, is always being forgotten when we attempt to signify it and to render it 
intelligible.  The act of reflection, then, in which we would turn back from our immersion 
in the sensibly given and articulate it in intelligible significations, must remain 
incomplete.  To this extent Lyotard is in agreement with Merleau-Ponty.  But for Lyotard 
the difference between sensible sense and significant sense is considerably more extreme 
than for Merleau-Ponty.  Throughout his entire philosophical oeuvre, from The Structure 
of Behavior to the posthumously published Visible and the Invisible, Merleau-Ponty 
presented the difference between the senses of sense as one primarily of degree.  Our pre-
reflective being-in-the-world, he argued, already contained a kind of nascent logos, and 
this logos was simply rendered more determinate in reflective thought.  In other words, 
sensible sense is for Merleau-Ponty always oriented “quasi-teleologically” toward 
significant sense.26 
 For Lyotard, on the other hand, this difference “is constitutive of an ontological 
gap [écart].”  Instead of a continuum, we are faced here with “two orders of sense which 
communicate, but which are as a consequence separated.”27  While for Merleau-Ponty the 
act of reflection reveals an originary ambiguity between the senses of sense, Lyotard 
insists that reflection reveals a heterogeneity.28  These heterogeneous orders of sense are 
named in the book’s title.  Importantly, these different orders are separated and conjoined 
in the title by a comma: Discours, figure.29  To speak of Sense and Non-Sense or of The 
                                                
25 Jean-François Lyotard, Discours, figure, 5th ed. (Paris: Klincksieck, 2002), 9. Hereafter DF.  All 
translations from DF are my own. 
26 Merleau-Ponty, PP, 54; PP-Fr, 66. 
27 Lyotard, DF, 211.  Emphasis mine. 
28 Ibid, 27. 
29 Cf. Mary Lydon, “Veduta on Discours, figure,” Yale French Studies 99 (2001):24-5. 
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Visible and the Invisible, as Merleau-Ponty does, is to suggest a fundamental 
homogeneity between the different senses of sense.  Sensuous sense expands itself into 
significant sense; the invisible is always only the invisible of the visible.  The comma that 
separates the orders of discourse and figure, on the other hand, marks a rupture in this 
homogeneity.  The connection between the two senses of sense will not belong to the 
logical, significant order (Merleau-Ponty’s and), but to the order of the event.30 
 Lyotard presents a rigorous description of the heterogeneity of the orders of sense 
in the first division of the book, entitled “Signification and Designation.”  This 
heterogeneity can be described with reference to three irreducible differences.  First, the 
space of discourse (significant sense) is essentially flat, whereas the space of the figure 
(sensuous sense) is essentially characterized by depth.  Second, the kind of negation 
appropriate to discourse is opposition, whereas negation appears within the sensible as 
distance.  Finally, the unconscious of discourse is passive and virtual, while that of the 
figure belongs to the act of perception itself.  In what follows, I will discuss each of these 
differences in detail. 
 In order to understand Lyotard’s claim that the profound space of the sensible is 
essentially different from the flat space of signification, one need only compare the 
experiences of viewing a sensible object and reading a text.  The description most 
appropriate to thinking the being of the sensible, according to Lyotard, is the kind of 
phenomenology we have already seen exemplified by Merleau-Ponty.  For Merleau-
Ponty, such a phenomenological thinking of the sensible is “a question put to what does 
not speak.  It asks of our experience of the world what the world is before it is a thing one 
                                                
30 The importance of the event in Lyotard’s work, and its role in this dissertation, will be taken up in detail 
later. 
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speaks of and which is taken for granted, before it has been reduced to a set of 
manageable and disposable significations.”31  As we have seen, Merleau-Ponty’s 
phenomenology of perception demonstrates an irreducible opacity at the heart of the 
knowing subject, with the result that the task of reflection is shown to be interminable.  
The world that I would know is always already the world in which I am rooted.  The 
object that I encounter from within my originary perceptual faith offers itself to me in 
depth: the side that I see promises sides that are presently concealed.  And this promise 
can only be made to a subject who is him- or herself sensibly profound.  To “fill out” the 
object that is given to me in profile, I must move my three-dimensional body in three-
dimensional space.  The most basic insight of Merleau-Ponty’s critique of reflection, 
then, is that the reflected world—the world insofar as it is “reduced to a set of 
manageable and disposable significations”—is necessarily grounded in a pre-reflexive 
opacity that it can never surpass. 
 The experience of reading and understanding a text is strikingly different from 
this.  Most basically, “a text is not sensibly profound; you do not move in front of it or 
inside it,” following the leads of its various profiles.32  Neither, of course, does one 
manipulate the text—for example, by turning it upside-down or by holding it at varying 
distances from the eyes—in order to “flesh out” the significance that it adumbrates from 
the normal reading position.33  Of course one can always treat the text as an object in 
depth, but in doing so one would precisely not be reading it.  And one must of course see 
the text with the same perceptual apparatus with which one sees objects in depth.  But the 
elements of the text, viz., the letters, words, and sentences that constitute it as a text, 
                                                
31 Merleau-Ponty, VI, 102.  Emphasis mine. 
32 Lyotard, DF, 9. 
33 Ibid, 60-1. 
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immediately efface themselves, giving way to the ideal significations that they merely 
support.  One does not progressively unveil the sense concealed in the thick materiality of 
the printed word; instead one instantly recognizes the immaterial meaning in which the 
whole function of the printed word is exhausted.34 
 As Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology is the methodology most adequate to 
thinking the sensible, so the most adequate theorization of the flat space of signification, 
according to Lyotard, is Saussurian linguistics.  The decisive step taken by Saussure was 
the isolation of the linguistic structure as the proper object of the science of linguistics.  
This decision inaugurates the well-known distinction between langue and parole.  
According to Saussure, this distinction separates “what is essential from what is ancillary 
and more or less accidental.”35  The langue constitutes the essential object of linguistics 
because it can be studied independently of everything external to it, including the uses 
that are made of it by actual speakers and its situatedness within its concrete social and 
historical contexts.  This abstraction of the linguistic structure from everything external to 
it finds its justification in the “first principle” of Saussurian linguistics, which is that “the 
link between the signifier and the signified is arbitrary.”36  The arbitrariness of the 
signifier does not in any way refer to the free choice of a speaker in choosing which 
signifiers will refer to which extra-linguistic realities.  It means, rather, that the signifier 
is unmotivated by external reality.37  The English-language signifier “tree” signifies a tree 
                                                
34 Ibid, 211. 
35 Ferdinand de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, trans. Roy Harris (Chicago: Open Court, 1986), 
14.  Hereafter CGL. 
36 Ibid, 67.  Translation modified.  Ferdinand de Saussure, Cours de linguistique générale (Paris : Payot, 
1965), 100.  Hereafter CGL-Fr. 
37 Ibid, 69. 
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not because of any natural connection to the real trees that exist in depth, but because of 
relations internal to the ideal, immaterial space of the langue. 
 The distinction suggested by the first principle between the reference of language 
outside itself to objects in depth and its reference to itself as system is the distinction that 
gives the title for the first division of Discours, figure: “Signification and Designation.”  
The trend of Saussurian linguistics is to reduce the phenomenon of meaning to 
signification, that is, to a function of langue as ideal, immaterial structure.  According to 
Lyotard, Saussure’s “conception of structure leads him to absorb all of signification into a 
cutting-up, i.e., into the system of intervals between the terms, or a system of values.”38  
This refers to what is certainly the most well known, as well as the most controversial, 
claim of Saussurian linguistics, namely that “in the langue there are only differences, and 
no positive terms.”39  The signification of a term is not given by its referent—what it 
designates in extra-linguistic reality—but by its place within the system of differences 
that constitutes the langue.  The meaning of a term insofar as it is determined by its 
differential relation to the other terms within the same system is the term’s value.40  To 
take Saussure’s own example, the English “sheep” and the French “mouton” have 
different values even though both words can be used to designate the same extra-
linguistic object.  The values of the two terms are different because English has a separate 
term for sheep qua food, while French does not.41  Value, then, is determined entirely 
                                                
38 Lyotard, DF, 93. 
39 Saussure, CGL, 118; CGL-Fr, 166.  Translation modified. 
40 Lyotard underlines this point with a quotation from the manuscript sources of Saussure’s CGL, which 
was itself compiled from students’ notes: “The value of a term results only from the coexistence of 
different terms.” Also, “The sense of a term depends on the presence or absence of a neighboring term.  
From the system we arrive at the idea of value, not of sense.  The system leads to the term.” Robert Godel, 
Les sources manuscrites du Cours de linguistique générale (Geneva : Droz et Minard, 1967), 238, 237.  
Quoted in Lyotard, DF, 94, 97. 
41 Saussure, CGL, 114. 
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within the differential system of langue; it functions independently of what is or is not the 
case in the external, sensibly profound world.  This independence reveals an “ontological 
gap” between the ideal, transparent sense that emerges on the flat space of signification 
and the profound, opaque sense that emerges from our irreducible anchorage within the 
sensuous.42 
 A second and closely related unbridgeable gap between discourse and figure 
concerns the kind of negation proper to each.  According to Lyotard, the negation proper 
to figure is “distance, the spacing that is constitutive of space, negation experienced in 
variability.  The experience of this mobility that engenders extension, thickness, figure is 
a privileged object of description for the phenomenologist.”43  The methodological and 
terminological apparatus necessary to think this negativity is given in the work of 
Husserl.  This can be demonstrated beginning with the famous principle of all principles: 
“Every originary presentive intuition [originär gebende Anschauung] is a legitimizing 
source of cognition. . . .Each theory can again draw its truth only from originary data 
[originären Gegebenheiten].”44  It is essential here to understand what Husserl means by 
“originary presentive intuition;” if we do not, then we will lose sight of the decisive 
advance introduced by phenomenology, and will reduce the latter to just another 
empiricism.  Most importantly, it is essential not to understand donative intuition in 
accordance with the natural attitude.  Givenness does not refer to a real relation between 
a consciousness on the one hand and the thing that would “enter into consciousness” on 
                                                
42 Lyotard, DF, 211. 
43 Ibid, 27. 
44 Edmund Husserl, Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, 
First Book, trans. F. Kersten (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1998), 43 (§24).  Hereafter Ideas I. 
Emphasis omitted.  Translation modified.  Page numbers for Ideas I refer to those marked in the margins. 
Edmund Husserl, Husserliana, Band III. Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen 
Philosophie, Erstes Buch. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1950), 52 (§24). Hereafter Ideen I. 
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the other.45  The given, in sum, does not go into consciousness the way that money goes 
into a wallet. 
 The essential difference between this empiricist, natural-attitude understanding of 
givenness and the properly phenomenological one concerns the primacy of intentionality.  
Givenness cannot be understood originarily as the givenness of one positivity to another.  
Instead, originary givenness happens only within the space of intentionality, of a 
consciousness that is always and constitutively a consciousness of. . . .  It is not the case, 
though, that this intentional consciousness goes out beyond itself in order to encounter 
the given; this conception still remains within the natural attitude.  Intentionality rather is 
the spacing without which presentation, and thus phenomenality, would be impossible.  
That which is given is given only within the originary spacing of the of.  To return to 
Lyotard’s terminology in Discours, figure, it is also this of of intentionality that gives 
what is presented to be given as figural.  That is to say, the given is given originarily in 
depth.  But this depth must not be understood as the real depth of the “external” world, 
but rather as the depth extended in the spacing or distancing which constitutes the very 
structure of phenomenality.46 
 This idea can be made more intuitive by turning to some of Husserl’s many 
descriptive examples of the workings of intentional consciousness.  The most basic point 
to be taken from all of these examples is that our consciousness is always of “unities of 
                                                
45 Edmund Husserl, Logical Investigations, Volume 2, trans. J.N. Findlay (London: Routledge, 2001), 98.  
Hereafter LI-2.  Also Husserl, Ideas I, 34-37 (§19). 
46 Without this originary spacing of intentionality, we would be forced back into the paradox of immanence 
and transcendence discussed earlier with respect to Merleau-Ponty.  That is, we would be left with an 
ontological gulf between the object insofar as it is “within” or immanent to the consciousness of the knower 
and the object as “outside” or transcendent to that consciousness.  We would be unable to think the 
phenomenon, the in-itself-for-us that we encounter in our day-to-day, unreflective experience.  Cf. Jean-
François Lyotard, Phenomenology, trans. Brian Beakley (Albany: State University of New York Press, 
1991), 54-56. 
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sense [Einheiten des Sinnes]”47  “I do not see colour sensations but coloured things, I do 
not hear tone-sensations but the singer’s song, etc. etc.”48  According to Husserl, anything 
that is perceived is presented in adumbrations.  To see a table, for example, is to see it 
from one point of view at a time.  But this limitation in no way prevents us from seeing 
the table itself.  Rather the various adumbrations constitutively point beyond themselves 
to the intended unity of sense that is the table itself.  Our consciousness does not lose 
itself in each sensation or “content of consciousness” precisely because these sensations 
are not discrete and self-contained.49  The spacing of intentionality within which anything 
like “the table itself” can appear is at the same time a sense-bestowal [Sinngebung]: the 
table as unity of sense is given only across the distance and depth opened up within the 
structure of intentionality.50  It is this originary phenomenon of depth and its relation to 
sense that characterizes the space of the figure for Lyotard. 
 To express the phenomenological project of grounding significance in the 
Sinngebung of the intentional act in terms very much foreign to that project, we might say 
that phenomenology attempts to ground langue in parole.  But it is precisely this 
grounding that Saussurian linguistics shows to be impossible.  As Lyotard puts it, 
“langue precedes parole in that no speaker can claim, even modestly, to have instituted 
the former.”51  This can be demonstrated simply by imagining an attempt to reform all of 
the significations of a language: we would quickly realize that the only tool we possessed 
for carrying out this task is the langue itself.52  To pick up an example of Saussure’s 
                                                
47 Husserl, Ideas I, 106; Ideen I, 134 (§55) 
48 Husserl, LI-2, 99.  Emphasis mine. 
49 Husserl, Ideas I, 73-76 (§41) 
50 Ibid, 128-9 (§55). 
51 Lyotard, DF, 34. 
52 Ibid. 
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addressed earlier, suppose that we wanted to refashion the English word mutton so that it 
would take on the whole significance presently distributed between the two words mutton 
and sheep.  To do so would be to call upon the whole system of relations that constitutes 
the langue: the words mutton and sheep, and the combined signification that we would 
like to assign to the former, are given in the first place only against the background of the 
differences that make them possible.  And if we succeed in changing the signification of 
mutton, this will also presuppose the langue as system of differences that makes it 
possible.  Thus we can see that prior to every act of sense-bestowal (parole) there is 
necessarily the structure that enables it. 
 The negation that supports the structure of the langue is different from the kind of 
spacing and distancing involved in the sense of the figural.  If meanings appear as self-
same, self-contained “unities of sense,” this for Saussure is only owing to a play of 
opposition at the level of the langue.  Opposition preserves the values of the terms within 
a language by maintaining the regulated differences that constitute the langue.  If we treat 
two signifiers within the language as positivities—for example, the signifiers “fat” and 
“hat”—we would describe their relation to each other as one of mere difference.  But this 
mere difference between positive contents is possible only because of the opposition at 
the level of structure that regulates that difference, that at once holds them apart and sets 
them in relation.  At the level of structure, to be the signifier “fat” is just to not be the 
signifier “hat,” among others.  If this opposition were not maintained—for example if 
English speakers ceased to differentiate between f and h—then the positive contents 
would be undermined.  And if the oppositional structure of the langue as such were not 
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maintained, then no sense-bestowing act of any sort would be possible.53  In this way the 
negations proper to discourse and to figure are shown to be irreducibly different. 
 The third and final irreducible difference between the two orders of sense that 
Lyotard discusses concerns the status of the unconscious in each.  According to Lyotard, 
what remains unconscious for the thinking of objects in depth is the act of consciousness 
in which those objects are given.  Once again Lyotard points to phenomenology as the 
privileged site for articulating this unconscious.  From the perspective of 
phenomenology, “it is the act itself . . . which is unconscious of itself and which forgets 
itself in its naïve, natural fascination with the objects that it has in view.”54  As we have 
seen, intentional consciousness aims at unities of sense; thus we tend in the natural 
attitude to suppose that in perception we encounter things that are given to us as already 
fully determinate.  Only by means of the phenomenological reduction are we able to step 
back from our natural fascination with fully-formed objects and to thematize the acts in 
which those objects are constituted.  In the manuscripts preparatory to the 1907 lecture 
course entitled The Idea of Phenomenology Husserl states unambiguously the role of this 
constitution within his phenomenology: “Transcendental phenomenology is 
phenomenology of constituting consciousness.”55  To thematize and articulate the acts of 
constitution in which objects are given (in the expanded sense of givenness discussed 
above) is to restore the depth proper to things—a depth that is otherwise covered over by 
our intending objects as unities of sense.56 
                                                
53 Ibid, 141-2. 
54 Ibid, 29. 
55 Edmund Husserl, Husserliana Band II, Die Idee der Phänomenologie (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 
1950), x.  Translation mine.  Emphasis in original. 
56 Lyotard, DF, 27. 
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 Merleau-Ponty takes up and develops the phenomenological theme of the 
constitutive unconscious.  In thinking through the role of the body within the structure of 
phenomenality as such Merleau-Ponty shows how “every active process of signification 
or Sinn-gebung appeared as derivative and secondary in relation to that pregnancy of 
signification within signs which could serve to define the world.”57  The task of Husserl’s 
“phenomenology of constituting consciousness” was to bring to reflective awareness the 
acts within which objects, conceived as unities of sense, were given.  What was 
unconscious for the natural attitude was to be made conscious under the 
phenomenological reduction.  It is this possibility that Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology 
calls into doubt.  For Merleau-Ponty the unconscious that gives there to be objects is not 
itself something that can be thematized as a unity of sense.58  In this way Merleau-
Ponty’s treatment of the unconscious reiterates the theme of the necessary 
incompleteness of reflection discussed above. 
 If it is an unconscious Sinngebung that gives there to be objects as unities of 
sense, and if that Sinngebung must remain to some extent pre-reflective, then we can say 
that Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology demonstrates a kind of nonsense at the origin of 
sense.  Nonsense here does not refer to the absence of sense, but rather to what cannot be 
reduced to a univocal sense.  Merleau-Ponty states his own conclusions on this matter as 
follows: 
In sum, what we have discovered through the study of motility is a new sense of the 
word “sense.”   The strength of intellectualist psychology and of idealist philosophy 
comes from their having no difficulty in showing that perception and thought have an 
intrinsic sense and cannot be explained in terms of external association of fortuitously 
assembled contents.  The Cogito was the coming to self-awareness of this interiority.  
                                                
57 Merleau-Ponty, PP, 429; PP-Fr, 490.  Translation modified. 
58 Cf. Merleau-Ponty, VI, 180: “This unconscious is to be sought not at the bottom of ourselves, behind the 
back of our ‘consciousness,’ but in front of us, as articulations of our field.  It is ‘unconscious’ by the fact 
that it is not an object, but it is that through which objects are possible. . . .” 
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But all signification was conceived ipso facto as an act of thought, as the operation of 
a pure I, and if intellectualism easily refuted empiricism, it was itself incapable of 
accounting for the variety of experience, of the nonsense within it.59 
 
The new sense of sense that Merleau-Ponty refers to here is one that includes the element 
of nonsense that is at its origin.  More specifically, he is referring to our originary 
rootedness in a pre-reflective world characterized by ambiguity between the different 
senses of sense.  The fully determinate objects of science emerge only from a ground in 
which the distinctions between sensible sense and intelligible sense, subject and object, 
and even self and others cannot be sharply defined. 
 This Merleau-Pontean conception of a constitutive unconscious characterized by a 
new, excessive kind of sense, has a consequence that is especially relevant to Lyotard’s 
project in Discours, figure as well as to the present study, viz., that this 
phenomenological unconscious is never a personal or individual unconscious.  This point 
has already been suggested by Merleau-Ponty’s claim that the active Sinngebung is 
derivative from a primary pre-reflective rootedness in the world.60  This pre-reflective, 
originary world is not proper to any perceiving subject: “Each time I experience a 
sensation, I feel that it concerns not my own being, the one for which I am responsible 
and for which I make decisions, but another self which has already sided with the 
world.”61  The self of this originary perceptual experience is for Merleau-Ponty the 
impersonal “one” (on).62  The pre-reflective anonymity right at the heart of the active 
subject is the nonsense at the origin of sense. 
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 The unconscious that characterizes the flat space of discourse is, for Lyotard, also 
an instance of nonsense at the heart of sense.  But the unconscious of discourse is even 
more primordial than that of figure.  While the phenomenological unconscious pertains to 
the acts in which objects are given, the discursive unconscious “belongs to the order of 
the virtual; it precedes and surrounds the act because it is what makes the act possible, it 
invests the act and remains unknown to it because the act erases it by its presence.”63  
This discursive unconscious is not, like Merleau-Ponty’s, a nascent logos that comes to 
be expressed, albeit incompletely, in a determinate sense.  It is rather, as virtual, a 
generative nonsense characterized by the co-presence of incompossible senses. 
 The unconscious of the space of discourse cannot even in principle be made 
conscious.64  This follows most basically from the Saussurian principle discussed above 
that “in the langue there are only differences, and no positive terms.”  As we have seen, 
the condition for any act that intends any meaning whatever is the linguistic structure.  
But the most basic elements of that structure are not themselves meaningful: they neither 
designate nor signify.65  Again, the phoneme f is constituted differentially, in its relation 
for example to the phoneme h, which is itself differentially constituted.  There is no f or h 
as such.  The condition for determinate sense, then, is originary difference, which can 
never be intended as a unity of sense. 
 The discursive unconscious must not be understood, though, as a mere condition 
of possibility for meaningful phenomena.  The unconscious structure is both generative 
of and immanent to the actualities it conditions.  This is exemplified perhaps most clearly 
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in Althusser’s concept of structural causality.  The structure, composed entirely of non-
signifying elements mutually determined by variable differences, cannot be thought as a 
self-identical essence external to phenomenal reality.  “The structure is not an essence 
outside the economic phenomena which comes and alters their aspect, forms and 
relations and which is effective on them as an absent cause, absent because it is outside 
them.”  Rather “the whole existence of structure consists of its effects. . . .”66  Owing to 
the immanence of the non-signifying structure to significant actualities, those actualities 
are necessarily overdetermined: each phenomenon bears numerous incompossible senses 
simultaneously.67  The nonsense of the unconscious ground, then, is just as much a 
nonsense right at the heart of the things we encounter every day in the natural attitude. 
 
 
III. Originary Blocking Together: Libidinal Sense 
 What Lyotard has demonstrated, in sum, is the existence of two heterogeneous 
orders of sense which occupy different spaces, are maintained by different negations, and 
are conditioned by different unconsciouses.  But these two orders still do not comprise 
the whole of sense.  “Signification does not exhaust sense, but no more do signification 
and designation combined.”68  Sense rather emerges from, without being in any way 
reducible to, the communication between the heterogeneous orders.  This inevitably 
raises a difficult question: if, ex hypothesi, the two orders of sense are heterogeneous, and 
indeed incommensurable, then how is communication between them possible? 
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9. 
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 Before detailing Lyotard’s answer to this problem, it will be helpful to describe 
what his answer is not.  We have seen that each of the two orders of sense contains an 
instance of nonsense at its heart and as such is not identical with itself.  It would be 
tempting, then, to suggest the existence of a third order of sense which would constitute a 
synthesis of signification and designation.  Lyotard rejects this solution.  He 
demonstrates, in the context of a discussion of the “Sense-Certainty” chapter of the 
Phenomenology of Spirit that the immediately intuited sensible which is designated, or 
even pointed to, does not simply resolve itself into the significant universal.  For Hegel 
any immediately intuited content shows itself to be already something negative, and thus 
mediated.  “The Here pointed out, to which I hold fast, is similarly a this Here which, in 
fact, is not this Here, but a Before and Behind, an Above and Below, a Right and Left.”69  
Designation, in other words, resolves itself into signification: “Language, as we see, is 
the more truthful.”70  Lyotard of course grants that there is a negation proper to the 
sensible, but insists that “the negating that is there in the field of the sensible is not the 
invariant negativity which makes of language the medium for understanding each 
other.”71  That is, the spacing in which something becomes visible in depth is irreducible 
to the opposition that maintains the values of the terms in a langue.  The perceived 
negations of left and right, above and below are irreducible to the structural negations 
between the words “right” and “left,” “above” and “below.”72  To attempt a synthesis 
between the two orders of sense, then, is to fail to do justice to the modes of difference 
proper to each. 
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 The mode of communication between the two orders of sense is rather what 
Lyotard calls “blocking together.”  Blocking together refers to a co-presence of 
incompossibles, unthinkable from the standpoint of representation.  More specifically, in 
the context of the present discussion it refers to the co-presence of incompossible 
spaces—the flat space of signification and the profound space of designation—in one 
space.73  This mode of co-presence is similar to what Derrida means by inscription: the 
“proper” sense of one term is determined by its necessary contamination by the presence 
of its other.  This co-presence is different from mediation in that the alterity of the other 
is not superseded: the other remains unrepresentable in terms of the same.74  Or as 
Lyotard puts it, “one can affirm that everything is sayable; this is true.  But what is not 
true is that the signification of discourse gathers up the whole sense of the sayable.  One 
can say that the tree is green, but one will not have put the color in the sentence.  Yet the 
color is itself sense.”75 
 Let us review the broadly deconstructive strategy at work in Discours, figure.  In 
the first section of the book, entitled “Le Parti Pris Du Figural,” Lyotard sets out to 
valorize the sensible, which tends to be marginalized in a philosophical discourse 
governed by logos.  “This book protests” he writes, that “the given is not a text, that there 
is a thickness in the given, or rather a difference, which is constitutive and which is not to 
be read, but to be seen; that this difference, and the immobile mobility that reveals it, is 
what never ceases to be forgotten in signification.”76  This valorization of the sensible is 
not be understood as the naïve attempt to leap over signification and to establish 
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immediate contact with the sensible, conceived as the absolute ground of truth.  Lyotard’s 
claim is considerably more complex: something of the sensible retains its alterity when it 
becomes something signified, and this something always already inhabits and disrupts 
the flat space of discourse that would absorb it.  Thus no matter how rigorously one 
reduces language to langue and meaning to value, still “there is a fact that our experience 
of speech does not permit us to challenge, which is that all discourse is cast in the 
direction of something it seeks to grasp, which is incomplete and open, somewhat like the 
way the visual field is partial, limited and extended by a horizon.”77  The object of any 
act of discourse is given within discourse itself in the kind of depth proper to the sensible.  
To speak of something is to establish it at a distance from the act of speaking itself; one 
then “approaches” the discursive object from various “angles,” attempting thereby to 
flesh out the adumbrations in which it is “given.”  In fact the langue itself is given only 
within the depth opened up by Saussure’s own discourse in the Course in General 
Linguistics!  The “depth” interior to discourse disrupts the flatness that is supposed to 
distinguish it rigorously from the sensible.  But it is also this orientation into quasi-visual 
depth that gives language its raison d’être in the first place. 
 What emerges from this deconstructive examination of the co-presence and 
communication of the heterogeneous orders of sense is a new, richer conception of sense.  
This new sense of sense is in no way a third sense beyond signification and designation, 
but rather the event of their blocking together.  It is this new, more complex sense that is 
named in the book’s title: Discours, figure.  More specifically, it is suggested by the 
comma which joins and separates discourse and figure in a manner that is reducible to 
neither.  The relation is not specifically of the discursive, logical order—for example, of 
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the representable relations “and” or “or”—but neither obviously is it of the perceptive 
order.  The comma rather points to a complex, non-representable imbrication.  It is 
because each of the orders of sense is always already imbricated with the other that sense 
is never exhausted either by signification or designation, or even by their combination.  
While discursive sense is significant sense and figural sense is designated sense, this new, 
more complex sense is the sense of desire.  The privileged site for the articulation of this 
sense, according to Lyotard, is psychoanalysis.  Owing to its close relation to desire and 
to psychoanalysis, we shall refer to this new kind of sense as libidinal sense. 
 
IV. The Dream-work: Autodidasker 
  
 Lyotard carefully describes the workings of libidinal sense in the third and final 
section of Discours, figure entitled “The Other Space.”  Focusing primarily on the works 
of Freud, he demonstrates how the sense of desire happens as the non-representable 
blocking together of signification and designation.  He shows, moreover, that this 
blocking together is originary; it is not the case that desire merely combines two orders of 
sense that are otherwise autonomous. 
 Lyotard demonstrates this most clearly in his examination of the dream-work as 
described in Freud’s Interpretation of Dreams.  To interpret a dream correctly, according 
to Freud, the symbolic method practiced most commonly by laypersons is insufficient.  
This symbolic method “considers the content of the dream as a whole and seeks to 
replace it by another content which is intelligible and in certain respects analogous to the 
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original one.”78  That is to say, the images that constitute the dream are resolved into a 
discursive significance.  The interpretation of dreams, then, would simply be a matter of 
translating one kind of sense (the manifest dream-content) into another (the latent dream-
thoughts).  But this would miss what is essential in dreaming.  “At bottom,” Freud writes, 
“dreams are nothing other than a particular form of thinking, made possible by the 
conditions of the state of sleep.  It is the dream-work which creates that form, and it alone 
is the essence of dreaming—the explanation of its peculiar nature.”79  To focus on dream-
thoughts and to try to render them articulate by the standards of significant sense, then, is 
to overlook the very donation of sense by the dream-work.  As Lyotard puts it in the title 
of the chapter in which these issues are addressed, “the dream-work does not think.”80 
 The dream-thoughts, which are entirely rational by the standards of waking life, 
are no more than the raw material of the dream-work: the whole function of the latter is 
to transform the former.  For Freud, these two elements of the dream are radically and 
qualitatively different.81  The dream-work does not confront the discourse of the dream-
thoughts as a second discourse; it does not transform them by translating them into 
different dream-thoughts.  Instead the dream-work distorts the signification of the dream-
thoughts by means that are not themselves properly discursive.  This act of distortion is 
wholly an act of desire, which can only be fulfilled by being rendered unrecognizable by 
the censorship and by the intelligible waking world that it defends.82 
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 The dream-work, then, is not representable as such.  It is irreducible to 
determinate, intelligible sense because it is the very act of distorting that sense.  The 
dream-work, in sum, is the originary blocking together of the heterogeneous orders of 
sense.  To return for a moment to the vocabulary of deconstruction discussed above, we 
can say that the intelligible dream-thoughts are contaminated always already by sensible 
images which distort their straightforward, univocal sense.  The distortion produced in 
this blocking together must not be understood, however, as the effect of the dream-work 
on an intelligible sense that would somehow pre-exist it.  Rather it is the blocking 
together which, as the event of desire, produces both the significant sense and the 
sensible sense that disrupts it. 
 In order to illustrate how the dream-work happens as the originary blocking 
together of the heterogeneous orders of sense, let us examine Lyotard’s treatment of 
condensation.  Condensation is the process of the dream-work which transgresses the 
order proper to discourse by telescoping the oppositions that maintain the langue.  The 
space of pure oppositions that constitute the langue, as we have seen above, is flat.  To 
telescope these pure oppositions, however, is to force the words of the langue into the 
space of depth.  That is to say, words whose sense is reducible to fully transparent value 
take on the depth and opacity of things.  Lyotard sums up this process as follows: 
“Normally, in the linguistic order, a word is transparent; its meaning is immediate, and it 
is that meaning which is received.  The phonic or graphic vehicle is itself, so to speak, 
unperceived.  The product of condensation, as its name implies, is on the contrary, 
opaque, dense, hiding its other sides.”83 
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 An excellent example of condensation as blocking together is furnished by the 
dream of the Autodidasker, reported in The Interpretation of Dreams. 84 Autodidasker is a 
word which formed a particularly vivid part of the content of one of Freud’s own dreams.  
The first point to take note of here is that the word is obviously a neologism: it has no 
place established for it in advance by the regulated system of oppositions that is the 
German language.  Despite this, the word does bear a sense, which it is the task of the 
dream interpretation to unravel.  That Autodidasker can have a sense at all, without 
respecting the system of oppositions in which it figures, demonstrates already that even 
the meanings of words, to say nothing of things, exceeds the transparency of purely 
linguistic value. 
 The word Autodidasker can, according to Freud, “easily be analysed into ‘Autor’ 
[author], ‘Autodidakt’ [self-taught] and ‘Lasker’” which latter is associated also with the 
name Lasalle.85  (Lasker and Lasalle are the surnames of German political figures from 
the time of Freud’s youth).  But this analysis of the word into its elements does not by 
itself reveal the sense of the word.  This is because the elements are not themselves 
purely linguistic, but have their senses inextricably bound up with their reference outside 
the flat space of signification.  This contamination of significant sense by sensible sense 
disrupts the order of the former.  Importantly, though, the contamination does not arise 
simply because the new word is put together from elements.  The term sociology, for 
example, was fairly recently a neologism and is made up of the elements socius and 
logos.  But the new term does not disrupt the discursive order in the least: it respects 
entirely the system of differences into which it was introduced.  That is to say, the 
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linguistic values for society and logos are in no way incompatible from the systematic 
point of view.  Any native speaker of English would recognize without difficulty that 
society was the kind of thing about which one could give an account.  The neologism 
socioHeracles would be entirely different in this regard, however, because one could not 
determine its sense on the basis of the component values alone. 
 In this respect Autodidasker is like socioHeracles.  While words like sociology 
articulate two transparent values together into a new, equally transparent value, words 
like Autodidasker compress together terms that are at least as much material realities as 
linguistic values.  The condensation of incompatible realities into a single term gives that 
term a sensibly profound, thing-like opacity, but without surrendering its significant 
sense entirely.  So, for example, we can recognize in “auto” a transparent linguistic value.  
We can also recognize in the whole word Autodidasker the value “autodidact,” although 
this value is concealed by the distortion of the sensibly presented word.  This second case 
is importantly different from the first, however, in that the particular combination of 
signifier and signified—the sensibly given Autodidasker and the value “autodidact”—
transgress the order of discourse in a way that “auto” by itself does not.  This 
transgression is present to the degree that “the phonic or graphic vehicle” of signification 
does not itself pass unperceived.  Finally, the element “Lasker” has no signification 
whatever: it is a proper name and thus takes its whole sense from its designating a reality 
outside the flat space of discourse.  The word Autodidasker, with its complex imbrication 
of sensible opacity and significant value, can thus be seen as a case of blocking together 
the two heterogeneous orders of sense. 
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 That this is the case can be shown by reviewing the process by which the sense of 
the term comes to be interpreted.  To determine the sense of Autodidasker one must 
occupy simultaneously the incompossible spaces of signification and designation.  On the 
one hand, we occupy the flat space of discourse in recognizing that the linguistic values 
of the component terms obviously contribute to the sense of the term.  Although the term 
to be interpreted is very much distorted, it remains the case that the measure of that 
distortion is given by the langue.  To recognize Autodidasker as requiring interpretation 
is to recognize simultaneously the norm of transparency proper to the space of 
signification and the deviation from that norm.  The commitment to the space of 
discourse is also revealed in the goal of interpretation, which is to eliminate the opacity 
introduced by distortion and to resolve the term into a clear and unambiguous 
signification.  And yet the process of interpretation also opens the interpreter onto the 
profound space of designation.  There would be no way to know, for example, that 
“Lasker” is a component of Autodidasker if one occupied the space of the langue 
exclusively.  Since “Lasker” has no signification, one could proceed in the interpretation 
only by referring to the three-dimensional man designated by the word.  This is even truer 
in the case of “Lasalle:” one would never suspect the presence of this element in 
Autodidasker without knowledge of the world in which the man figured, and even more 
specifically, of his meaning for Freud as presented in the specific dream in which his 
name is remotely suggested.   
 The presence of these non-discursive elements in the word Autodidasker renders 
the word also a thing.  As the course of the analysis given in The Interpretation of 
Dreams demonstrates, the sense of the term is given progressively according to the 
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structure of adumbrations described in Husserl’s and Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenologies.  
For example, the word “Lasker,” like the famous phenomenological cube, gives itself in 
such a way as to suggest hidden sides; like sensible things generally, its sense is given 
within the play of revealing and concealing.   In the context of the dream, the name both 
presented and disguised Freud’s concern with the domestic happiness of his brother, 
named Alexander.  “I now perceived that ‘Alex’, the shortened form by which we call 
him, has almost the same sound as an anagram of ‘Lasker’. . . .”86  “Lasker,” then, both 
reveals and conceals “Alex.”  Importantly, the actual man designated by the name Lasker 
had died of syphilis.  The name Alex, in turn, is associated with a particular author 
(Autor), who was a friend of Alex’s and had once made a remark to him about marriage.  
Thus “Lasker” suggests simultaneously Alex and problems with women, while Autor 
suggests the issue of marriage.  Each of the elements of that composes Autodidasker, 
then, adumbrates a sense beyond what is immediately given.  It is by following up the 
leads provided by these adumbrations that one arrives at the sense of the whole, just as 
one arrives at the sense of a cube by picking it up and viewing the sides that are both 
concealed and revealed in a frontal view. 
 
V. The Donative Event: Primary and Secondary Processes 
 
 Importantly, this blocking together of incompossible senses is not confined to the 
language of dreams.  If dreams provide a privileged locus for the study of this kind of 
sense, it is only because the state of sleep relaxes the censorship against the demands of 
desire, allowing them to appear somewhat more transparently in the form of articulate 
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discourse.  But the dynamic model according to which repressed, unavowable desires 
break through into consciousness characterizes the whole of our psychical life.  The most 
primitive layer of our psychical apparatus, which Freud calls the primary process, acts 
wholly in accordance with the pleasure principle, disregarding reality entirely.  It 
functions by producing a “’perceptual identity’—a repetition of the perception which was 
linked to the satisfaction of a need.”87  For example an infant whose hunger has been 
satisfied by its mother’s breast will recathect, or essentially hallucinate, that same 
perception the next time it experiences hunger.  It must not be supposed, however, that 
this perceptual identity is very rigorously determined at the level of the primary process: 
because the task of the psychical apparatus is simply to discharge excitations as quickly 
as possible it will treat anything associated with the remembered source of satisfaction as 
identical to it.  It does this according to the same processes of condensation and 
displacement that characterize the dream-work.   
 The secondary process emerges as an extension of the primary process.  Because 
the strategy of hallucinating a satisfaction so often fails to discharge unpleasurable 
excitations, it becomes necessary to reproduce the object of satisfaction in the external 
world.  This, of course, requires reality testing and all of the clear and rigorous cognition 
associated with it.  These two processes must not be understood as discrete loci of 
psychical activity, such as can be suggested by the topographical model of the conscious 
and the unconscious systems.  Rather, “all of the complicated thought-activity which is 
spun out from the mnemic image to the moment at which the perceptual identity is 
established by the external world—all this activity merely constitutes a roundabout path 
to wish-fulfillment which has been made necessary by experience.  Thought is after all 
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nothing but a substitute for a hallucinatory wish. . . .”88   The clear and distinct 
signification characteristic of the secondary process, then, is inextricable from the work 
of the primary process, which is indifferent to that signification.  And because the 
primary process is prior chronologically and genetically to the secondary process, there is 
no good sense that is not inhabited always already by nonsense, conceived as an 
impossible profusion of sense.89 
 Any object of internal or external perception is given to us within the interplay of 
the primary and secondary processes, the first of which renders excitations freely mobile 
and the second of which binds them into repeatable and recognizable unities.  While the 
secondary process builds up the stable significations of the langue, the primary process 
ceaselessly undermines them, scrambling the code and making of every transparent value 
a kind of Autodidasker.  To connect this libidinal sense explicitly to the Saussurian and 
Merleau-Pontean senses discussed above, we can say that everything we encounter is 
given at once as an obscure, non-representable invitation to our fundamentally libidinal 
bodies and as an ideal unity of meaning.  The smiling face that I encounter is indeed the 
smiling face of a real determinate person in a real determinate situation.  But it is at least 
as much a repetition of innumerable, anonymous satisfactions experienced by a 
premature, incompetent body and an invitation to return, at least for a moment, to that 
scarcely organic state prior to the onset of the reality principle.  Every encounter, in other 
words, happens as the blocking together of incompossible senses. 
 Libidinal sense, then, appears as excessive to itself, as grounded in a kind of 
nonsense.  In this regard it is not different from the discursive and figural senses 
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exemplified by Saussure and Merleau-Ponty.  We saw that each of these kinds of sense 
had its own unconscious.  The flat space of discourse, characterized by transparent 
significations, is made possible by completely non-signifying differences.  The profound, 
embodied sense articulated by Merleau-Ponty has as its ground an anonymity, the On, 
that cannot be recuperated by the reflecting I.  In both these cases the world of good sense 
is made possible by a grounding nonsense.  But in each of these cases this nonsense at the 
ground is oriented entirely toward the good sense that it grounds.  The non-signifying 
differences that ground discursive signification do not in any way challenge the order of 
good sense, but rather secure it.  Likewise, the anonymous passivity at the basis of our 
sensible opening onto the world of objects remains subordinated to that known world.  
According to Lyotard, the concept of a passivity irrecoverable in reflection “can only 
operate within the field prepared by phenomenology, as the contrary or the correlate of 
active intentionality, as its layer of support.”90 
 In both these cases the alterity of nonsense is reintegrated into the world of good 
sense by presupposing the latter as the norm and end of the former.  Both structural 
linguistics and phenomenology, according to Lyotard, are oriented from the first by the 
goal of knowledge, which is constitutively directed toward a world that is given to us in 
sense.91  But there is no space within knowledge for the event in which sense is given.  
“Knowledge supposes the space of signification in which resides the set of syntactical 
constraints that governs the consistency of its discourse; and inasmuch as it is a 
referential discourse, it also requires the space of designation at the heart of which the 
knowing speaker gauges the reference of his discourse.  But truth happens (e-vents) as 
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that which is not in its place.  It is essentially displaced.”92  Discourses of knowledge, 
then, cannot recuperate the essentially nonsensical event of the donation of the two 
spaces of sense.  The nonsense at the origin of sense is not the nascent proto-sense of 
signification and designation, but rather the donative event that has disrupted those 
spaces always already. 
 This is just what we saw in the discussion of the primary and secondary 
processes.  To return to the example of the infant at its mother’s breast, we can say that 
this situation is given to the infant most basically as a perceived satisfaction.  We must 
not suppose that this satisfaction refers beyond itself to the space of signification, such 
that it would be related to an ideal thought-content, in this case the signification 
“mother’s breast.”  Nor does the satisfaction refer to the ordered space of designation in 
which the mother’s appearance and disappearance are understandable and predictable 
occurrences.  All of this rudimentary knowledge presupposes the functioning of the 
secondary process and the reality principle.  To suppose that infantile libidinal excitations 
are mapped from the first onto the spaces of signification and designation is to miss the 
alterity of the event in which those spaces of sense are given.  At the level of the primary 
process the given—the felt satisfaction—is not something mediated, not a bit of proto-
knowledge.  The freely mobile cathexis creates identifications and linkages that are 
unthinkable within the strictly marked and regulated spaces of the secondary process.  
And yet it is the primary process and the exigencies of the pleasure principle that open 
the nascent subject onto the real world of knowledge.  Reality is thus libidinal through 
and through.  At some point the infant will learn to instantiate its desire onto the real 
unity that is its mother’s breast.  But the mother’s breast will never cease to bear 
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innumerable and incompossible meanings and to produce by extension innumerable and 
incompossible satisfactions.  This is in no way owing to a correctable error of rational 
cognition, but is rather the trace of its inassimilable and unavowable ground.93 
 This alterity at the heart of libidinal sense makes manifest a fissure within the 
fundamentally knowing subject presupposed in both structuralism and phenomenology.  
The event of the donation of sense has no place pre-established for it in the ordered world 
opened up by that very donation.  “The event opens up a vertiginous space and time; it is 
not bound to its context or to its perceptive environment.”94  From the perspective of the 
knowing subject, however, this vertigo shows itself simply as error, as a fall from the 
rigor of rational cognition.  Such an interpretation establishes as a norm for thinking the 
kind of cognition characteristic of the secondary process and at the same time prepares 
the way for the effacement of the event.95  But knowledge is not our most originary 
opening onto the world.  The objects of our encounters are not in the first instance 
significations or designations, or any combination of these.  This is made manifest in the 
experience of jarring, unthinkable breaks within the ordered, regulated world of 
knowledge.  The encounters that produce these felt breaks are libidinal.  Take for 
example an encounter with a woman as described by Lyotard: 
The slender and very dark finger of her left hand which, in a conversation, the young 
woman, anxious because she is afraid of what she believes to be your erudition, 
passes over her eyebrow, while in the other hand she pulls at a cigarette—here is a 
real region to invest, one can die for it, one can give all one’s organicity, one’s 
ordered body, one’s functional arrangement of organs, one’s memory of organs, one’s 
socio-professional status, one’s supposed past and one’s supposed future, one’s 
agenda and one’s intimate theatre, one can feel like paying very dearly, exorbitantly, 
                                                
93 Cf. Jean-François Lyotard, Libidinal Economy, trans. Iain Hamilton Grant (Bloomington : Indiana 
University Press, 1993), 21-5.  Hereafter LE.  Jean-François Lyotard, Économie Libidinale (Paris: Les 
Éditions de Minuit, 1974), 31-5.  Hereafter LE-Fr. 
94 Lyotard, DF, 135. 
95 Ibid. 
  
 40 
for this finger which is like an engraver’s stylus and the whole orbital space, cranial, 
vaginal, that it engenders around the eye.96 
 
This woman, given strictly as object of this encounter, is not a subject oriented within a 
world that I might hope to share.  And the I, again as strictly given in the encounter, is not 
the worldly I defined by well-established roles and projects.  All of this is precisely what 
the event of the encounter disrupts.  The event dispossesses the subject of itself and of the 
known, ordered world in which it takes its bearings.  In sum, “the event as disruption is 
always that which defies knowledge; it can defy knowledge articulated in discourse, but it 
can just as well shake the quasi-understanding of the body, bringing it into conflict with 
itself and with other things, as in emotion.”97 
 What is given in the donative event, and what undermines always already the 
orders of signification and designation onto which it opens, is libidinal investment.  
Cathexis is never given within the spacing which is constitutive of objects in depth nor 
within the system of regulated differences that constitutes the langue.  This is just to say 
that cathexis is never something mediated, never something properly known.  Rather 
libido “invests without condition.”98  The libidinal investment announces itself within 
thought as an inassimilable difference.  As unmediated the investment is presented as 
different from mediated knowledge.  But this felt difference is incommensurable with the 
regulated differences that govern the spaces of signification and designation.  What is 
experienced, then, is a different and thus unknowable difference.  In order to be able to 
experience this disruption within the orders of knowledge, “it suffices that there be at the 
heart of these orders negations irreducible to the gaps of opposition or to the depth of 
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designation, insane events, i.e., operations or effects of operations requiring an “order” 
that cannot fall under the negativities that we have identified, precisely because it is 
inscribed in them only negatively, an order that one is tempted for this reason to suppose 
is positive.”99 
 
VI: Imperative 
 
 This originary blocking together, which is never properly known because it 
disrupts the space of knowledge always already, manifests itself practically.  More 
specifically, the event of the donation of sense happens as an imperative of the kind that 
Kant articulates in his moral philosophy.  The imperative, according to Kant, can be 
experienced only by finite rational beings like ourselves for whom the faculty of desire is 
divided into higher and lower stems, the former of which is determined rationally and the 
latter pathologically.  “All imperatives are expressed through an ‘ought’ and thereby 
indicate the relation of an objective law of reason to a will which in its subjective 
constitution is not necessarily determined by that law (a necessitation).”100  The 
imperative, in other words, is given originarily to finite rational beings as irreducibly 
intelligible and sensible.  It is given intelligibly as the moral law, expressed in the 
formula of the categorical imperative, but it would not be an imperative if it were not also 
given as a command, felt as weighing on our sensibility. 
 The irreducibly dual nature of the imperative is experienced most acutely in the 
feeling of respect.  Kant examines this feeling most thoroughly in Chapter III of his 
                                                
99 Lyotard, DF, 138. 
100 Immanuel Kant, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. Allen W. Wood (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2002), 30 (Ak 4: 413).  Hereafter GMM. 
  
 42 
Critique of Practical Reason titled “Of the Drives of Pure Practical Reason,” where he 
situates respect at the very heart of practical life.  For Kant “respect for the law is not the 
drive to morality; it is morality itself. . . .”101  Respect, in other words, is not simply one 
feeling among others, registering the condition of our finite organisms in experiences of 
pleasure and pain.102  Respect is rather a “singular feeling,” the “only one which we can 
know completely a priori and the necessity of which we can discern.”103  While the other 
feelings help to orient us in the sensibly given world by disclosing objects as things to be 
pursued or avoided, the feeling of respect refers us immediately to the supersensible 
world of the moral law.  It is the effect on our sensibly determined organisms of a second, 
intelligible world which can never be given in experience, but which we are nonetheless 
commanded to realize practically in this world.  As such the singular feeling of respect 
exceeds the traditional metaphysical boundary between intelligible and sensible sense. 
 The moral feeling of respect resembles the event as described by Lyotard in two 
important and closely related ways.  First, it makes manifest an alterity at the heart of 
experience.  Respect is a feeling whose only reference is beyond the sensible world 
conditioned by our faculty of knowledge.  We never, properly speaking, respect mere 
things.  We may fear or enjoy things, or even admire them, but to say that we respect 
them would be to pass over what is essential in our practical opening onto the world.104  
In respect I am revealed to myself as a moral person, commanded to exercise my 
causality in accordance with the laws of freedom, which exceed the laws of causality 
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according to which the natural world is known.  To be a person is to acquire a dignity, a 
value exceeding the mere “price” one commands in the natural world.105  As a natural 
being I am always something general and exchangeable, a token of a type.  But in respect 
I am revealed to myself as singular and thus as radically incommensurable. 
 Secondly, the feeling of respect happens as a kind of Lyotardian event in that it 
disrupts the ordered world of knowledge, and indeed has disrupted it always already.  In 
revealing me to myself as a singularity the moral feeling also gives me over to a lawful, 
supersensible world as the field for my practical life.  The lawfulness of this other world 
and of the free persons who legislate in it is, of course, wholly different from the 
lawfulness proper to the sensible, natural world.  But it would be a mistake to interpret 
this to mean that we human beings simply occupy two different worlds, one concerning 
the sensible side of our being and the other the intelligible side.  The moral law revealed 
in the feeling of respect, in other words, does not command obedience merely from the 
intelligible side of our being, leaving our sensible side to be determined completely by 
the laws of the natural world.  Rather we are commanded to exercise our free, 
spontaneous causality within a natural world in which such causality is unknowable.  We 
are required each time to leap across the intelligible/sensible divide, using our faculty of 
judgment to bring naturally conditioned worldly situations under the supersensible laws 
of freedom.106 
 Our practice of moral judgment, of applying the laws of pure practical reason to 
the domain of nature, where they are not properly legislative, reveals an excess over 
experience from within experience.  In nature, for which the understanding legislates, we 
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know that sensible appearances have as their causes only other sensible appearances.  
Indeed “experience itself—in other words, empirical knowledge of appearances—is thus 
possible in so far as we subject the succession of appearances, and therefore all alteration, 
to the law of causality; and, as likewise follows, the appearances, as objects of 
experience, are themselves possible only in conformity with the law.”107  And yet we can 
all recognize moral phenomena, which presuppose the wholly different causality of 
freedom, within experience.  We encounter other human beings not entirely as the 
products of natural laws, but also, as Kant remarkably puts it, as instances of “the law 
made visible.”108  Owing to this disruption of the uniformity of cause and effect by the 
“appearance” of intellectual causality within experience, we find the certainty of our 
empirical knowledge, at least as it concerns human beings, undermined.  “It is absolutely 
impossible to settle with complete certainty through experience whether there is even a 
single case in which the maxim of an otherwise dutiful action has rested solely on moral 
grounds and on the representation of one’s duty.”109  It is, of course, equally impossible 
to know that an action in accordance with duty is not the effect of intelligible causality. 
 This disruption within the ordered world of knowledge points to an excess that is 
inseparable from, and ultimately constitutive of, the knowing subject.  The faculty of 
knowledge, for which the understanding legislates, has as its condition of possibility the 
unity of apperception.  The manifold that is given in sensible intuition, and which 
becomes properly known as it is brought under the categories of the understanding, 
receives its uniformity through “a necessary relation to the ‘I think’ in the same subject in 
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which this manifold is found.”110  The “I think” to which representations refer is not itself 
something given in intuition; it is transcendental.  It is, in other words, not the same as the 
empirical I, which appears within sensible nature and is thus subject to its laws.  Rather 
the transcendental unity of apperception is a spontaneous act of synthesis, bringing 
together the various representations and thus constituting them as a nature that can be 
known. 
 If this were the complete account of human reason, however, it would be 
impossible to explain the quasi-appearance of moral acts within sensible nature.  Our 
recognition of moral situations in the world raises a basic question: how could such an 
excess become manifest within the field of experience, which is constituted by the 
knowing subject?  The answer, according to Kant, is that the theoretical interest of our 
reason is ultimately subordinated to the practical interest: “it is evident that the ultimate 
intention of nature in her wise provision for us has indeed, in the constitution of our 
reason, been directed to moral interests alone.”111  This must not be interpreted simply to 
mean that because reason has an interest over and above knowing, it is entitled to an 
extension beyond experience.  This would suggest that the practical interest of reason is 
merely added on to the speculative interest.  In fact reason has always already 
legitimately exceeded the bounds of sensible nature.  The field of experience that is 
constituted by pure reason in its speculative use is also, in a strange way, conditioned by 
pure practical reason.  “Pure reason, then, contains, not indeed in its speculative 
employment, but in its practical employment which is also moral, principles of the 
possibility of experience, namely, of such actions as, in accordance with moral precepts, 
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might be met with in the history of mankind.”112  The sensible field, then, has always 
already been synthesized in accordance with the practical interest of reason, and in such a 
way as to include the possibility of a causality that is entirely unknowable from the 
perspective of speculative reason.113   
 The synthesis of the intuited manifold that is enacted by the knowing subject is, as 
we have seen, spontaneous and active.  Indeed, to understand the work of synthesis as the 
mere product or effect of objects in the world would be to overlook what is essential in 
the critical turn.  The lawfulness that nature seems to teach us is in fact legislated 
spontaneously by our higher faculty of knowing.  And yet, given the primacy of practical 
reason, we must conceive of a kind of receptivity right at the heart of activity.  Anterior 
to the active legislation of the understanding is the command that there be law.  The act, 
in other words, by which the understanding legislates to nature is more originarily a 
response to the moral imperative.  In short, to think is always more primordially to 
obey.114 
 This originary obedience to the demand for lawfulness points to a receptivity 
more radical than the subject’s mere “capacity to be affected by objects.”115  This latter 
kind of receptivity concerns sensible intuitions, which come to be known within the unity 
of experience, and which therefore presuppose the activity of the knowing subject.116  
The more originary receptivity, which is a receptivity for the moral law, is characterized 
                                                
112 Ibid, 637 (A807/B835). 
113 Bernard Freydberg, Imagination in Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 2005), 68-9.  Hereafter Imagination.  Freydberg emphasizes Kant’s use of the subjunctive 
in the quote above: “in der Geschichte des Menschen anzutreffen sein könnten.”  In its conditioning of 
experience practical reason does not properly speaking determine objects.  It does, however, secure the 
possibility of our experiencing  acts as brought about through a purely rational causality. 
114 Alphonso Lingis, Deathbound Subjectivity (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989), 38-44. 
115 Kant, CPR, 71 (A26/B42). 
116 Ibid, 441 (A494/B522). 
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by Kant as “the sole fact of reason.”117  To describe our consciousness of the imperative 
as a fact is to highlight its independence from any of the elements proper to human 
reason.  It is neither entailed nor posited by anything within the structure of pure reason.  
Nor is it, of course, grounded in any sensible intuition.  As a brute fact anterior to the 
articulated structure of reason it is neither identifiably intelligible nor sensible.118  And 
yet this fact is a fact of reason.  It is, as Jean-Luc Nancy describes it, “a heterogeneous 
and incommensurable factuality” at the very heart of reason.119  If this incommensurable 
factuality is never given to reason as an object of knowledge, this is because it originarily 
gives there to be our rational opening out onto the world.  It is here, in the radical 
receptivity at the heart of reason, that the singular moral subject emerges as subjected to 
the law, as its pure addressee.  And precisely as this incommensurable singularity the 
addressee is commanded to make itself universal, to become an addressor of the law for 
the worlds of sensible nature and of morality.  The fact of the imperative, in sum, is what 
first gives the distinction between receptivity and activity, between the subject as 
subjected to the law and the subject that legislates it.  But the unique factum rationis 
radically exceeds these distinctions: it is neither a receptive nor a legislating subject, 
neither active nor passive.120  Characterizing this originary, donative heterogeneity 
Heidegger writes: “The self-submitting, immediate surrender to . . . is pure receptivity; 
the free, self-affecting of the law, however, is pure spontaneity.  In themselves, both are 
originally one.”121 
                                                
117 Kant, CPrR, 31-2 (Ak 5:31). 
118 Freydberg, Imagination, 34. 
119 Jean-Luc Nancy, L’Impératif Catégorique (Paris: Flammarion, 1983), 22.  Hereafter IC. 
120 Ibid. 
121 Martin Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, Fourth Edition, Enlarged, trans. Richard Taft 
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VII. The Project of the Present Work 
 
 In what follows I shall attempt to rethink the phenomenon of the imperative, 
presenting it as the event of the donation of sense.  In order to do this, of course, I will 
need to think outside the Kantian system within which the imperative was first articulated 
as such.  But certain Kantian themes I could not abandon without losing what, it seems to 
me, is constitutive of the phenomenon.  Most broadly, I will retain the theme of the 
primacy of the practical, according to which our opening out onto the world is conceived 
as essentially responsive.  Moreover, I will retain the correlative idea that that to which 
we most originarily respond cannot become something properly known, and that it 
manifests itself only as an inassimilable alterity within the ordered world of knowledge.  I 
will take up Kant’s emphasis on the incommensurability of the person that first emerges 
in the response, although I will speak instead of a singularity.  And finally, it will be 
essential to my project to maintain the connection established by Kant between this 
singularity and the significant, law-governed world that is projected in accordance with 
the command of the imperative. 
 Other leading themes of the present work will be markedly un-Kantian.  Most 
generally, I shall present the imperative wholly in terms of the kind of originary, 
excessive sense described above.  In doing so, I will be building on the more 
contemporary insights of phenomenology, Saussurian linguistics, and a certain kind of 
psychoanalysis, all of which have in common an emphasis on the situatedness of the 
subject within a ground that it can never recuperate in reflection.  The various ways in 
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which these three lineages of thought articulate the irreducible anchorage of the subject 
within a pre-reflective ground of excessive sense will be indispensable for my own 
account.  Each of them can be understood to suggest a way of thinking the relation 
between an always already responsive subject and the broader world extended by 
originary sense.  And each of these ways presents the phenomenon of the imperative in 
ways importantly different from Kant’s own portrayal. 
 The first two chapters will focus on Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of 
Perception and Visible and the Invisible, respectively.  Through these works I will 
articulate an imperative that occurs right here in the sensibly given world, without 
reference to anything like Kant’s pure form of law.  Despite his gestures toward bridging 
the gulf that separates the intelligible from the sensible, for example in the a priori 
feeling of respect, Kant tends to present the imperative in a very traditional, moralizing 
way as demanding the submission of our sensible natures to the purely intelligible law.  
Merleau-Ponty’s works, on the other hand, argue that this sharp distinction emerges only 
as an abstraction from what is given in the more originary level of perception.  In the 
natural attitude we orient ourselves wholly to the end-products of the process of 
constitution, taking the rigorous determinations of these fully-known objects as the 
measure for thinking as such.  In a similar way Kant takes the ideal end-product of 
speculative reason as the standard for our entire practical being-in-the-world: “So act as if 
the maxim of your action were to become through your will a universal law of 
nature.”122 But if this ideality is inseparable from the rich, ambiguous world of 
perception from which it issues, as Merleau-Ponty argues, then it is a serious mistake to 
hold this abstraction up as the measure for our practical lives. 
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 The third chapter will focus primarily on Gilles Deleuze’s Logic of Sense, which 
will be read as a contemporary, post-Saussurian articulation of the flat space of discourse 
described above.  Deleuze demonstrates an irreducible nonsense at the basis of the very 
structure which gives there to be sense.  This nonsense, which is not an absence of sense 
but rather an excess, ceaselessly undermines the good sense that characterizes the ideal of 
intelligibility.  Between good, univocal sense and this excessive nonsense there exists “an 
original type of intrinsic relation, a mode of co-presence” that is given right at the objects 
of experience.123  This nonsense is given within experience not as something to be 
known, but rather as the object of an encounter which suspends the lawful order of 
projects and initiatives so important in Kant’s account of practical life.  The passage from 
Lyotard’s Libidinal Economy quoted on page 37 above gives an example of such an 
encounter.  It is not the woman as unity of sense that is the object of the encounter.  The 
whole, molar woman would be given along with her own practical world, and would 
present to the man in the example an invitation to take up that world as his own.  It is 
rather a kind of excess of sense, given right with the proper woman, that is the object of 
the encounter.  This encounter suspends the significant order of practical initiatives in 
which the subject maintains his public identity, throwing him back onto a singularity that 
is not properly his own.  The singularity made manifest in this encounter is immanent to 
the world given in sense, and in no way refers to a transcendent beyond that would 
somehow ground that world.  This location of a wholly immanent singularity helps to 
overcome the piety and religiosity so characteristic of Kant’s moral philosophy. 
                                                
123 Gilles Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, trans. Mark Lester, with Charles Stivale (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1990), 68.  Hereafter LS. 
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 In the fourth and final chapter I shall attempt to think the kinds of sense 
articulated by Merleau-Ponty and Deleuze together as libidinal sense.  This latter sense 
will be thought as the originary blocking together of the profound space of designation 
and the flat space of signification.  I shall focus primarily on two closely related texts:  
Jean-François Lyotard’s Libidinal Economy and, to a lesser extent, Gilles Deleuze and 
Félix Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus.  Each of these texts presents the connection between a pre-
subjective singularity and the ordered, significant world of practice as happening in the 
event of libidinal cathexis.  The irreducible fact of this libidinal practical reason is that 
the libido “invests without condition.”124  The libido, in other words, does not invest in 
accordance with some rule or model that would somehow pre-exist and account for it.  
Indeed this is just what the description of cathexis as event is intended to deny.  The 
vocabulary of Deleuze and Guattari is especially helpful on this point.  For them all 
investment is understood as production (which I have been describing with the more 
phenomenological term donation).  But “production is immediately consumption and 
recording, and the recording and consumption determine production directly, but from 
within production itself.”125  Libido, in other words, invests unconditionally and 
originarily.  But this investment is inseparable from the establishment of a record that 
sustains and reproduces the investment by channeling and ordering it.  In this way 
cathexis opens onto the ordered world of significations which becomes the object of 
knowledge and the field for human practice.  And each libidinal investment, directed into 
repeatable forms by the recording apparatus, yields an affect which gives rise to a pre-
                                                
124 Lyotard, LE, 4. 
125 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, trans. Robert Hurley, Mark Seem, and Helen R. Lane 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1977), 4.  Translation modified.  Emphasis mine.  Hereafter 
AOE.  Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, L’Anti-Oedipe (Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit, 1972), 9-10.  
Hereafter AOE-Fr. 
  
 52 
subjective singularity.  The excessive sense that I am articulating as imperative sense is 
brought together here as the immediate duality of the originary libidinal event.126 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
126 I take the term “immediate duality” from Leonard Lawlor, Thinking Through French Philosophy: The 
Being of the Question (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003), 130-5. 
  
 53 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER TWO: EMBODIED SENSE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 54 
 In the Introduction, we isolated and described in detail what Lyotard calls the two 
heterogeneous orders of sense.  These two orders can be rigorously differentiated 
according to their spatiality (the profound space of the figure versus the flat space of 
discourse), their mode of negation (the distancing of figural sense versus the opposition 
within discourse), and the structure of their unconsciouses (unconsciousness of the act in 
figural sense versus the virtual, passive unconscious of discourse).  Figural sense, 
according to Lyotard, is best elucidated by phenomenology, and especially the 
phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty, while discursive sense is best described on the basis 
of Saussurian linguistics.  In the present chapter, I shall be concerned with figural sense 
and more specifically with its ambiguity.  I intend to show, primarily through a reading of 
Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception, that our originary opening out onto the 
world happens as an opening out onto irreducibly ambiguous sense, and that a kind of 
imperative is at work precisely in that opening out. 
 
I. Corporeality as Irreducible 
 
 From the outset, phenomenology has been oriented by the question of origins.  
Already in the Logical Investigations Husserl had established as an ideal for 
phenomenological research the principle of freedom from presuppositions.127  Ten years 
later, in “Philosophy as Rigorous Science,” Husserl expresses an even deeper 
commitment to the question of origins: “Philosophy . . . is essentially a science of true 
beginnings, of origins, of rizōmata pantōn.  The science concerned with what is radical 
                                                
127 Edmund Husserl, Logical Investigations, Volume 1, trans. J.N. Findlay (London: Routledge, 2001), 177-
9. Hereafter LI-1. 
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must from every point of view be radical itself in its procedure.  Above all it must not rest 
until it has attained its own absolutely clear beginnings. . . .”128  Phenomenology, if it is 
to be appropriately radical, must be a phenomenology of origins, in both senses of the 
genitive.  On the one hand, phenomenological discourse is a discourse about origins; it 
aims, by means of its own strict methodology, to disclose and to elucidate “the dimension 
of origin for all being.”129  On the other hand, this origin of which phenomenology speaks 
is also the origin from out of which it speaks.  The phenomenological method, which 
seeks to realize the task of first philosophy, is not itself first.  It is rather something 
motivated by the questionability of the origin to which it responds.  As essentially 
responsive, phenomenology can never hope to coincide with the origin it seeks; it can 
never exhaust the questionability that constitutes its own origin. 
 Owing to this responsiveness to the questionability of its origins, phenomenology 
has had from the first a practical orientation in addition to its more obvious theoretical 
concerns.  This practical theme becomes evident in “Philosophy as Rigorous Science,” 
and reaches its fullest expression in The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental 
Phenomenology.  According to Husserl, the dimension of the origin of being is just as 
much the dimension of the origin of our humanity.  The achievement of pure, originary 
knowledge, which constitutes the telos of philosophy as such, would thus not only satisfy 
our “loftiest theoretical needs” but would also render “possible from an ethico-religious 
point of view a life regulated by pure rational norms.”130  But this ideal, which Husserl 
calls the ideal of philosophy as rigorous science, has never been realized, even by the 
                                                
128 Edmund Husserl, Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy, trans. Quentin Lauer (New York: 
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129 Eugen Fink, Sixth Cartesian Meditation: The Idea of a Transcendental Theory of Method, trans. Ronald 
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ancient Greeks who first introduced it.  And what is worse, the philosophical tradition 
that has developed since Hegel, which is characterized by the prominence of naturalist 
and Weltanschauung philosophies, has moved further and further away from the ideal.  
Husserl believes that this situation constitutes a crisis: in the absence of a realized 
philosophy, and moreover in the absence even of progress toward a realized philosophy, 
human beings risk losing their faith in reason, which latter “ultimately gives meaning to 
everything that is thought to be, all things, values, and ends—their meaning understood 
as their normative relatedness to what, since the beginning of philosophy, is meant by the 
word ‘truth’. . . .”131  The recognition of this crisis in philosophy, and consequently in 
humanity itself, serves for Husserl as a kind of imperative to carry on the task of 
phenomenology.  Husserl gives expression to this imperative in a particularly spirited 
passage from the Crisis which demands quotation at length: 
But as philosophers of the present we have fallen into a painful existential 
contradiction.  The faith in the possibility of philosophy as a task, that is, in the 
possibility of universal knowledge, is something we cannot let go.  We know that we 
are called to this task as serious philosophers.  And yet, how do we hold onto this 
belief, which has meaning only in relation to the single goal which is common to us 
all, that is, philosophy as such? 
 We have also become aware in the most general way [through the foregoing 
reflections] that human philosophizing and its results in the whole of man’s existence 
mean anything but merely private or otherwise limited cultural goals.  In our 
philosophizing, then—how can we avoid it?—we are functionaries of mankind.  The 
quite personal responsibility of our own true being as philosophers, our inner personal 
vocation, bears within itself at the same time the responsibility for the true being of 
mankind; the latter is, necessarily, being toward a telos  and can only come to 
realization, if at all, through philosophy—through us, if we are philosophers in all 
seriousness.132 
 
In sum, the essence and telos of humanity is rationality, which has never been achieved at 
any point in history.  Nonetheless, this telos makes itself felt as an “ought-to-be.”133  
Phenomenology, as the necessary beginning point for any realized philosophy, happens 
                                                
131 Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, trans. David 
Carr (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970), 12-13.  Hereafter Crisis. 
132 Ibid., 17.  Emphasis and brackets in original. 
133 Ibid., 341. 
  
 57 
as the only appropriate response to this originary ought-to-be.  Phenomenology must 
reinvigorate humanity’s faith in reason, and thus its faith in itself and in its appointed 
task.134 
 In order to carry out this task, phenomenology must effect a critique of reason.135  
If previous attempts at philosophy have fallen short of the ideal and have thus brought 
about the crisis to which Husserl feels compelled to respond, this is because they have 
failed to secure their own foundations, the rizōmata pantōn.  Phenomenology, as a 
critique of reason, must begin “from the ground up with a foundation free of doubt.”  
From there the edifice of knowledge must rise up “like any skillful construction, wherein 
stone is set upon stone, each as solid as the other. . . .”136  Failing this, the task of radical 
self-responsibility to which Husserl so often refers, and in accordance with which we 
must both judge and act in the world only on the basis of strictly rational norms, will 
necessarily remain uncompleted. 
 The first and methodologically most important step for the critique of reason is to 
gain access to the dimension in which being is given originarily.  Phenomenology must 
not adopt the modes of access proposed by any existing philosophical systems or special 
sciences since, ex hypothesi, all of these have failed.  Their failure consists precisely in 
their inability to secure the appropriate beginning point.  More specifically, the paradoxes 
and contradictions that have plagued previous attempts at philosophy arise from their 
grounding in the natural attitude.  In order, then, to arrive at a more secure foundation, 
                                                
134 For a closely reasoned account of the relation between Husserlian phenomenology’s concern for 
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phenomenology must “put out of action the general positing which belongs to the essence 
of the natural attitude.”  That is, it must refuse to accept as originary “the whole natural 
world which is continually ‘there for us,’ ‘on hand,’ and which will always remain there 
according to consciousness as an ‘actuality’ even if we choose to parenthesize it.”137  
This putting into parentheses is not, of course, the same as the skeptical denial of the 
external world, for such a denial is itself a thesis which takes its bearings from the natural 
attitude.  It is instead simply a refusal to accept as originary the world as it appears to 
naïve, uncriticized cognition.  
 This reduction of the world as given in the natural attitude opens up the way to the 
dimension of origins.  In one respect, to be sure, natural reality does come first: our de 
facto understanding of the world always begins with our relation to what is given 
unproblematically and as a matter of course.  Nonetheless, phenomenology demonstrates 
that what is first for us is second in itself.  We must not assume that “the ordo et connexio 
rerum necessarily conform[s] to the ordo et connexio idearum.”138  Reality, which is first 
for us, has no being at all considered in itself.  Rather what the phenomenological 
reduction reveals is that reality “has the essentiality of something which, of necessity, is 
only intentional, only an object of consciousness, something presented [Vorstelliges] in 
the manner peculiar to consciousness, something apparent <as apparent.>”139  The 
essence of natural reality is to be given, to be presented.  We pass over this essence in the 
natural attitude, however, because our attention is directed straightforwardly to the given 
things and not to their modes of givenness.140  The structures in accordance with which 
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natural reality is given thus constitute what is first in itself.  As we saw in the 
Introduction, the originary space of givenness is the intentionality proper to 
transcendental subjectivity.  With this, Husserl arrives at what he takes to be a secure 
beginning: “The realm of transcendental consciousness as the realm of what is, in a 
determined sense, ‘absolute’ being, has been provided us by the phenomenological 
reduction.  It is the primal category of all being (or, in our terminology, the primal 
region), the one in which all other regions of being are rooted, to which, according to 
their essence, they are relative and on which they are therefore all essentially 
dependent.”141 
 According to Husserl, nothing whatever is lost in the reduction and in the turn to 
transcendental subjectivity for which it opens the way.  That is, the things encountered in 
the natural attitude obviously do not cease to be once the reduction has been performed.  
This is true for physical objects, other human beings, cultural and historical objects, and 
anything else that appears in naïve, uncriticized experience.  The only difference—and 
this makes all the difference for phenomenological method—is that these objects come to 
be thought strictly as phenomena, that is, in accordance with their essence as things 
presented.142  In this respect, phenomenology closely resembles the Cartesian philosophy, 
as both are wholly committed to the methodology of reflection.  According to Husserl 
“the phenomenological method operates exclusively in acts of reflection.”143  Reflection 
transforms things experienced as transcendent into phenomena immanent to the 
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consciousness that constitutes them as objects, as transcendent in the first place.  All 
naively experienced transcendencies are taken up into transcendental subjectivity, which 
is the originary dimension of their being. 
 Is it really the case, however, that everything given in the natural attitude as 
transcendent can be adequately reconceived as immanent to the transcendental 
subjectivity that constitutes it?  Is there really nothing, in other words, that resists the 
movement of reflection?  The answer, even for Husserl, is no.  The course of 
phenomenological investigation reveals the existence of a certain corporeality that resists 
the reduction to ideal subjectivity.  One sees this theme played out most prominently in 
the Second Book of Ideas.  There Husserl shows how absolute constituting consciousness 
is necessarily an embodied consciousness.144  This is not merely to suggest that 
transcendental consciousness has a body, which would somehow be its vehicle.  
Husserl’s claim is considerably more far-reaching: the body itself contributes essentially 
to the acts of constitution that give there to be objectivity as such.  An example of the role 
of corporeality at the heart of constituting consciousness concerns the orientation of 
objects.  Any material object that can become present to consciousness, whether it be in 
the mode of perception, imagination, recollection, etc., is given as oriented relative to a 
situated body.  That is, whatever is given presents itself as to my right or to my left, as 
approaching or receding.145  These characteristics of orientation belong to the sense of an 
                                                
144 Throughout Ideas II Husserl makes important use of the distinction between the German words Körper 
and Leib, both of which can be translated into English as body.  Körper refers to inanimate matter, as for 
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using the word in the sense of Leib. 
145 Edmund Husserl, Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, 
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objective material thing as such.  Phenomena of orientation point back to a situated body 
as “the bearer of the zero point of orientation, the bearer of the here and the now, out of 
which the pure Ego intuits space and the whole world of the senses.”146  If Husserl’s 
descriptions of embodiment in Ideas II are correct, then the body cannot be understood as 
one object among others.  A thoroughgoing effort of reduction can never reduce 
corporeality to our consciousness of corporeality; it can never render it wholly an object.  
Rather the reduction presents us with a corporeality that is neither subjective nor 
objective, neither constituting nor constituted, and neither transcendental nor worldly.  In 
sum, it presents us with corporeality as irreducible ambiguity. 
 
II. Duality and Unity of Intelligible Sense and Sensible Sense 
 
 In Phenomenology of Perception Merleau-Ponty takes up the account that Husserl 
gives in Ideas II concerning the body and its inextricable bond with constituting 
consciousness, articulating “an unthought-of element” in that work which nonetheless 
“opens out on something else.”147  While Husserl had demonstrated that our embodied 
being could not be entirely bracketed in the reduction to ideal, transcendental 
subjectivity, Merleau-Ponty argues even more radically that intentionality belongs to the 
very essence of corporeality.148  The difference between these two positions may seem 
slight, but its consequences are far reaching.  Despite his isolation in Ideas II of a certain 
corporeality within the absolute sphere of subjectivity, Husserl retained throughout his 
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career a commitment to the methodology of reflection and to the classically metaphysical 
conclusions to which it gives rise.  Thus in the Crisis, his last major work, Husserl still 
insists that the phenomenological reduction makes evident “the absolute correlation 
between beings of every sort and every meaning, on the one hand, and absolute 
subjectivity, as constituting meaning and ontic validity in the broadest manner, on the 
other hand.”149  Husserl continues to regard as basic the distinctions between subjectivity 
and objectivity, constituting consciousness and constituted world, intelligible sense and 
sensible sense.  The thesis of corporeal intentionality that Merleau-Ponty articulates 
throughout Phenomenology of Perception challenges the priority of these distinctions and 
in doing so renews the phenomenological project of returning to the most originary 
dimension of being.  In this context the quotation from Signs, referred to in the 
Introduction, takes on its full significance: “From Ideen II on it seems clear that reflection 
does not install us in a closed, transparent milieu, and that it does not take us (at least not 
immediately) from ‘objective’ to ‘subjective,’ but that its function is rather to unveil a 
third dimension in which this distinction becomes problematic.”150   
 In the introductory chapters of Phenomenology of Perception, collectively titled 
“Traditional Prejudices and the Return to Phenomena,” Merleau-Ponty shows that these 
traditionally metaphysical distinctions, and especially the distinction between intelligible 
sense and sensible sense, are not originary, but are rather abstractions from our more 
primordial relation to the world.  The first chapter, “The ‘Sensation’ as a Unit of 
Experience,” examines the idea of sensible sense in itself, completely uncontaminated by 
intelligible sense.  Such a pure sensation would be “the experience of an undifferentiated, 
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instantaneous, dotlike impact.”151  Of course, we are never presented with such pure, 
meaningless qualia in any actual experience; even the positivists’ minimalist patch of 
green is already qualified as a patch and as green.  We could not even imagine a pure 
sensation, precisely because we would imagine it as a pure sensation.  This demonstrates 
that sensation, whether given in the mode of perception, recollection, or even 
imagination, always already points beyond itself to some intelligible sense.  The 
imagined green patch points beyond itself to the intelligible signification “green”; if it did 
not, it could never have been given as a green patch in the first place.  Sensible sense, 
then, is always already contaminated by intelligible sense. 
 In the third chapter of the Introduction, titled “‘Attention’ and ‘Judgement’” 
Merleau-Ponty addresses the intellectualist thesis according to which intelligible sense 
has its origin entirely in acts of consciousness, and not at all in the sensible given.  
Intellectualism grounds itself on the obvious failure of the extreme kind of empiricism 
described above: since the intelligibility of things clearly cannot derive from mute, 
meaningless sense data, it must have its origin in consciousness.  In this way 
intellectualism appears to be a version of the philosophy of reflection described in the 
context of Husserlian phenomenology.  To return to a previous example, the green patch 
that seems to be given immediately in sensation is in fact nothing but the judgment that I 
am seeing a green patch.  That is, the significance of my seeing a green patch owes 
everything to an act of consciousness and nothing to the unmediated sensation of green 
that I seem to be having.  But this reflection of sensuous givenness into acts of judgment 
loses sight entirely of that which it was supposed to reflect.  It yields the surprising 
conclusion that all of our words that seem to refer to sensing—seeing, touching, 
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perceiving, etc.—turn out in fact to name acts of judgment.  Merleau-Ponty sums up this 
rather extreme position as follows: “Judgement is everywhere where pure sensation is 
not—that is, absolutely everywhere.”152 
 Merleau-Ponty objects to this thesis on the ground that it accounts very poorly for 
our actual experience in the world.  First, it cannot account for the undeniable experience 
we have of learning.  If consciousness “eternally possesses the intelligible structure of all 
its objects” then it is unclear how anything in the world could motivate its acts of 
attention and judgment.153  If we were not in some sense ignorant about things, we would 
have no motive to investigate and to learn about them.  This, of course, is another version 
of Meno’s paradox, which we discussed in the Introduction with regard to the problem of 
immanence and transcendence.  Second, if the intellectualist thesis were correct, then 
experiences of persistent ambiguity in the sensible given would never arise.  But of 
course they do.  Suppose that, fully aware of what I am doing, I draw a cube on a piece of 
paper.  I will find that the drawn figure presents itself ambiguously: it appears sometimes 
as if seen from the side and sometimes as if seen from above.  According to the 
intellectualist thesis, this can only be because I am alternating between two different 
judgments about the cube.  But I myself drew the cube knowing in advance its 
geometrical properties, which represent a kind of view from nowhere.  Intellectualism 
cannot account for why I experience the cube as ambiguous, why I seem always to view 
it from somewhere.154  Of course the answer is that the sensible, given cube motivates the 
ways that I direct my consciousness to it.  If this degree of receptiveness to the sensible 
given manifests itself in cases in which I have explicitly constructed the given, we can be 
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certain that the contribution of sensible sense to intelligibility is irreducible in experience 
generally. 
 Husserl’s phenomenology marks an important advance concerning the relation 
between these two categories.  This is especially clear in his conception of sense-
bestowal (Sinngebung).  To be sure, Husserl’s account does privilege the active moment 
of sense-bestowal, in which consciousness intends unities of sense.  Under the 
phenomenological reduction, we will recall, the essence of consciousness was revealed as 
consciousness of something, as intentionality.  Correlatively, the object of consciousness, 
that of which consciousness is conscious, comes to be clarified according to its essence as 
something presented, as noema.  It follows directly from this that “every intentive mental 
process is precisely noetic, i.e., it is its essence to include within itself something such as 
sense.”155  That is to say, according to its essence as intentional, consciousness 
necessarily bears meaning within itself.  To be conscious of something just is to intend 
the sense of an intentional object.  For example, as I write these words I am conscious of 
the notebook in which I am writing.  As soon as I turn my gaze to the notebook, I am 
presented with a multiplicity of sensuous, hyletic data.  I then “animate” these data by 
intending across their adumbrations the unity of sense “notebook.”  Without this power to 
intend unities of sense there could be no consciousness; I could never perceive, recall, 
anticipate, or even desire a notebook or any other determinate something.  
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 Despite his emphasizing the active moment of sense-bestowal, however, Husserl 
also recognizes that the intention of unities of sense cannot be indifferent to the 
specificity of the hyletic data that come to be animated.  That is to say, consciousness 
does not bestow sense arbitrarily.  Rather the hyletic data present the thing that comes to 
be grasped in its intelligible unity.  They motivate and sustain the sense-bestowal.  Sense 
data, then, are never experienced as undifferentiated, meaningless impressions.  This is 
especially evident in cases where we have been mistaken in our bestowals of sense.  
Suppose, for example, that I catch sight of a person approaching from a distance.  The 
person seems to be tall, slender, and blonde.  On the basis of these data I come to intend 
the person as my friend Paul, who is indeed tall, slender, and blonde.  As the person 
comes nearer, however, I realize that I am mistaken, that I am not in fact seeing my friend 
Paul but rather some other person whom I do not know.  When this change in sense-
bestowal occurs, the hyletic data do not remain stubbornly what they were; instead they 
come to motivate a new, more adequately founded sense-bestowal.  Try as I might, I am 
no longer able to intend “Paul” across the adumbrations that present this person to me.  
This demonstrates an irreducible receptivity right at the heart of the activity by which 
consciousness grants meaning to things and reveals, in Husserl’s words, “a remarkable 
duality and unity of sensuous ‘ύλη and intentive µορφή.”156 
 
III. Ambiguous Sense and Corporeal Intentionality 
 
 When Husserl’s meaning-giving, world-constituting intentionality comes to be 
reconceived as belonging to the essence of corporeality, as it is in Merleau-Ponty’s 
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Phenomenology of Perception, then our conception of the nature of the Sinngebung must 
be revised accordingly, rendering that “remarkable duality and unity of sensuous ‘ύλη and 
intentive µορφή” even more remarkable.  What will become apparent as we follow 
Merleau-Ponty’s descriptive accounts of our opening out onto the world of sense is that 
the body is necessarily the site of an ambiguous intentionality.  We will see moreover that 
this ambiguous intentionality reveals the originality of a dimension of ambiguous sense, 
within which we as embodied subjects find ourselves situated prior to all reflection.  The 
two categories of sense described above—intelligible sense and sensible sense, or in 
Husserl’s vocabulary, intentive sense and hyletic sense—will come to be recognized as 
abstractions from this original dimension of ambiguous sense.  Finally, we will be able to 
see the ways in which this ambiguous sense functions also as a kind of imperative sense. 
 Before we move on to a detailed account of the body as site of ambiguous 
intentionality, it would be well to offer at least some preliminary remarks concerning how 
the concept of ambiguity ought not to be understood as it figures in Phenomenology of 
Perception.  (To appreciate the more positive sense of the term will require our following 
Merleau-Ponty through his descriptions of our embodied opening out onto the world, 
which we will take up presently.)  Most basically, ambiguity ought not to be understood 
as something negative: it does not refer to a provisional lack of clarity that will be 
corrected during the course of phenomenological investigation.  As we will see, Merleau-
Ponty’s thesis of the primacy of our embodied opening out onto the world rejects this 
conception explicitly.  Ambiguity is rather to be conceived as a positive phenomenon in 
its own right.  Merleau-Ponty will attempt to show that our most originary being-in-the-
world happens ambiguously, and that attempts to eliminate this ambiguity return us to the 
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traditional prejudices refuted in the introductory chapters.  The second point that must be 
made about the thesis of ambiguity is that it ought not to be conceived exclusively with 
reference to the dualisms that it rejects.  That is to say, it is not simply the case that 
ambiguity names the phenomenon of neither/nor, for example neither subject nor object, 
neither intelligible nor sensible, neither immanent nor transcendent, neither finite nor 
universal, etc.157  Again, such an understanding reverses the sense of Merleau-Ponty’s 
contention.  It is not at all the case, according to Merleau-Ponty, that the various dualisms 
enjoy an ontological priority relative to which ambiguity would need to be understood.  
Rather it is ambiguity that is first; the dualisms emerge only on the basis of it.  Merleau-
Ponty refers to this “neither/nor” conception of ambiguity as the “bad ambiguity.”  By his 
own admission, he had only succeeded in articulating the bad ambiguity in 
Phenomenology of Perception.158  Nonetheless, the trajectory of his thinking moves 
undeniably in the direction of the “good ambiguity” which characterizes the dimension of 
origin for our being-in-the-world, and which is already on the horizon in the earlier 
work.159 
 Having suspended the traditional dualisms of subjectivity and objectivity, 
intelligible sense and sensible sense, that characterize the philosophy of reflection, 
Merleau-Ponty undertakes a fundamental redescription of our opening out onto the world.  
Philosophies of reflection, according to Merleau-Ponty, tend to take their stand in the 
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results of reflection, leaving behind both the process of reflection and that which 
originally motivated that process.  This is not to say, though, that reflection as such is a 
philosophical mistake.  It means rather that reflection must be carried out more 
thoroughly, that it must be expanded into what Merleau-Ponty calls radical reflection:160 
“Reflection cannot be thorough-going, or bring elucidation of its object, if it does not 
arrive at awareness of itself as well as of its results.  We must not only install ourselves in 
a reflective attitude, in an impregnable Cogito, but must furthermore reflect on this 
reflection, understand the natural situation which it is conscious of succeeding and which 
is therefore part of its definition.”161  The reduction, in other words, is entirely necessary:  
one does not achieve an understanding of the unreflected world by attempting to coincide 
with it in an unthinkable immediacy.  The reduction rather constitutes a stepping back 
which allows the unreflected to become manifest as such.  We must not, however, come 
to accept the results of reflection as giving unproblematically the truth of the unreflected, 
for we never free ourselves existentially from its firstness; we only seem to do so in our 
abstractions.  For Merleau-Ponty, then, “the most important lesson which the reduction 
teaches us is the impossibility of a complete reduction.”162  In redirecting our attention to 
“the world [that] is always ‘already there’ before reflection begins, as an inalienable 
presence” Merleau-Ponty takes up and radicalizes the characteristic phenomenological 
orientation toward the question of origins.163 
 This originary dimension which is always already there this side of reflection, and 
which first calls for reflection, has its locus in what Merleau-Ponty calls the corps propre, 
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the lived body.  The lived body must be rigorously distinguished from the objective, 
worldly body as well as from the transcendental subjectivity that would merely “have” a 
body.  Both of these conceptions belong to the various dualisms that Merleau-Ponty 
suspends in order to reach the level of the phenomenon.  The lived body is neither simply 
subject nor simply object, but is rather the locus of an ambiguous corporeal intentionality. 
 The ambiguity of the lived body is made manifest in an especially striking way in 
the case of one hand touching the other.164  Suppose, for example, that I run my left hand 
slowly up and down the fretboard of a guitar that I am interested in purchasing, in order 
to get a feel for the quality of its construction.  It is not at all difficult for me to 
comprehend my body in this situation as playing the role of subject: I am making use of 
the tactile surfaces of my body in order to realize a project that I have actively taken up.  
As long as I am absorbed in this project I do not feel like an object.  While it is true that I 
can only gather tactile sensations from the guitar to the extent that I make myself 
receptive to those sensations, i.e., to the extent that I let myself be touched by the guitar, I 
nonetheless do not concern myself with this aspect as long as my active sense-bestowal, 
my concern with the quality of the guitar, dominates the experience.  But now suppose 
that with my right hand I touch my left hand while the latter is still touching the guitar.  
Immediately the straightforwardly subjective orientation of my left hand is interrupted as 
it becomes in addition an object for my right hand.  In this case the phenomenon that had 
previously been unattended to, viz., that touching entails being touched, becomes 
manifest right there in the felt ambiguity of touching-being-touched.  This touching-
being-touched is a unitary phenomenon, as indicated by the hyphens.   That is to say, I do 
not experience my left hand alternately as a fully constituted worldly object and as a 
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constituting subjectivity, as a description guided by the “bad ambiguity” would dictate.  
Rather in the phenomenon of touching-being-touched, the very same body which seemed 
originally to give me the world is revealed as also something already given in the world, 
as something non-posited, stubbornly there prior to all constitution.   
 The phenomenon of touching-being-touched, of the irreducible ambiguity of the 
lived body, makes manifest our rootedness prior to all reflection in an originary ek-stase.  
This originary ek-stase, which I have been calling corporeal intentionality, must not be 
conceived as a gap between the subject and the object, as if these latter enjoyed a kind of 
ontological priority.  Rather it is the ek-stase that is originary, that happens as the spacing 
within which subject and object can appear at all.  This ek-stase happens right at the level 
of the lived body.  In the privileged phenomenon of touching-being-touched I experience 
“the perpetual beginning of reflection,” the very advent of the difference-from-self that 
comes to be fixed in the traditional oppositions of subject and object, intelligible and 
sensible.165 
 This can be clarified with reference to our previous example.  On the one hand, 
the lived body certainly puts me in contact with a world that is already there without my 
having constituted it.  When I inspect the guitar with my touch, I feel myself to be in 
direct contact with the thing itself: I am not merely feeling my own representations, but 
rather the very particular texture of this wood.  If this is not sufficiently certain on the 
basis of the lived experience alone, then I can also know that my lived body puts me in 
contact with something transcendent simply because I must touch the wood as it demands 
to be touched.  If I move my hand either too slowly or too quickly over the surface of the 
fretboard, I will not feel its texture and will therefore fail in my objective.  In short, I 
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cannot touch the guitar without touching according to it.  On the other hand, this very 
same touch that puts me in direct contact with the world also gives me immediately to 
myself.  The tactile sensations of a guitar are just as much tactile sensations of myself as 
touched by the guitar.  If I could not touch myself touching the guitar, then I could not 
properly speaking touch the guitar at all, any more than my books touch the shelves on 
which they sit.  We experience right at the level of the lived body, prior to the categories 
of reflection that would make of it a subject or an object, an ambiguous unity of 
centrifugal and centripetal orientations:  in “going out” into the world, we equally “return 
into” ourselves.  But of course we neither really go out nor return.  Rather we are this 
spacing, this originary ek-stase. 
 The categories of subject and object emerge only as abstractions from this 
originary dimension.  From my experienced certainty of contact with a world that is not 
reducible to my private representations I generalize to the hypothesis of an objective 
reality independent of my consciousness of it.  And from the centripetal orientation of my 
embodied relation to the world I conclude that all being is ultimately being-for-me.  As 
Merleau-Ponty notes in The Visible and the Invisible, “the ‘natural’ man holds on to both 
ends of the chain, thinks at the same time that his perception enters into the things and 
that it is formed this side of his body.”166  These natural convictions, along with the 
empiricist-realist and intellectualist theses that develop them, would be unthinkable 
without the originary ek-stase that sustains them.  If in remaining within myself I did not 
also transcend myself into the world, I could have no experience whatever, and thus no 
conception of immanence and transcendence, subjectivity and objectivity. 
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 In the phenomenon of the lived body we experience ourselves as rooted in an 
originary, ambiguous sense.  Our unreflected being-in-the-world takes place within the 
element of what Merleau-Ponty calls the “nascent logos.”167  That is to say, our originary 
opening out onto the world cannot be adequately articulated in terms of the reflected 
categories of intelligible sense and sensible sense.  Merleau-Ponty describes our bodily 
ambiguity succinctly when he writes that the body “is always something other than what 
it is.”168  On the one hand, we might be tempted to think that the body resolves itself into 
the unity of its intelligible sense, into the idea of the body.  But as we have seen, such a 
reflective attention to the body always arrives too late: I can intend my body as a unity of 
meaning only because my body has always already been there, giving me to myself in the 
first place.  The intended unity of intelligible sense, then, is sustained by another sense 
that presents it and that it cannot recover in the act of reflection.  On the other hand, we 
might think of the body simply as the most immediately given sensible.  But this sensible 
givenness cannot be thought according to the model of the brute, self-identical quale, 
since the body is sensibly given for itself.  This mutual reference that first constitutes the 
two kinds of sense is the nascent logos. The sensible given is never an intrinsically 
meaningless hyle, but rather opens out toward a meaning.  The left hand that I touch with 
my right is not given as a bundle of sense qualia for me to animate, but rather as my own 
left hand, or even as my own left hand touching the guitar.  In my experience of the lived 
body, I find myself always between sensible and intelligible sense without ever coming to 
a rest in either.  This between, this ambiguous sense, however, is ontologically prior to 
the reflected senses of sense that it sustains. 
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 To describe originary ambiguous sense as a nascent logos is to address in a new 
way the pre-eminently phenomenological question: how, anterior to the natural attitude 
and to the categories of reflection to which it gives rise, do beings become manifest?  
Merleau-Ponty’s answer, as suggested by his account of the lived body and of its 
experience of touching-being-touched, is that beings are given as gesturing toward a 
signification with which, however, they never wholly coincide.  My ambiguously 
intentional body brings to light the guitar as such, as a significant part of a significant 
world.  But owing to the irreducible centripetal orientation of my embodied being-in-the-
world, I never reach the guitar as a fully transparent signification.  In the very act by 
which I transcend myself toward the guitar as promised intelligibility, I find myself 
subjected to the guitar, as stopped up in myself.  This being-subjected is manifest as an 
opacity that I am unable to reflect.  Thus, my sensuous opening out on to the world truly 
happens as a perpetually nascent logos, a logos always promised but always withheld. 
 To an extent, this conception of the nascent logos follows from what we have 
already discussed.  We have seen that originary sense is not the unity of meaning 
intended across a multiplicity of hyletic data.  Nor is it the mute quale that would affect 
the sentient body from without.  What both these conceptions of sense have in common is 
complete presence to consciousness.  The philosophy of reflection grounds itself on the 
insight that my thought, as opposed to anything that might be given in or by that thought, 
is immediately present to me.  While the sensible cube appears only through 
adumbrations that suggest but do not immediately give the cube as a unity, the intelligible 
sense that I intend is given all at once.  Likewise, the pure quale gives itself immediately 
and without reserve.  If I mistake the given quale for something else, then I have 
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committed an error in judgment, for the quale as such is unambiguous; it is no more than 
it gives itself to be.  If neither of these kinds of sense is originary, if both are rather 
abstractions from a more primordial ambiguous sense, then clearly originary sense will 
have the kind of density and opacity characteristic of the nascent logos. 
 But this description is still too negative, taking the form of neither/nor that 
characterized the “bad ambiguity.”  Merleau-Ponty offers a more positive description in 
the chapter of Phenomenology of Perception titled “The Body in its Sexual Being” (“Le 
Corps Comme Être Sexué”).  The purpose of the chapter is to demonstrate that beings 
come to exist for us not through sensation or through intellection, but rather more 
originarily through an opaque affectivity.  “If then we want to bring to light the genesis of 
being for us, we must finally look to that area of our experience which clearly has sense 
and reality only for us, and that is our affective life.  Let us try to see how an object or a 
being begins to exist for us through desire or love and we shall thereby come to 
understand how objects and beings can exist in general.”169  Nowhere is this emergence 
of beings through affectivity more evident than in our sexual being-in-the-world.  We can 
recognize here a kind of erotic intentionality which is not at all the self-conscious 
positing of unities of sense across hyletic data.  “Erotic perception is not a cogitatio 
which aims at a cogitatum.”170  To encounter another person as seductive is not, in other 
words, primarily to predicate seductiveness of him or her.  Rather I grasp the erotic sense 
of this seductive person with my own ambiguous intentional body.  I am able to perceive 
the other as seductive only because he or she evokes in my body the postural schema 
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necessary to take up the erotic situation that is presented to me.171   We do not understand 
the sexual gestures of animals in anything resembling the way we grasp the incarnate 
sense of human sexual drama.  Moreover, infants do not understand the sense of the 
sexual activity that they witness, but are rather likely to interpret it as aggression.172  In 
both these cases, the inability to grasp the erotic sense of a situation has its origin in the 
inability of the perceiving body to take up that situation and live it as its own. 
 Erotic intentionality can only be the intentionality of an irreducibly ambiguous 
body.173  In order even to recognize a situation as erotically charged, I must be able to 
experience the ambiguous unity of centrifugal and centripetal orientations that 
characterizes our most originary embodied being-in-the-world.  On the one hand, I must 
perform a kind of Sinngebung.  Freud has shown us that human sexuality is meaningful 
through and through, that it cannot be reduced to a set of biological or mechanical 
functions.174  When I find another person sexually attractive, I am not merely reacting to 
objectively existing sexual stimuli.  What attracts is not simply a body, but rather a 
stylized, meaningful body.  In the other, I recognize the embodiment of a culture, a social 
and economic class, a level of education, an aesthetic style, an erotic style, etc.  Across 
these data—or better, across these expressions, these incarnate senses—I intend the other 
as an erotic object.  With this sense-bestowal the object takes on a new meaning for me 
and at the same time opens up a world of possible future meanings. 
 On the other hand, this erotic Sinngebung also demands a centripetal orientation; 
one cannot be an erotic subject without at the same time being an erotic object.  Although 
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human sexuality is saturated with meaning, it is certainly not reducible to it.  Thus, to 
take up and to live an erotic situation as such, it does not suffice merely to intend the 
other as a sexual object.  I must also make of myself a lure for the gaze of the other, and 
thus take on the role of object.  Intentionality is revealed in this erotic situation as a kind 
of active passivity.  Just as in touching the guitar I allow myself to be touched by it, so in 
transcending myself toward the erotic other I encounter myself as seen by the other.  This 
centripetal orientation, which is inseparable from the centrifugal one, is experienced as a 
dense, opaque affect that resists reflection into a fully self-present signification.  The 
possibility for this affect is given by the ambiguous, intentional body.  “At the very 
moment when I live in the world, when I am given over to my projects, my occupations, 
my friends, my memories, I can close my eyes, lie down, listen to the blood pulsating in 
my ears, lose myself in some pleasure or pain, and shut myself up in this anonymous life 
which subtends my personal one.”175  In the context of sexuality, this anonymous opacity 
can be called voluptuousness.  Far from being a mere side effect of erotic sense, this pre-
personal, pre-worldly voluptuousness is more nearly its consummation.  But this passive 
consummation is inseparable from the active erotic sense-bestowal; for corporeal 
intentionality every act doubles back on itself and is experienced as a voluptuousness that 
interrupts the order of intelligible sense always already.   
 The careful elucidation that Merleau-Ponty gives of our erotic intentionality is not 
meant merely as a description of one isolated component of our total being-in-the-world.  
The ambiguity of the centrifugal and centripetal orientations of corporeal intentionality 
which is revealed so clearly in sexuality is in fact present in every modality of our 
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opening out onto the world.176  The ambiguity of corporeal intentionality is especially 
evident in sexuality owing to the prominent role of voluptuousness in that sphere of our 
lives.  But there is a kind of voluptuousness in all intentionality.  That is to say, every act 
of sense-bestowing transcendence into the world is accompanied by an affect that 
presents the subject to him- or herself, simultaneously as something significant and as 
something which resists that signification. 
 Let us take as an example my own role as a lecturer at the university.  In order for 
a university class to take place, I must intend its meaning; I must be able to take up the 
situation as what it is.  So, for example, I must understand the role requirements that all 
the participants of the situation must satisfy, as well as the purposes that the roles serve.  I 
know that a lecturer in general must come to each class prepared to lecture on or discuss 
a specified portion of the subject matter.  I know that students in general must comport 
themselves in more or less explicitly understood ways that are conducive to their being 
educated.  This set of role requirements, which is of course greatly truncated for the 
purpose of exposition, constitutes the intelligible sense of a university class.  If I could 
not intend this meaning, I could not even conceive of being a lecturer.  One becomes an 
actual lecturer by conforming one’s behavior to this set of idealities. 
 But I can never really be the lecturer as such; I can never be a mere instance of 
“lecturer” as intended unity of sense.  This is because of the centripetal orientation that is 
included in any sense-bestowing intentionality.  To stand at the front of the classroom 
and to look out onto the class as constituted unity of meaning is equally to see myself as 
seen within the context of that meaning.  Here again, intentionality is revealed as a kind 
of active passivity.  Standing before the class, I feel myself subjected to the meaning that 
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I intend.  I must not only intend the meaning of a university class, but must give myself to 
be seen within the context of the class.  So, for example, I see myself being seen in the 
dress shirt, slacks, and tie that I wear.  I hear myself being heard as I adopt a particular 
tone of authority.  This mode of dress and this tone of voice are not external signs of my 
position within the university system, in the way that the numbers on a football player’s 
jersey represent the position he plays.  They rather stylize the role of lecturer, giving it a 
particular expression.  Expression for Merleau-Ponty names an incarnate sense, a 
meaning that is inseparable from the opaque materiality that presents it.  One is presented 
to oneself and to others only through such a stylization or expression.  It is in seeing 
myself being seen in a dress shirt, slacks, and tie that I become present to myself as a 
competent and professional lecturer.  Although one becomes a lecturer by conforming 
one’s conduct to the set of idealities that constitutes the meaning “lecturer in general,” I 
become a lecturer only through an affectivity that emerges in my own necessarily situated 
and stylized response to that meaning. 
 
IV. Sense and the Imperative of the World 
 
 The ambiguous, embodied sense within which we find ourselves rooted always 
already, prior to all reflection, is also an imperative sense.  We have seen in a number of 
different contexts that our sense-bestowing transcendence into the world is 
equiprimordially an obedience to that world.  Merleau-Ponty has demonstrated that we do 
not open originarily out onto a world of meaningless sense data, which we would 
subsequently animate in our acts of judgment.  Nor do we open directly onto a world of 
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fully determinate significations.  Both of these rejected theses posit as originary a world 
of sense that is self-identical and that makes no demands on the subject who would open 
out onto it.  The pure quale of the empiricist is nothing more than what it gives itself to 
be; it opens onto nothing other than itself.  If the empiricist were to postulate an 
imperative to know the world of qualia, then this imperative would have to originate 
wholly on the side of the knowing subject.  But since, ex hypothesi, these qualia give only 
themselves, then anything further that cognition might make of them would be essentially 
unmotivated, and hence not even knowledge.  The subject would need to be understood 
in this case as obligating him- or herself to know a world that does not give itself to be 
known.  On the other hand, if we opened directly onto a world of determinate 
significations, then again the world would have nothing to teach us.  It would be arrayed 
before us in full transparency, leaving the subject nothing to do but to behold it. 
 Merleau-Ponty has shown, through the kind of radical reflection described above, 
that originary sense is a nascent logos, an incarnate sense that opens out onto a promised 
intelligible sense while at the same time holding it in reserve, withdrawing into the 
opacity and density of sensuous sense.  This ambiguous sense does make a demand on 
the subject.  The house that I perceive from the front presents itself as holding itself in 
reserve, as promising more intelligibility than it offers from the frontal perspective alone.  
This presentation and this promise are addressed to a mobile and intentional body, which 
can fulfill the promise only by orienting its perceptions according to the house itself.  The 
sensibly-given house can have this power of summoning the intentional body only 
because of its irreducible ambiguity.  On the one hand, the embodied subject finds its 
gaze stopped in the dense materiality of the house.  This opacity serves as the most 
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primordial evidence that the perceiving subject achieves direct contact with a 
transcendent world.  But the opacity of the given house is not the infinitely dense, self-
identical being of the quale.  Rather the house is given as a solid, material reality that 
points constitutively beyond itself toward its own ideal signification.  Merleau-Ponty 
describes concisely the intimate relation between these two moments of the sensibly 
given when he writes that “the aseity of a thing, its unchallengeable presence and the 
perpetual absence into which it withdraws, are two inseparable aspects of 
transcendence.”177 Ambiguous sense thus functions both as anchor for the perceptual 
orientation of a fundamentally intentional body and as a summons to that body for further 
anchored perceptions.  It is this anchoring and drawing power of ambiguous sense that 
makes of it also an imperative sense. 
 Opening out onto a world, then, requires much more than simply opening one’s 
eyes.  It is not at all the case that the world is already there, fully formed, waiting only for 
a subject who would turn his or her attention to it.  Rather one must know how to see the 
world.  This knowledge belongs not to the pure mind or intellect—whatever these might 
be—but rather to a body that knows how to orient itself relative to a world which 
demands of it a certain postural schema, a certain focus, a certain angle and distance of 
vision, in order adequately to be seen.  Perception, then, can never be accounted for 
solely in terms of the categories of reflection.  I do not call upon the reflective science of 
optics in order explicitly to direct my body into the position requisite for seeing the 
notebook in which I write.  Rather, I am able even to conceive of something like a 
notebook only because my knowing body has already responded appropriately to its 
summons.  “In perception, we do not think the object and we do not think ourselves 
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thinking it; we are rather given over to the object and we merge into this body that is 
better informed than we are about the world, and about the motives we have and the 
means at our disposal for synthesizing it.”178  The notebook, then, is there for me first as a 
nascent logos, as a sensuously experienced something that suggests, but never resolves 
itself into, an ideal signification.  And this originary, nascent logos is conceivable only as 
given to a fundamentally knowing, intentional body. 
 This conception of our ambiguous opening out onto the world is supported by 
case studies of persons who have been blind from a very young age and who have had 
their sight restored through surgery.  One would suppose, at least from the perspective of 
the natural attitude, that once the surgery had been completed and the bandages removed, 
the patients would look out immediately onto the same world as those who have been 
sighted their whole lives.  This, however, proves not to be the case.  The world onto 
which the newly-sighted person first looks is a world of scarcely determinate colors and 
forms; the patient finds him- or herself unable to see coherent, integral things, but only 
the sensory qualities which, under normal conditions, would present those things.  
Merleau-Ponty, quoting from Marius von Senden’s Space and Sight, presents a 
particularly striking case of this inability to encounter a visual thing: after the operation, 
“form as given by sight is for these patients something quite new which they fail to relate 
to their tactile experience”, “the patient states that he can see, but does not know what he 
sees. . . .  He never recognizes his hand as such, and talks only about a moving, white 
patch.”179  One might suppose that the patient could recognize at least his own hand, 
which he must have long since learned to feel as an integral whole, and not as a medley 
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of incoherent sense data.  That he could not suggests very strongly that perception 
amounts to much more than simply opening one’s eyes, that it names an ambiguous, 
essentially cooperative relation to the world.180 
 It is important to understand precisely why the post-operative patients are unable 
to see coherent things.  Is it because their eyes are not yet coordinated in the manner 
necessary for seeing things?  Or is it rather because the visual field is itself confused, 
offering nothing stable at which they could fix their gazes?  It seems to be a matter here 
of determining “whether they fail to see through failure to focus, or whether they fail to 
focus through not having anything to see.”181  The answer, of course, is that both of these 
are true simultaneously.  On the one hand, it is certainly true that the newly-sighted 
person does not yet know how to focus his eyes in such a way as to see things, as 
opposed merely to colors, shapes, and movement.  His prior relation to the world had 
been primarily tactile; he came to know this world by running his hand over the surfaces 
of things.  When, after the surgery, he is able to see, he naturally attempts this same 
movement with his eyes.  The case reported by Von Senden is once again exemplary: “To 
distinguish by sight a circle from a rectangle, he has to run his eyes round the outline of 
the figure, as he might with his hand. . . .”182  But of course one does not see a thing the 
same way that one feels it, namely little by little, segment by segment.  One sees a thing 
by fixing on its Gestalt, on its integral sensuous physiognomy, just as one reads by taking 
in at one glance whole meaningful units, and not by moving the gaze successively from 
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left to right, letter by letter.183  Thus it is certainly true to say that the newly-sighted 
person fails to see things owing to a failure to focus his eyes in the ways necessary to see 
them. 
 As it stands, however, this explanation remains abstract and one-sided.  The act of 
focusing presupposes something in the world that gives itself to be focused on.  All 
focusing, in other words, is prospective; we focus only with the expectation that 
something given as vague, as a nascent object, will become something given “in the 
flesh,” as a fully coherent thing.184  This coming-into-being of the thing demands a 
cooperation between the perceiver and the perceived, such that the perceiver takes up the 
summons of the nascent logos to which he most originarily opens out.  It is not, in other 
words, the thing in itself which gives itself to be seen, but rather a thing whose very being 
is to be presented to an embodied subject.  “To this extent, every perception is a 
communication or a communion, the taking up or completion by us of some extraneous 
intention or, on the other hand, the complete expression outside ourselves of our 
perceptual powers and a coition, so to speak, of our body with things.”185  Thus it is true 
as well that the newly-sighted person fails to focus through not having anything to focus 
on.  To speak more generally and more phenomenologically, we might say that a 
coherent world can be given only to a subject who can intend unities of sense across 
sensuous hyle that evoke and sustain that sense.  In the case at hand, the failure of the 
patient to see such a world cannot be localized on the subjective side (failure to focus) or 
on the objective side (lack of something to focus on), but must rather be located beneath 
this duality, at the more originary level where they are not yet distinct.  The patient’s lack 
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of embodied knowledge and the world’s seeming failure to provide anything that would 
motivate that knowledge are not two separate phenomena, but rather a failure within the 
structure of phenomenality as such. 
 These case studies concerning restored vision demonstrate that originary sense 
plunges the perceiving subject immediately into the world.  But it is important to clarify 
here what we mean by world.  Most basically, the world is that which is there, prior to all 
reflection, as the horizon for all of the subject’s perceptual experiences.186  Perception, 
which provides us with our most originary openness to being, is defined by Merleau-
Ponty as the appearance of a figure against a background.187  This background is the 
world, the horizon presupposed in the givenness of anything whatever.  Owing to the 
elementary figure/background structure of perception, anything that is given to the 
perceiving subject is given only as referring beyond itself to its antepredicative setting.  
This, of course, explains why there can be no experience of pure sense data: they are 
wholly meaningless, wholly foreign to any possible world because, ex hypothesi, they 
make manifest nothing but themselves.  Meaning emerges only in the reference of a 
given to its horizons, and this reference happens right at the level of sense.  The white 
that I sense before me is immediately the white of the page on which I write.  The depth I 
sense before me is immediately the depth of the notebook.  And, shifting away for a 
moment from our exclusive emphasis on vision, the purring that I hear is immediately the 
purring of my cat, who is lying on my arm as I write.  By “immediately,” I do not mean 
to suggest that the white just is the paper, that the purring just is the cat.  I mean rather to 
emphasize that the sensuous givens themselves refer beyond themselves; I do not first 
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encounter whiteness and then perform a separate act of intellection wherein I judge the 
whiteness to belong to the paper.  The sensuously given whiteness itself motivates my 
seeing it as the whiteness of the paper.  In sum, to perceive anything whatever is 
necessarily to perceive a meaningful world. 
 The world that is presented along with the sensuously given is presented as an 
imperative, as a demand for unity addressed to our sentient and sensible bodies.  The 
world is not given originarily as that completed, objective system that would be presented 
transparently and all at once in a view from nowhere.  Rather “the world is an open and 
indefinite unity in which I am situated. . . .”188  This indefinite unity is not presented as 
such to the perceiving subject, but as an ongoing task.  The case of perceptual illusion 
helps to bring out clearly this imperative of the world.  It often happens in the summer 
that when I am driving, I seem to encounter a thin sheet of water some distance further 
ahead on the road.  This appearance creates a perceptual imbalance: on the one hand, it 
does appear to be a thin sheet of water, but on the other hand, there is something I 
vaguely perceive as “wrong” in the appearance.  The perceived sheet of water actually 
gives itself as somehow “unreal,” not unlike the colored spots I see after I have looked 
into a bright light.  I experience the sheet of water as vaguely unreal because it seems to 
be entirely out of place there on the hot, otherwise dry road.  That is, given the choice 
(albeit an unconscious, bodily choice) between accepting the real existence of an 
appearance inconsistent with its worldly horizons on the one hand, and denying its real 
existence for the sake of a united, coherent world on the other, my perceiving body 
chooses the latter.  My body chooses this way because it has always already sided with 
the world, has always already oriented itself to its imperative. 
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 In denying the validity of the illusion, I do not take refuge in a purely intelligible 
world that I would posit as distinct from the apparent one.  Rather I respond to dubious 
appearances by supplementing them with more appearances.  I continue driving and 
when I approach the place where I thought I had seen the sheet of water, I see that it is 
not really there.  I accept this second appearance as authoritative for two intimately 
related reasons.  First, worldly things themselves demand to be seen from a certain 
perspective and not from others.  “For each object, as for each picture in an art gallery, 
there is an optimum distance from which it requires to be seen, a direction viewed from 
which it vouchsafes most of itself: at a shorter or greater distance we have merely a 
perception blurred through excess or deficiency.”189  I do not see a book, for example, 
when I place it a millimeter from my eyeball.  To be sure, I see something, but nothing 
that gives itself as a book.  Likewise, there is a range of privileged positions from which 
to observe a sheet of water; if the water does not appear from these perspectives, then it is 
the world itself that suggests the illusoriness of the appearance.  Second, I accept the later 
appearance as authoritative because it is consistent with the vast majority of appearances 
I would have of that place were I to survey it from every possible perspective.  I do not 
need actually to view the place from every possible perspective to know how it would 
appear.  In adopting one of the privileged perspectives on a thing, my body takes up in a 
virtual way all the others.  For example, in taking up a frontal view of the book, I know 
virtually, and not by an explicit act of judgment, that I would see its back side if I were 
either to turn the book around in my hands or to move my whole body around to its other 
side.  Again, we see that the sentient and sensible body is drawn, prior to all reflection, by 
the sensuously given world as imperative for unity and coherence. 
                                                
189 Merleau-Ponty, PP, 302; PP-Fr, 348. 
  
 88 
 The imperative of the world is not merely an imperative for maximal visual unity, 
as our example of optical illusion might suggest, but rather an imperative for full, 
intersensorial unity.  Worldly things do not engage the senses separately and discretely, 
but rather call upon the integrated sensory-motor powers of the whole body in order 
adequately to be experienced.  Merleau-Ponty describes the ways in which the different 
senses are “pregnant one with the other,” a remarkable phenomenon which sustains the 
antepredicative unity of the world.190  We quite literally hear the brittleness of the glass 
when it breaks and see the weight of the block of iron resting on the earth.191  Thus, he 
writes, “what I call experience of the thing or of reality—not merely of a reality-for-sight 
or a reality-for-touch, but an absolute reality—is my full co-existence with the 
phenomenon, at the moment when it is in every way at its maximum articulation, and the 
‘data of the different senses’ are oriented toward this one pole. . . .”192  If, for example, I 
hear someone calling my name, I fully expect to see the person who did so as soon as I 
turn my gaze in the direction from which the call originated.  Once I see and recognize 
the person who had called, I feel myself to be unchallengeably present to the real 
situation.  If, on the other hand, I turn and see no one, or at least no one who could 
possibly have been the one who called, then I conclude that I must have misheard, for in 
a coherent and unified world, disembodied and unlocalized voices do not call out my 
name.  If I continue to hear a call that I cannot localize, I will begin to feel unsettled.  I 
will either redouble my efforts to locate the source of the call or I will try very hard to 
pretend that I did not hear it.  The unsettled feeling and the options I have for dealing 
with it testify to the force of the imperative for intersensorial unity. 
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 It is this imperative that creates such difficulties for those who have recovered 
their sight after having spent most of their lives blind.  According to Marius von Senden, 
newly-sighted adults tend to arrive, after an initial period of exhilaration, at a 
“motivational crisis,” where they sincerely question whether they want to continue to live 
as sighted, or would rather return to their former lives as blind persons.  One patient is 
reported to have threatened to tear out his own eyes, so frightened was he of the new 
manner of taking up the world that sight required of him.193  Richard Gregory reports the 
case of one of his patients, S.B., as follows: 
We formed a strong impression that his sight was to him almost entirely 
disappointing.  It enabled him to do a little more . . . but it became clear that the 
opportunities it afforded him were less that he had imagined. . . .  He still to a great 
extend lived the life of a blind man, sometimes not bothering to put on the light at 
night. . . .194 
 
S.B. became deeply depressed shortly following the surgery, and within two years he was 
dead.  Oliver Sacks reports the case of one of his own patients, Virgil.  Following his 
operation, Virgil was able to see and to identify colors quite well, and shapes somewhat 
less well.  He was especially interested in cars, which he perceived as moving masses of 
color.  But Virgil had a very difficult time correlating the colors and shapes that he saw 
with the coherent and determinate world that he had long since learned to experience 
through touch.  Thus, although he was fascinated by the colors and shapes of cars, he 
could not identify the one that belonged to his wife.195  He could perceive the discrete 
parts of his cat—its paws, head, tail, etc.—but could not synthesize these into the 
perception of one integral cat.196  In sum, Virgil had a very difficult time experiencing the 
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world as an intersensorial unity.  Like many newly-sighted persons, Virgil experienced 
the imperative of the world so strongly that he eventually gave up entirely on the sense of 
sight in order to return to the tactile world in which that imperative was already 
satisfied.197 
 
V. The Ambiguous Imperative 
 
 The world extended in imperative sense is first and foremost a practical world.  
Our most basic encounter with a worldly thing does not happen according to the 
requirements of abstract knowledge, as the subsumption of a sensible given under an 
ideal identity term.  Rather we encounter things by linking up with them, by joining our 
own sensory-motor forces to the practical worlds of significance that they open up.  The 
worldly thing, then, is given most originarily as an incarnate practical sense. 
When the hiker reaches for her boots, her view does not stop on the shape of a mass 
of leather; she turns to the mountains, the crisp air and pellucid light, the rocks that 
rise sovereign over those that scurry back and forth in the plains.  Her boots are not 
for her raw material that sustains the shape the cutter has put on it, but a force 
sustaining the forms of her advance, a power to forget the mud and the thorns.  In the 
materiality of the boots, she sees the consistency, the reliability that sustains the harsh 
rigor of the mountain paths.198 
 
This is more than a fanciful, poetic way of describing our relation to things.  We might be 
tempted to believe that the given thing just is what it is, and that any practical 
significance we might attach to it must originate in our own subjective projects.  But 
Merleau-Ponty has already refuted this conception.  In his description of touching-being-
touched, which is the most basic phenomenon of the intentional, sentient and sensible 
body, he showed that our projects, our being out ahead of ourselves toward the open-
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ended world, are grounded in originary ambiguous sense.  It is sense that gives us to be 
an ek-stase, to be simultaneously given to ourselves and drawn out beyond ourselves.  To 
say, then, that the sensible boots are given to the hiker immediately as extending a 
practical world is just to unfold the implications of that core insight.   
 In order rigorously to think through the practical world of projects extended by 
imperative sense, it is necessary to begin with the phenomenon of behavior, of particular 
embodied modalities of being-in-the-world.  According to Merleau-Ponty, “we 
understand the thing as we understand a new kind of behavior, not, that is, through any 
intellectual operation of subsumption, but by taking up on our own account the mode of 
existence which the observable signs adumbrate before us.”199  At approximately fifteen 
days old, a baby begins to smile in response to its mother’s smile.  There can be no 
serious suggestion here that the baby is responding in anything other than a bodily way.  
That is, the baby clearly does not recognize its mother’s smile as a particular geometrical 
configuration of her lips and then interpret that configuration as a sign for her happiness.  
The smile is rather an expression; its meaning is inseparable from its manifestation.  The 
baby “knows” the meaning of the smile by “catching on” to its incarnate sense, by taking 
up that sense with its own sensory-motor powers.  In taking up its mother’s expression, 
the baby extends a very simple little practical world.  In smiling, the baby occupies a 
world that it perceives, albeit dimly, as safe and happy.  This capacity to pick up on 
others’ expressions obviously expands during the course of the child’s maturation, 
thereby rendering possible increasingly determinate practical worlds.  In “The Child’s 
Relations with Others,” Merleau-Ponty recounts the case of a boy who had been the 
youngest child in the family until the recent birth of a brother.  The new arrival was very 
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difficult for the boy to accept, since he had been until then the primary focus of attention 
within the household.  Eventually, though, the boy adjusted to the situation by adopting 
toward the new baby the same comportment that his older brother had adopted toward 
him.  In taking up this new set of behaviors, the boy came to occupy a rather complex 
familial world characterized by multiple, determinate role requirements.  The boy became 
an older brother, not through arriving at an abstract conception of the institution of the 
family, but by living his role through his behavior.200 
 In a very similar way, our embodied relations with things extend practical worlds.  
A thing is not given simply as standing there, over against a perceiving subject; it is given 
as an imperative to the sensory-motor powers of a body that is capable of taking it up and 
of following its directives.  This idea is expressed in a striking way by Hilary Putnam: 
If I dared to be a metaphysician, I think I would create a system in which there were 
nothing but obligations. . . .  Instead of saying with Mill that the chair is a ‘permanent 
possibility of sensations,’ I would say that it is a permanent possibility of obligations. 
. . .  What I do think, even outside my fantasies, is that fact and obligations are 
thoroughly interdependent; there are no facts without obligations, just as there are no 
obligations without facts.201 
 
Perception encounters things in their full, unchallengeable reality only to the extent that 
those things play a role in the practical world of the embodied subject.202  This becomes 
especially manifest in our perception of things as spatial.  For intellectualism, and for the 
transcendental, non-embodied subject that it posits, space is not oriented: there is no left 
or right, up or down, in objective space.  According to this thesis, we should not perceive 
things as having their own proper orientations in space.  But of course we do.  For 
example, I perceive an easy chair standing upright very differently from the way I 
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perceive one that is upside down.  Of course, in both cases I am able to subsume the 
sensuously given under the ideal identity term “easy chair.”  But this ideal sameness 
masks important differences in the modes of givenness of the two chairs.  To return for a 
moment to the language of Husserlian phenomenology, the hyletic data do not sustain the 
sense-bestowal in the same way.  When I encounter the easy chair in its proper, upright 
position, I find it to be given immediately and unproblematically as an easy chair.  But 
when I encounter it upside down, I find there to be something unnatural about it.  My 
gaze becomes fixed in the materiality of the spectacle, in the thickness and softness of the 
chair’s padding, in the texture of its fabric, its color, etc.  In short, the hyletic data do not 
recede as readily to make way for the meaning that they sustain.  The easy chair standing 
upright appears as more solid and more real because it exists as a summons to which my 
body knows how to respond.  It is the concretion of a practical situation.  “Thus the thing 
is correlative to my body and, in more general terms, to my existence, of which my body 
is merely the stabilized structure.  It is constituted in the hold which my body takes upon 
it; it is not first of all a meaning for the understanding, but a structure accessible to 
inspection by the body, and if we try to describe the real as it appears to us in perceptual 
experience, we find it overlaid with anthropological predicates.”203 
 The things that we encounter as correlates of our intentional bodies extend 
coherent, determinate practical worlds in which we take our bearings as fundamentally 
practical subjects.  It is not the case, in other words, that subjects impose their intelligible 
projects onto a world that would be wholly indifferent to them.  Rather one becomes a 
subject by being subjected to the imperative of the world.  The agent, according to 
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Alphonso Lingis, is delegated by things.204  When I report for my first day of work at the 
factory, I encounter an assembly line whose workings I do not understand.  I am at first 
unable to see the assembly line in its full determinacy because my body does not yet 
know how to orient its sensory-motor powers to it.  To learn the job is not to master 
intellectually the processes by which the raw materials are converted into the final 
product; one must rather learn new modes of perception and of muscular coordination.  
One must learn to see and to evaluate what is coming down the line and to organize one’s 
bodily forces in the manner required to deal with those things correctly.  One comes to 
understand the intelligibility of the factory’s system in an irreducibly bodily manner.  
Now, having acquired this bodily knowledge, I look at the assembly line and its meaning 
is immediately and unproblematically present.  At that point I have been delegated by the 
things.  I have truly become a factory worker. 
 But the things do not delegate the agent as a particular human being.  I do not 
become the individual I am through having mastered the correct bodily comportment to 
the machines in the factory.  I am rather delegated by the machines as a factory worker in 
general, interchangeable with any other body that has mastered the same skills.  This 
follows directly from what we have already said about reflection.  The sentient and 
sensible body cannot be reduced; it is there prior to all reflection, prior to becoming a 
body-for-consciousness.  “There is, therefore, another subject beneath me, for whom a 
world exists before I am here, and who marks out my place in it.”205  Because I cannot 
reduce this embodied self wholly to my self, I experience an anonymity and generality 
right at the heart of my sensuous opening out onto the world.  It is not an already 
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constituted I that responds originarily to the imperative of the world, but rather an 
impersonal “one.”  Merleau-Ponty refers to this impersonality and generality at the heart 
of personal experience as l’on primordiale.206  The machines in the factory link up with 
one’s body, making one, anyone in general, into a factory worker.  The world of the 
factory that is extended by the correlation between things and one’s body is likewise a 
practical world for anyone. 
 The Kantian imperative, as we have seen, is an imperative for lawfulness.  The 
law, for Kant, is characterized essentially by universality and necessity.  This conception 
of the law is evident both in nature and in political society, which serve as models for the 
moral imperative: “So act as if the maxim of your action were to become through your 
will a universal law of nature” and “act in accordance with maxims of a universally 
legislative member for a merely possible realm of ends.”207  Kant believes that these 
principles already prevail, at least vaguely, in moral common sense, that they are not 
merely the products of abstract philosophizing.208  And indeed it does seem that one of 
the most basic tenets of our moral common sense is that it is impermissible to make an 
exception of oneself, that if an obligation legitimately binds others similarly situated, then 
it binds oneself as well.209  This common-sense belief articulates informally the very idea 
of a law, whether it be natural, political, or moral: a law that is not universal and 
necessary, that allows for exceptions in particular cases, is not properly a law at all.  The 
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imperative, then, addresses itself not primarily to what is particular in human beings, but 
rather to that which is impersonal and universal in them, to their humanity in general. 
 We are now in a position to understand this imperative lawfulness as the dynamic 
proper to originary, ambiguous sense.  We have seen that our embodied relations with 
things extend a coherent, intelligible world as the field for our practical activity.  In 
linking up my body’s forces with those of the assembly line, I become part of the world 
of the factory.  This world is a practical world, a coherent layout of demands addressed to 
the factory worker in general.  In this respect there is nothing exceptional about me, or 
about any of the other factory workers.  I perform my function correctly when I do what 
anyone in my situation would do.  And, it should be noted, this kind of imperative for 
universality is not confined to dreary, mechanized settings like the factory.  We can see 
the same phenomenon in the other examples that we have discussed in the present 
chapter.  There is, for example, a world of guitar aficionados.  When I inspect the quality 
of a particular guitar, I do so with hands that are responsive to the demands that guitars in 
general make on one’s sensibility, and in the same way that anyone with similar skills 
would do it.  Likewise, I drive well when I account for possible hazards on the roadway 
in the same way that a good driver in general would.  In sum, our originary, embodied 
relations with things extend a practical world which makes demands on us as pre-
personal, general beings.  In being subjected to these imperatives, we become moral 
subjects. 
 We must not suppose, though, that in rethinking the Kantian imperative on the 
basis of originary ambiguous sense, we leave it exactly as it was.  Our conception of the 
imperative of the world has up to this point focused exclusively on the centrifugal 
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orientation of corporeal intentionality.  That is, we have focused on the ways in which 
our perception of some particular thing necessarily opens us out to the world in which 
that thing has its place.  Exclusive consideration of the centrifugal orientation yields a 
kind of imperative that emphasizes lawfulness, intelligibility, and wholeness.  But, as we 
have seen, our fundamentally embodied opening out onto the world entails a centripetal 
orientation in our intentionality as well.  We cannot open out onto a world without at the 
same time being presented to ourselves as particular, situated beings.  This, of course, 
was revealed in the phenomenon of touching-being-touched, and in its analogues in the 
other senses.  We saw in this regard that the lecturer can never be given to him- or herself 
as the ideal unity “lecturer in general.”  One can live the role of lecturer in general only as 
backed up into oneself by the gazes of the particular students that one actually teaches, 
and thus as a particular embodiment and stylization of the role.  If it is true that the 
imperative happens according to the dynamic of our originary sensuous opening out onto 
the world, then there must be a moment of particularity and situatedness in the imperative 
which interrupts always already the moment of generality and wholeness. 
 Taking this irreducible moment of particularity into account, we can see that “the 
system of experience is not arrayed before me as if I were God, it is lived by me from a 
certain point of view; I am not the spectator, I am involved, and it is my involvement in a 
point of view which makes possible at the same time the finitude of my perception and its 
opening out upon the completed world as a horizon of every perception.”210  When I view 
the front of the house, I find the house as a whole given in adumbrations as a task for my 
sentient and mobile body.  But this nascent wholeness is given only because my gaze is 
anchored, because this particular side of the house is unchallengeably present from a 
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particular point of view.  The front of the house can promise the whole only if my gaze 
can, to a certain extent, become absorbed in it.  It is from this anchorage that I receive the 
summons to examine the other promised perspectives.  The house as a whole, then, is 
never arrayed transparently before me.  Nor, by extension, is the neighborhood, the city, 
or the whole practical worlds of construction or of realty.211  The wholes promised by the 
centrifugal orientation of our corporeal intentionality are always only provisional and 
indefinite. 
 There are situations in which the incompleteness of the world becomes especially 
pressing from a practical perspective.  In these cases it is one’s own particularity that is 
addressed by the imperative; to act as anyone in general would act in these situations 
would demonstrate a profound failing of ethical sensibility.  Just recently my father died 
from lung cancer and emphysema, the products of a lifelong three-pack-a-day smoking 
habit.  Each breath of air demanded great exertion from him, even with the help of the 
oxygen mask.  Visiting him each day in the hospital, I linked up to his world with the 
forces of my own body.  Seeing him struggle to breathe, I felt my own chest tightening 
up sympathetically, fighting along with him for air.  But the world that was made 
manifest in this bodily connection to my father’s situation was not the impersonal and 
generalized world of projects and tasks that we saw in the factory.  Rather it was the 
finitude, the closing off of his world that presented itself most forcefully.  In this 
constricted world, in which those present are given as backed up into themselves, as 
situated firmly in this place and at this time, I feel myself called upon imperatively to be 
myself, and no one else.  I must not comfort my father in the same way that any son 
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carpentry of the whole world.” 
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would in similar circumstances.  I must respond to the particularities of the situation as it 
is informed by a very particular relationship with a very particular history.  I must 
respond in this way without the possibility of knowing in advance, according to some 
clear, intelligible model, how to do so. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
 We have seen that there is something irreducible, something that resists all 
reflection, right at the heart of our opening out onto the world.  This unreflected element, 
whose locus is the lived body, we have called originary, ambiguous sense.  We have seen 
that the different modalities of our being-in-the-world are essentially responsive and 
obedient to this ambiguous sense, which we have therefore also called imperative sense.  
Finally, we have seen that this imperative also commands ambiguously.  We are called 
upon to orient our practical lives to an intelligible, complete world of projects and tasks, 
but also to resist the wholeness of the world, to respond to particularities as 
particularities.  Responsibility, in sum, must always be an ambiguous responsibility. 
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 In Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty attempts to articulate an 
originary, ambiguous sense relative to which the traditional metaphysical dualisms—
those of the sensible and the intelligible, subject and object, universal and particular, 
etc.—are revealed as abstractions.  We mentioned in the previous chapter, however, that 
Merleau-Ponty came to believe that he had failed there to articulate ambiguity in a 
sufficiently rigorous way.  In a brief text written in pursuit of his admission into the 
Collège de France, in which he summarizes the trajectory of his philosophical work to 
date, Merleau-Ponty admits that “the study of perception could only teach us a ‘bad 
ambiguity,’ a mixture of finitude and universality, interiority and exteriority.”212  In the 
present chapter, I will show how this failure to articulate ambiguity in a sufficiently 
rigorous way amounts to a failure to articulate sense as originary.  I will then show how 
Merleau-Ponty’s work following Phenomenology of Perception, beginning with The 
Prose of the World and concluding with the posthumous Visible and the Invisible, moves 
progressively closer to a more adequate articulation of ambiguity, and thus of originary 
sense.  Finally, I will show how the conception of imperative discussed in the previous 
chapter is enhanced by the more originary conception of sense achieved in Merleau-
Ponty’s later works. 
 
I. Tacit Cogito and the Bad Ambiguity 
 
 The task of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology is, as we have seen, to unveil a 
“third dimension” that would ground, but also disrupt, the distinction between 
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subjectivity and objectivity.213  The more originary dimension that Merleau-Ponty hopes 
to unveil is that of the phenomenon, of the paradoxical in-itself-for-us that is brought to 
light in the phenomenological reduction.214  But in order to articulate this third dimension 
of phenomenality, Merleau-Ponty begins with the very categories that conceal it.  In 
every chapter of Phenomenology of Perception, he shows that the categories of 
objectivity and subjectivity, which are represented by the theses of empiricism and 
intellectualism respectively, provide inadequate accounts of the phenomenon being 
discussed.  Merleau-Ponty states this methodological principle explicitly: “In order not to 
prejudge the issue, we shall take objective thought on its own terms and not ask it any 
questions which it does not ask itself.”215  The method, in other words, is one of critique.  
Merleau-Ponty shows from within the theses of empiricism and intellectualism that there 
is something for which they cannot account on their own terms.  We have seen, in our 
discussion of Husserl’s Ideas II for example, how the lived body escapes from the 
intellectualist thesis that would reduce it to an object for constituting, transcendental 
consciousness.  This thesis was unable to account for the orientation of objects in space, 
which is essential to the sense of any constituted object.  We have also seen, in our 
discussion of patients whose vision has been surgically restored, that the body cannot 
adequately be conceived as an object that simply receives and processes visual “data” 
from the external world.  This empiricist thesis was unable to account for the plainly 
observable fact that post-operative patients could not immediately see determinate things, 
and could do so later on only with great difficulty.  By presenting the failures of the two 
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theses, Merleau-Ponty hoped to bring into relief the originary dimension that they had 
covered over. 
 It is this critical methodology that prevents Merleau-Ponty from thinking 
ambiguity in an originary way.  Throughout Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-
Ponty’s descriptions of the originary dimension of phenomenality “remain dependent on 
the very terms that [he] refuses and that he claims to overcome: subject-object, world-
consciousness, unreflected-reflection.”216  That is, he discovers in many different 
phenomena an opacity, an unreflected element that resists the movement of reflection.  
There is, for example, an embodiedness that refuses to be resolved into consciousness of 
embodiedness.  There is an anonymity (l’on primordiale) at the heart of the subject’s 
perceptual opening out onto the world.  And there is a stubborn perspectival anchorage 
that challenges the unity and totality of the perceived world.  But when Merleau-Ponty 
undertakes to describe these phenomena, he tends simply to graft the unreflected 
elements onto the familiar categories of reflection.  Thus intentionality becomes motor 
intentionality; the subject becomes the embodied subject; the body becomes the lived 
body; and the unity of the world becomes an “open and indefinite unity.”217  Because 
these new concepts remain tied so closely to the concepts of reflection that they are 
meant to challenge, and that, according to Merleau-Ponty himself, tend to cover over the 
originary dimension of phenomenality, they succeed in describing that dimension only 
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indirectly and negatively.  The ambiguity that they describe is the kind of “neither/nor” 
that characterizes the bad ambiguity.218 
 The clearest, and for our purposes the most important, example of Merleau-
Ponty’s failure to think ambiguity in an originary way is his concept of the tacit cogito.  
We have seen that Phenomenology of Perception can be read as a sustained critique of 
the philosophies of reflection, which according to Merleau-Ponty tend to take their stand 
in their own transparent results, failing thereby to recognize the necessary opacity at their 
ground.  Central to the critique of reflection is the demonstration of an opacity, a non-
self-presence right at the heart of the cogito.  That is, the egos of the Cartesian and 
Husserlian traditions can perform their world-constituting functions only on the condition 
that they never be able to achieve total self-transparency.219  I am, for example, able to 
see this thing before me as a house only because my body already knows, prior to all 
reflection, how to adopt the posture and the series of perspectives necessary to do so.  I 
am able to reflect on myself, to encounter myself as consciousness of the house, only 
through the opaque medium of the world.  My vision puts me in direct contact with the 
thing itself, which is given unchallengeably as transcendent to me, as something more 
than my own private representation.  But this transcendence into the thing itself is 
equiprimordially a return into myself as the one who is seeing it.  Without this centripetal 
orientation being given right along with the centrifugal one, I could never, properly 
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speaking, see the house at all.  “It is by communicating with the world that we 
communicate beyond all doubt with ourselves.”220 
 The method of “radical reflection” that is employed throughout Phenomenology 
of Perception thus reveals the existence of an opaque tacit cogito more originary than the 
cogito of reflection.  Both Descartes and Husserl discovered, through different versions 
of the methodology of reflection, that the essence of being is being-presented.  Reflection 
shows that the thing naively encountered in the natural attitude must be conceived more 
rigorously as an object for a cogito.  Radical reflection takes up this result and presses 
further, reflecting on the reflection itself.221  If being is being-presented, must this not be 
true of the cogito as well?  And if the cogito is indeed something essentially presented, 
does it not follow that it is something derived?  Merleau-Ponty addresses this point 
explicitly with regard to the Cartesian cogito.  He shows how the cogito, the immediate 
and indubitable presence of the self to itself, is presented by means of the words and 
sentences that constitute the Meditations on First Philosophy.  “The cogito at which we 
arrive by reading Descartes (and even the one which Descartes effects in relation to 
expression and when, looking back on his own life, he fixes it, objectifies it and 
‘characterizes’ it as indubitable) is, then, a spoken cogito, put into words and understood 
in words. . . .”222  Just as our intentional consciousness plunges us directly into things and 
forgets itself in the process, so too the words of the Meditations present us with the cogito 
in a manner so direct that we overlook the presentation itself.223  Radical reflection shows 
that the cogito is essentially the conclusion of a demonstration.  If it were not—if our 
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presence to ourselves were immediately present to us—then the Meditations would not 
constitute a watershed moment in the history of philosophy. 
 Despite his discovery of the essentially derivative character of the cogito, 
Merleau-Ponty was unable in Phenomenology of Perception to break free entirely of the 
philosophy of consciousness.  The method of radical reflection in effect recreates the 
solution of ordinary reflection, except at a supposedly more fundamental level.  Merleau-
Ponty argues in this regard that the cogito, as something essentially presented, must be 
presented to a pre-existing, more originary self-consciousness.   This more originary self-
consciousness is the tacit cogito.  His argument here is entirely Cartesian: “. . . I should 
be unable even to read Descartes’ book were I not, before any speech can begin, in 
contact with my own life and thought, and if the spoken cogito did not encounter within 
me a tacit cogito.”224  If radical reflection is possible at all—if I am able to reflect on the 
linguistic constitution of the cogito revealed in ordinary reflection—then it must be the 
case that I as tacit cogito pre-exist both the cogito and the language that presents it.  The 
tacit cogito must therefore be conceived as a non-thetic, unreflected presence-to-self.  Of 
course, what an unreflected presence-to-self might amount to is not at all obvious.  The 
only purpose this conception could serve in Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy is that of 
placeholder, an unthematizable something that grounds the appearance of phenomena.  
But such a purpose makes sense only within the philosophy of consciousness that he is 
struggling to overcome. 
 The concept of the tacit cogito reveals in an especially clear way Merleau-Ponty’s 
failure in Phenomenology of Perception to think the “third dimension” of being on its 
own terms.  It recreates the dualisms that characterized the philosophies of reflection 
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which, in the forms of intellectualism and empiricism, serve as Merleau-Ponty’s foils 
throughout the book.  To be sure, these dualisms are no longer conceived as distinct 
spheres of being, but are instead mixed together in the form of the bad ambiguity.  
Merleau-Ponty strives throughout Phenomenology of Perception to articulate our 
originary opening out onto the world as an essentially worldly phenomenon, and thus to 
reach a dimension anterior to the dualisms of interiority and exteriority, subject and 
object.  “The acts of the I are of such a nature that they outstrip themselves leaving no 
interiority of consciousness.  Consciousness is transcendence through and through. . . 
.”225  And again, “what I discover in the cogito is not psychological immanence, the 
inherence of all phenomena in ‘private states of consciousness’, the blind contact of 
sensation with itself. . . .  It is the deep-seated momentum of transcendence which is my 
very being, the simultaneous contact with my own being and with the world’s being.”226  
But the tacit cogito reinstates, right at the heart of our opening onto the world, the very 
dualisms that Merleau-Ponty was attempting to overcome.  For example, our most 
originary being-in-the-world is described not as the unity of transcendence and 
immanence, centrifugal and centripetal orientations, but rather as a mixture of interiority 
and exteriority.227  The tacit cogito names a pure interiority that must always remain 
separate from the movement of transcendence into the world.  Thus my consciousness is 
interior precisely to the extent that it cannot be exterior and exterior precisely to the 
extent that it cannot be interior.  Likewise, the dualism of cogito and tacit cogito recreates 
the Cartesian dualism of object and subject.  As tacit cogito, I am the pure subject for 
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whom the spectacle of the world takes place, while as cogito I am an object presented 
within that spectacle.  Again, I am a subject to the extent that I cannot be a pure object 
and I am an object to the extent that I cannot be a pure subject.228  In both of these cases, 
the dimension of origin that Merleau-Ponty is attempting to articulate appears here as 
something secondary, derived from the dualisms of reflection.  Thus in my most 
originary opening out onto the world I am neither immanent nor transcendent to myself, 
neither subject nor object, but an ambiguous mixture of these. 
 
II. The Dualism of Phenomenology of Perception 
 
 Merleau-Ponty articulates the problem that we have seen revealed in the tacit 
cogito as succinctly as possible in a famous working note for The Visible and the 
Invisible: “The problems posed in Ph.P are insoluble because I start there from the 
‘consciousness’-‘object’ distinction--.”229  As the title of the working note suggests, 
Merleau-Ponty recognizes that a philosophy of consciousness must always remain a 
dualistic philosophy.230  More specifically, such a philosophy presupposes an essential 
distinction between ground (consciousness) and grounded (object).  “For consciousness 
there are only the objects which it has itself constituted. . . .  There is nothing in the 
objects capable of throwing consciousness back toward other perspectives.  There is no 
exchange, no interaction between consciousness and the object.”231  This is true of the 
                                                
228 Isabel Matos Dias makes a very similar point, though in a slightly different context, in Dias, Elogio, 
155. 
229 Merleau-Ponty, VI, 200; VI-Fr, 253.  Ph.P refers, of course, to Phenomenology of Perception. 
230 Ibid. The title for the working note is “Dualism—Philosophy.” 
231 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Themes from the Lectures at the Collège de France 1952-1960 , trans. John 
O’Neill (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970), 39. 
  
 109 
philosophies of reflection—e.g., those of Descartes and of Husserl—but also of the 
philosophy of radical reflection that is carried out in Phenomenology of Perception.  
Insofar as the tacit cogito is opaque and unthematizable, a presence-to-self so immediate 
as to be almost vacuous, it seems entirely inassimilable to the Cartesian cogito with its 
characteristic clarity and distinctness.  However, the functions performed by the two 
cogitos within their respective systems are nearly identical: each serves as the conditio 
sine qua non for the appearance of objects.  The problems that arise for Descartes 
concerning the possibility of communication between the two kinds of substance are well 
known.  Similar problems arise for Merleau-Ponty.  If the tacit cogito is something 
essentially unreflected, how can it be given for radical reflection without losing its nature 
as unreflected?  If the tacit cogito is entirely pre-verbal, how can it be thematized?  And if 
the tacit cogito is a pure interiority, how can it ground knowledge, which pertains to a 
transcendent world?  All of these cases raise the problem of the relation between two 
spheres of being that seem incommensurable.  That this problem arises testifies to 
Merleau-Ponty’s failure to articulate an originary third dimension anterior to the dualisms 
of reflection. 
 These results bring to light a certain equivocation in Merleau-Ponty’s 
methodology of radical reflection.  On the one hand, the methodology has a definite 
ontological orientation.  By subjecting the dualisms of the traditional philosophies of 
reflection to critique, Merleau-Ponty attempts to unveil the structure of our most 
originary being-in-the-world.  From this ontological perspective, the most basic fact for 
philosophy is that “there is absolute certainty of the world in general, but not of any one 
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thing in particular.”232  That is to say, we find ourselves always already anchored within a 
pre-reflective world, relative to which particular, determinate worldly things are 
secondary and derived.  Merleau-Ponty’s more ontological task, then, and one of the 
tasks of phenomenology generally, is “to re-achieve a direct and primitive contact with 
the world, in order to endow that contact with a philosophical status.”233  This direct 
contact with the pre-reflective world happens, according to Merleau-Ponty, at the level of 
perception.  An ontological description of that world, then, would be one that describes 
the level of perception in an originary way, independent of the prejudices of 
intellectualism and empiricism.   
 On the other hand, Merleau-Ponty uses the method of radical reflection in the 
service of transcendental arguments, which are concerned less with our originary opening 
out onto the world and more with the determinate, known world that is built up on the 
basis of that opening out.  In order to provide a ground for the world of knowledge, 
Merleau-Ponty reinstates the kind of subjectivity that the ontological descriptions had 
already surpassed.  Thus, after having shown the ontological primacy of the 
unreflectively present world, Merleau-Ponty introduces the tacit cogito as the subject for 
whom and on whose basis the world can appear.  Likewise, the lived body that is 
described at the ontological level as the open-ended unity of touching-being-touched is 
made also to serve as the ground of the known world by means of its pre-thematic, latent 
understanding of objects and of objectivity in general.  It is this latter, transcendental 
tendency that prevails in Phenomenology of Perception.  This is what Merleau-Ponty was 
referring to when he criticized that text for beginning on the basis of the consciousness-
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object distinction.  The problem with this transcendental orientation is that it causes the 
ontological phenomena to be articulated in terms that are not their own.  Although these 
phenomena are first in the ordo et connexio rerum, they are presented as second 
according to the ordo et connexio idearum.  Merleau-Ponty’s descriptions of the 
originary phenomena bear the marks of this secondness throughout Phenomenology of 
Perception.234 
 All of the equivocations and bad ambiguities that we have discussed—those of the 
transcendental and the ontological, subject and object, unreflected and reflected, and, 
most important for our purposes, the sensible and the intelligible—have their locus in the 
lived body.  More specifically, the lived body functions throughout Phenomenology of 
Perception as the mediator for these dualisms.235  Merleau-Ponty had hoped there to 
articulate the body as a “third genus of being,” originary and anterior to the dualisms that 
characterize the philosophies of reflection.236  Nonetheless, the body as described in 
Phenomenology of Perception functions more as the locus for the ambiguous co-
existence of these dualisms than as the originary dimension from which they arise.  Once 
again, the supposedly originary dimension is conceived on the basis of what is derived. 
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much idealism.  “To say that Merleau-Ponty stops at phenomenology without any means of going beyond it 
is to fail to understand that the phenomenon itself, in the phenomenological sense of the term, goes beyond 
the realm of the empirical.  The phenomenon in this sense is not empirical but rather that which manifests 
itself really, that which we can really experience, in opposition to what would be only the construction of 
concepts. . . .  The only reproach I would make to the author is not that he has gone ‘too far,’ but rather that 
he has not been sufficiently radical.  The phenomenological descriptions which he uses in fact maintain the 
vocabulary of idealism.  In this they are in accord with Husserlian descriptions.  But the whole problem is 
to know whether phenomenology, fully developed, does not require the abandonment of subjectivity, and 
the vocabulary of subjective idealism as, beginning with Husserl, Heidegger has done.” Merleau-Ponty, 
Primacy, 41-2. 
235 Barbaras, The Being of the Phenomenon, 7; Dias, Elogio, 151. 
236 Merleau-Ponty, PP, 350; PP-Fr, 402. 
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 This failure to conceive embodiedness as an originary dimension of being is 
evidenced by the different terminologies that Merleau-Ponty employs to describe its 
functions.  On the one hand, Merleau-Ponty often refers to the “embodied subject” or the 
“embodied I.”237  Whenever Merleau-Ponty uses these terms, he intends to critique the 
notion of a fully ideal, constituting consciousness.  More specifically, he shows how the 
transparent, self-present consciousness that characterizes various transcendental 
philosophies is anchored always already in an unreflected embodiment that it cannot 
comprehend on its own terms.  “If reflection is to justify itself as reflection, that is to say, 
as progress towards the truth, it must not merely put one view of the world in place of 
another, it must show us how the naïve view of the world is included in and transcended 
by the sophisticated one.”238  This is precisely what the ideal constituting subject cannot 
do: it presupposes an unreflected dimension of being as that which it must supersede, but 
it cannot comprehend that dimension as such, i.e., as unreflected.  To comprehend it 
would be to transform it into something reflected, which ex hypothesi it is not.  “To say 
that it is myself who conceive myself as situated in a body and furnished with five senses 
is clearly a verbal solution, since I who reflect cannot recognize myself in this embodied 
I. . . .”239 
 The notions of embodied subject and embodied I mark a turn away from the 
transcendental perspective and toward a more ontological one.  By demonstrating the 
irreducible situatedness of the constituting subject within an unreflected dimension of 
embodiment, Merleau-Ponty opens up the possibility of describing that dimension in a 
                                                
237 The consistency of Merleau-Ponty’s terminology in this regard is not reflected in the English translation.  
Smith translates “sujet incarné” variously as embodied subject, incarnate subject, and subject incarnate. 
238 Merleau-Ponty, PP, 213; PP-Fr, 247. 
239 Ibid. 
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vocabulary proper to it.  Such a description would attempt to articulate our most originary 
opening out onto the world, but without relying on the kinds of understanding appropriate 
to the derived world of reflected knowledge.  This more ontological conception of the 
task of philosophy, and more specifically of Phenomenology of Perception, is expressed 
most forcefully in the book’s preface, where Merleau-Ponty stresses the priority of the 
unreflected over the reflected, of the world as facticity over the world as reflected totality, 
and of inchoate, nascent meaning over fully determinate, well-ordered meaning.  “To 
return to things themselves is to return to that world which precedes knowledge, of which 
knowledge always speaks, and in relation to which every scientific schematization is an 
abstract and derivative sign-language, as is geography in relation to the countryside in 
which we have learnt beforehand what a forest, a prairie or a river is.”240  The true task of 
phenomenology, then, is somehow to articulate this dimension that is essentially prior to 
knowledge, “to seize the meaning of the world or of history as that meaning comes into 
being.”241  As we have seen, this advent of the sense of the world happens, according to 
Merleau-Ponty, at the level of the lived, pre-reflective body.  A rigorous phenomenology 
of the body, which puts out of play all of the prejudices of the philosophies of reflection, 
ought then to function primarily as an ontological articulation of our most originary 
being-in-the-world. 
 In turning away from constituting consciousness and toward the more primordial 
unreflected body, Merleau-Ponty appears to discover a starting point essentially different 
from the consciousness-object distinction referred to in the working note from The 
Visible and the Invisible.  Nonetheless, the phenomenology of the body that is carried out 
                                                
240 Merleau-Ponty, PP, ix; PP-Fr, iii. 
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throughout Phenomenology of Perception retains both the concepts and the general 
orientation of transcendental philosophy.  Even the notion of the embodied subject, which 
marked the turn toward more ontological concerns, retains the classically transcendental 
idea of subjectivity.  The passages in which the embodied subject appears usually address 
the impossibility of a pure, ideal subject.  Merleau-Ponty shows in these passages that 
pure subjectivity cannot comprehend the richness and thickness of our being-in-the-
world, and that a more adequate comprehension requires that subjectivity be situated 
always already in the unreflected body.  But rather than undermine the priority of 
constituting consciousness, this move in fact grounds it.  The lived body is thought 
simultaneously as that which escapes a certain kind of subjectivity and as that which 
supplements it.  Embodiment is simply added onto the traditional idea of the subject 
without calling it radically into question. 
 The persistence of the transcendental problematic is reflected in another set of 
concepts that Merleau-Ponty uses throughout Phenomenology of Perception.  The most 
important of these is the concept of the knowing body (corps-connaissant).  While the 
concept of embodied subject serves as a corrective to the one-sidedly ideal understanding 
of constituting consciousness, the concept of the knowing body is meant to replace the 
one-sidedly objective understanding of the body that characterizes mechanistic 
philosophies.  The knowing body is the transcendental body, i.e., the body insofar as it 
contributes to the constitution of objects and of the world as ordered totality of objects.  
As such, the knowing body takes on the functions traditionally assigned to the subject.  
Merleau-Ponty quotes with approval the psychologist Paul Guillaume who writes, 
concerning the constancy of perceived colors through variations in lighting, that the eye 
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“takes the lighting into account.”242  In terms of Husserlian phenomenology, this 
intending of a unity of sense across varying sensuous data would have to be understood 
as an act of Sinngebung performed by the transcendental subject.  Guillaume, however, 
locates the act of Sinngebung in the eye itself.  Merleau-Ponty agrees with this 
substitution of the transcendental body for the transcendental ego.  “The eye is not the 
mind, but a material organ.  How could it ever take anything ‘into account’?  It can do so 
only if we introduce the phenomenal body beside the objective one, if we make a 
knowing-body of it, and if, in short, we substitute for consciousness, as the subject of 
perception, existence, or being in the world through a body.”243 
 The transcendental character of this account of the body is confirmed in other 
passages where Merleau-Ponty explicitly assigns the characteristic functions of 
subjectivity to the body.  Addressing the way in which the subject finds him- or herself 
always already oriented in the world, Merleau-Ponty argues that there must be “another 
subject beneath me, for whom a world exists before I am here, and who marks out my 
place in it.  This captive or natural spirit is my body. . . .”244  Far from unveiling a “third 
dimension” that would be anterior to the distinction between subject and object, and that 
would in fact undermine that distinction, the method of radical reflection merely 
discovers another, more originary subject.  This transcendental, subjective body is 
essentially oriented toward the fully constituted world, whose order it prefigures with its 
own “latent knowledge.”245  Finally, this nascent bodily understanding is built up into 
                                                
242 Guillaume, Paul, Traité de Psychologie (Paris: PUF, 1957), 175.  Quoted in Merleau-Ponty, PP, 309 ; 
PP-Fr, 357. 
243 Merleau-Ponty, PP, 309; PP-Fr, 357. 
244 Merleau-Ponty, PP, 254; PP-Fr, 294. Emphasis mine. Cf. PP, 240; PP-Fr, 277. 
245 Merleau-Ponty, PP, 408; PP-Fr, 467.
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determinate, objective knowledge through acts of “motor intentionality.”246  To return to 
an example from the previous chapter, I am able to constitute the house as an object of 
knowledge only by intending it across various perspectives that my mobile, knowing 
body can take on it.  This phenomenology of the transcendental body corresponds term 
for term with the Husserlian account of transcendental consciousness.  In both cases the 
constituted world is grounded in a subject for whom that world appears.  In both cases the 
subject possesses the meaning of the world in advance, and in both cases that meaning is 
bestowed through acts of intentionality.  In this regard, then, Merleau-Ponty’s self-
criticism in The Visible and the Invisible is certainly correct: insofar as he fails to 
undermine the foundational position of subjectivity, and in fact insofar as he grounds that 
position even more firmly in the lived body, Merleau-Ponty has not succeeded in 
adopting a starting point outside the consciousness-object distinction. 
 
III. The Dynamic of Expression: Merleau-Ponty’s Reading of Saussure 
 
 Merleau-Ponty’s failure in Phenomenology of Perception to overcome the 
dualisms that haunt the philosophies of reflection stems from his failure to think originary 
sense in a sufficiently rigorous way.  Methodologically, Merleau-Ponty takes as his 
beginning point the already accomplished ideal sense that characterizes objective 
knowledge.247  Each chapter performs a critique of the intellectualist thesis, showing how 
this reflected, intelligible sense cannot account for itself on its own terms, and how it 
therefore requires the unreflected density and opacity of the perceiving body as its 
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ground.  But as we have seen, Merleau-Ponty articulates this unreflected ground almost 
entirely with reference to the ideal sense that it grounds.  The unreflected elements are 
not thought through on their own terms, but are simply grafted on to the familiar 
categories of reflection, yielding such composite notions as the knowing body and the 
tacit cogito.  In this way, the traditional dualisms are mixed together, but never properly 
overcome. 
 In his works from the 1950s, beginning with The Prose of the World, Merleau-
Ponty makes a decisive advance over Phenomenology of Perception.  The relation 
between these two works can be articulated without too much simplification in terms of a 
very basic reversal: while Phenomenology of Perception attempts to think sense on the 
basis of the unreflected, perceiving body, The Prose of the World attempts to think both 
perception and the body on the basis of sense.248  In Phenomenology of Perception, fully 
accomplished, ideal sense is conceived as first in the order of investigation, but not as 
first ontologically.  In that work, our perceptual opening out onto the world is conceived 
as ontologically basic.  In a classically phenomenological way, the ontologically basic 
level of perception is conceived as constituting the level of objective, ideal sense.  In The 
Prose of the World, on the other hand, Merleau-Ponty begins to recognize that the 
perceiving body cannot constitute sense except insofar as that body belongs always 
already to a world of originary sense.  In isolating sense as the ground of sense, Merleau-
Ponty moves decisively beyond the consciousness-object distinction that grounds his 
earlier work, and thus beyond the various dualisms and bad ambiguities that that 
distinction entails.  The dualisms of subject and object, ground and grounded, unreflected 
and reflected, and intelligible and sensible are replaced by a monism of sense. 
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 To understand how a monism of sense can overcome all of these dualisms, it will 
be necessary to examine Merleau-Ponty’s reading of Saussure, which informs so much of 
his work after Phenomenology of Perception.  As we discussed in the Introduction, 
Saussurian linguistics takes as its point of departure a basic distinction between langue 
and parole.249  Langue refers to the language insofar as it is a self-contained, describable 
system, while parole refers to the particular, ad hoc speech acts in which individual 
speakers make use of the system.  Saussure articulates the distinction between the two as 
that between “what is essential from what is ancillary and more or less accidental.”250  
Because the langue is presupposed in every linguistic act, and because it is a self-
contained, describable totality, Saussure insists that it, and not parole, constitutes the true 
object of the science of linguistics.251 
 While the philosophers traditionally labeled post-Saussurian or post-structuralist 
tend to insist on a sharp separation between langue and parole, and to prioritize the 
former unambiguously over the latter, Merleau-Ponty understands their relation from the 
perspective of the speaking subject.  Merleau-Ponty, like Saussure, makes much of the 
basic insight that “in the langue there are only differences, and no positive terms.”252  A 
language, in other words, is never merely one positivity alongside others; it is never 
reducible to a collection of signs, each of which would denote a single worldly thing or 
idea.253  To adopt this common-sense understanding of language is to remain within the 
                                                
249 The English translation of Saussure’s Course in General Linguistics renders these as “linguistic 
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250 Saussure, CGL, 14. 
251 Ibid., 8-11. 
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standpoint of the natural attitude, which posits the world as already there, 
unproblematically present, independently of its mode of presentation.  It is to suppose 
that the world is a totality of already determinate things and that language simply doubles 
that world in a system of signs.   
 According to Merleau-Ponty, we can be certain that the natural-attitude 
conception of language is inadequate because it is entirely incompatible with the 
experience we all have as speaking subjects when we attempt to give expression to 
ourselves or to the world.  In many situations—for example, when I order a hamburger or 
when I enter into a legally binding agreement—it seems that I merely exchange well-
established significations in order to achieve a well-defined end.  “Hamburger” names 
unambiguously the category of food that I would like to eat and that the restaurant 
specializes in preparing. “Jointly and severally liable” is a well-established signification 
that leaves little doubt as to my obligations to the landlord in the event that my roommate 
fails to pay his share of the rent.  But in other situations I struggle to express a meaning 
that is at least partially new, and for which there does not exist an already established 
codification.  The present dissertation is an example of this.  The meaning that I am 
attempting to express is given to me at first only vaguely and provisionally.  I must call 
upon the resources of my language to say something that, until now, has not been said in 
that language.  Of course others have already expressed meanings similar to the one that I 
am attempting to express. Nonetheless, the norms of graduate education require that I do 
something more than to reprint the formulations that other philosophers have already 
advanced.  I must offer a novel variation on what has already been expressed.  If any 
genuinely new meaning is possible, as our experience as speaking subjects suggests that 
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it is, then it must not be the case that language is simply one positivity among others.254  
There must be in the langue a difference that is somehow more basic than the positivity 
of its terms. 
 The second major difference between Merleau-Ponty’s reading of Saussure and 
those of the post-structuralist philosophers concerns the way in which this difference 
within the langue is conceived.  This second difference is closely related to the first, 
which concerned the status of the speaking subject relative to the structure.  As we 
discussed in the Introduction, the standard post-structuralist interpretation of the 
difference that constitutes the langue is that it is oppositional.  That is to say, the positive 
terms, and even more basically the positive phonemes, have their content not in 
themselves, but rather only in virtue of not being the other terms or phonemes.  To return 
to an example from the Introduction, the term “hat” can have the content it has only 
through the opposition between “h” and such neighboring phonemes as “f” and “ch.”  If 
English lost the distinction between “h” and “f” or between “h” and “ch,” then it would 
also lose the specific content presently signified by “hat.”  Positive significations are thus 
dependent on completely non-signifying oppositions.  The relevance of this in the present 
context is that such an oppositional conception rules out the possibility that the speaking 
subject could ever re-appropriate that difference in an act of reflection, or even in an act 
of Merleau-Pontean radical reflection.  The langue as system of non-signifying 
differences is the necessary condition for any positive content whatever, including that of 
the subject.  This is the reason that the so-called post-structuralist philosophers have 
insisted on the priority of the langue and have de-emphasized the role of the subject in 
constituting the world. 
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 Merleau-Ponty, on the other hand, understands the difference within the langue in 
accordance with the phenomenological conception of spacing.  Difference, in other 
words, is conceived horizonally, as presentive difference.  Just as the perceived house is 
given in adumbrations which are not self-identical positivities, but which rather point 
constitutively beyond themselves toward the fulfilled intention “house,” so the non-self-
identical elements of the linguistic system point beyond themselves toward their 
fulfillment in an achieved signification.  Thus, whereas the post-structuralist 
interpretation conceives differences within the langue as wholly other to and prior to 
signification, Merleau-Ponty’s more phenomenological interpretation thinks that 
difference as oriented, quasi-teleologically, toward achieved significations. 
 The phenomenon of horizonal, presentive difference within the langue can be 
seen especially clearly in literature, the very purpose of which is to produce new 
expressions using only the resources provided by the stock of already-existing 
significations.  Writers would never feel compelled to produce new works, nor would 
readers derive any enjoyment from them, if literature did no more than to recycle 
established significations.255  Nonetheless, works of literature are composed almost 
entirely of these significations.  Literature is able simultaneously to express something 
new and to make these expressions understandable to readers who come to the text armed 
only with their knowledge of the language as it exists prior to the work they are about to 
read.  Literature can do this because the significations shared by the writer and the reader 
are different from themselves, and can thus adumbrate new and as yet unrealized 
significations.   
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 Merleau-Ponty points to Stendhal’s The Charterhouse of Parma as an example of 
this horizonal structure of linguistic difference.  “Before I read Stendhal, I know what a 
rogue is.  Thus I can understand what he means when he says that [Rassi] the revenue 
man is a rogue.”256  Because Rassi is an important character, it is a necessary condition of 
my understanding the text that I know the established meaning of “rogue.”  But this 
knowledge is far from sufficient: I do not know the character Rassi simply by knowing 
that he is a token of the type “rogue.” (Neither would I know Rassi by knowing the 
established significations of all the predicates that Stendhal attributes to him.)  As I read 
the text and come progressively to catch onto Stendhal’s unique style of expression, I 
come to acquire a more nuanced, but also more vivid, understanding of the stock 
signification “rogue.”  This general idea becomes incarnated and thus fulfilled in the 
unique man Rassi.  All of the situations in which Rassi is described, along with all the 
other qualities that he is presented as having, contribute toward drawing the idea “rogue” 
beyond its sedimented signification and toward a new, richer one.  In Stendhal’s work, 
and indeed in any successful work of literature, stock significations “are given a new 
twist.  The cross references multiply.  More and more arrows point in the direction of a 
thought I have never encountered before and perhaps never would have met without 
Stendhal.”257 
 This example from literature illustrates a dynamic that applies to all forms of 
expression, including even the wordless expressions of painting and music.  All of these 
cases of expression presuppose a sedimented stock of meanings from which subjects 
must draw.  In the non-linguistic arts, this stock of meanings corresponds to a set of 
                                                
256 Merleau-Ponty, PW, 12; PW-Fr, 19.  In both the French original and in the English translation, Merleau-
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stylistic conventions.  For example, the set of musical conventions from which Western 
music has traditionally drawn is based on the division of the octave into twelve tones and 
on the articulation of those tones into the various major and minor scales.  The tones of 
the scale, like the words that make up the novel, cannot be reduced to self-identical 
positivities, but rather point beyond themselves in adumbrating expected resolutions.  To 
simplify somewhat, we could say that in a piece of music written in the key of C, the 
tones that are played point ahead to some version of the C chord as their proper 
resolution.  In the nineteenth century, Western musicians began to seek new expressive 
possibilities beyond strict adherence to the major-minor system.  This trend reached its 
culmination in the twentieth century with such composers as Schoenberg and Webern, for 
whom all twelve tones had equal value.  In their twelve-tone compositions, the individual 
tones came to adumbrate a much wider variety of possible resolutions: any tone could be 
followed by any other.  Within this new system, the meaning of the individual tones 
changes radically, allowing for possibilities of expression that were previously 
unimagined.  As listeners learn to hear this new music, it comes to be accepted as making 
a kind of musical sense, in much the same way that linguistic innovations come to be 
adopted into the commonly accepted stock of significations. 
 These examples illustrate a quasi-dialectical dynamic of sense in which the 
langue envelops the speaking subject (parole) while at the same time being enveloped by 
it.  Let us address the envelopment of the subject by the langue first.  In any attempt to 
express myself—whether it be in language, in the non-linguistic arts, or even in my 
bodily, gestural comportment toward the world—I find myself always already given over 
to a sedimented system of meanings.  That is to say, I could never situate myself anterior 
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to the langue, reducing it in a Husserlian fashion to the correlate of my intentional, 
constituting consciousness.  This is because to intend the langue already presupposes the 
resources of the langue.  “Langue” and “system” and “signification” are themselves 
values within the langue.  I could not hold these unities of sense within my intentional 
gaze if these were not already held fast within the differential structure of the langue.  
Even when I intend a sense that has never been expressed before, I call upon the open 
possibilities that are constitutive of the langue as expressive system.  James Joyce and his 
readers, for example, are able to intend the “museyroom” as a unity of sense owing to the 
fortuitous differential relation between the English-language values “museum,” “to 
muse,” and “room,” along with the expressive morpheme “ey,” which connotes 
something silly, childlike, or diminutive.258  The expressive possibilities constitutive of 
the langue, then, always condition the possibilities of the intending subject.  This is what 
we mean when we say that in the dynamic of expression, langue envelops parole. 
 On the other hand, the subject is never reducible to the langue.  It is important not 
to conceive the subject and the langue as two positivities, related in such a way that the 
latter produces the former as a kind of optical illusion, like the mirage on the hot road.  
Rather the langue is what it is only when it is animated by the speaking subject’s 
intention to express him- or herself.  Without the subject’s intention to bend the system of 
language in order to express a signification that did not already exist, the language would 
be reduced to a code, where signifiers corresponded one to one with their already 
determinate signifieds.  It would be inconceivable in such a situation that a term could 
take on a new or expanded sense without ruining the equilibrium of the whole system.  
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For example, I am able successfully to express affirmation by using the conventionally 
accepted sign for negation.  If a friend is a guest at my home and asks if he can have a 
glass of water, I might smile and say no.  In smiling and saying no, I of course intend yes, 
and my friend understands the intended sense entirely unproblematically.259  That I can 
express myself successfully while violating one of the most fundamental differential 
relations within the langue—that yes is not no and no is not yes—suggests that it is my 
subjective intention, along with that of my friend, that carries the sense.  Terms can take 
on new and even contradictory significations without in the least endangering the stability 
of the langue.  This is because the successful new expression is fed back into the system, 
where it becomes another stock signification and is integrated into a new equilibrium.260  
Insofar as the speaking subject has this power to re-establish the equilibrium of the 
system, and insofar as the expressive system is what it is in virtue of enabling this 
subjective power, it is legitimate to say that the langue is enveloped by parole. 
 In Merleau-Ponty’s reading of Saussure, then, the orders of langue and parole 
cannot be adequately conceived in isolation from each other, but rather exist in a relation 
of mutual implication.  More specifically, langue is related to parole as a latent totality of 
sense to a particular, achieved expression of sense.  The subject, who is given over 
always already to this latent totality, responds to the possibilities that it adumbrates and 
expresses a sense that is understandable to the members of his or her community of 
expression.  In my own case, I have more or less appropriated the successful expressions 
of a number of philosophers in the twentieth century Continental tradition.  These 
expressions constitute a stock of sedimented significations for the community of 
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philosophers conversant with that tradition.  But once again these expressions are not 
self-identical positivities.  Rather they constitute a horizon, presenting new possibilities 
of sense.  As a speaking subject given over to these possibilities, I experience in an 
obscure way that something calls to be said.  Specifically, I sense that there is something 
new to be said about the bond between the phenomenon of the imperative and the 
originary character of sense.  These stock significations, along with the whole tradition of 
which they are a part, gesture beyond themselves to an accomplished signification that 
will complete them, just as in perception the background phenomena point toward the 
object that calls to be focused on.  Conversely, the sense that is achieved by the speaking 
subject is what it is only as fulfilling the promise of the latent sense.  In sum, the sense 
achieved in parole has no meaning except as referring back to the sedimented langue 
whose promises it fulfills, and the langue has no meaning except as referring ahead to the 
acts of parole that will crystallize it. 
 
IV. The Body as Expressive 
 
 This dynamic, in which sense refers ceaselessly to sense, is originary.  In 
Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty had attempted to ground the achieved 
sense of the world on the ambiguity of the intentional, perceiving body.  But this 
ambiguity turned out to be a bad ambiguity, and to reinforce the very dualisms that 
Merleau-Ponty had hoped to dissolve.  In The Prose of the World, he begins to recognize 
that the perceiving body cannot ground the dynamic of expression, but must rather be 
reconceived on the basis of that dynamic.  With this reversal, Merleau-Ponty moves 
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decisively beyond the transcendental perspective that still haunts Phenomenology of 
Perception and beyond the dualisms that that perspective entails. 
 In The Prose of the World and in other works of the 1950s, Merleau-Ponty 
reconceives our embodied being-in-the-world as more primordially an embodied giving 
expression to the world.  We have seen how in Phenomenology of Perception Merleau-
Ponty begins methodologically with the system of ideal, objective knowledge that is 
posited by the philosophies of reflection.  He goes on to show how this world of fully 
completed knowledge cannot be conceived as first in itself, but must rather be constituted 
by the embodied subject.  The body described in this context by Merleau-Ponty is a 
transcendental body, constitutively oriented toward the world conceived as telos, as 
adumbrated totality of fully achieved, objective knowledge.  The body is able to play this 
transcendental role because it, and not the purely ideal transcendental subject, already 
possesses the knowledge of the world implicitly.  In The Prose of the World, by contrast, 
Merleau-Ponty begins to take as his starting point the dynamic of expression as it is 
exemplified in the arts and as articulated in a certain reading of Saussurian linguistics.  
Here the subject is no longer primarily an embodied subject, but rather a speaking 
subject.  That to which the subject is given over is no longer the implicit knowledge of the 
fully determinate objective world, but rather a sedimented, latent totality of sense, which 
demands to be expressed.  And instead of the world being figured as the telos of 
completed knowledge, it now comes to be thought as the infinite arche of a sense which 
no subject could ever bring to conclusive expression.261  There is, for example, no 
painting that could bring the entire history of painting to its successful conclusion.  There 
is no proposition or series of propositions that could gather up all of sense, leaving 
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nothing more to be expressed.  The world as arche of sense is inexhaustible because, as 
we have seen, all successful expressions are recycled back into the stock of latent sense, 
adumbrating new possibilities that call in their turn to be expressed.  The music of Mahler 
and of Wagner, for example, gave expression to the possibilities opened up by 
Beethoven.  Eventually, Mahler’s and Wagner’s expressions came to be reabsorbed into 
the musical lingua franca, opening up still new possibilities for composers such as 
Schoenberg and Webern.  The world as infinite arche happens as the perpetual opening 
out of latent sense onto expressed sense and as the perpetual reintegration of the latter 
back into the former. 
 When this dynamic comes to be understood as originary, the embodied, 
perceiving subject loses its transcendental, constituting function.  The subject is able 
corporeally to intend a fixed world of stable significations only insofar as it is subjected 
to the demand that “arises from every lived thing (at times trifling), namely, the demand 
to be expressed.”262  Renaud Barbaras articulates this change in the function of the 
subject in an especially clear way: “Subjectivity thus is open and traversed by the 
expressive teleology: subjectivity no longer bears teleology; subjectivity is born in 
teleology.”263  That is to say, I become who I am only in responding to the solicitations of 
the meaningful world in which I find myself.  For example, I am among many other 
things a male.  To live my life within the set of meanings that constitutes the culture of 
the contemporary United States is to experience the pervasive demand that I give some 
kind of expression to my gender.  But, contrary to the position of intellectualism, the 
determinate meaning “male” does not pre-exist my expressing it.  Thus, if I were to 
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express my masculinity in accordance with some model that had been successfully 
established long ago—for example, if I were to comport myself in all of my dealings like 
Clark Gable—my expression would be unsuccessful.  My expression would fail to serve 
as a horizon gesturing toward the whole subject that I am, and would be encountered by 
others simply as an object: people would ask me why I continuously impersonate Clark 
Gable.  “Masculinity” is not objectively present as a positivity, as an already determinate 
model that needs only to be re-enacted:  I can never make of myself simply a token of the 
type.  “Masculinity” rather names a style, an open-ended, never fully determinate theme 
for which I must produce a variation.264  In taking up this demand to give expression to 
the various possibilities of meaning that exist for me in my culture, I become the subject 
that I am. 
 In The Prose of the World, Merleau-Ponty reconceives the role of the body and of 
perception on the basis of this imperative to give expression to the world that we live: 
“All perception, and all action which presupposes it, in short, every human use of the 
body, is already primordial expression.”265  The human body, in other words, is most 
originarily an expressive body.  My posture, my gait, the expressions on my face, and the 
way I form my words all express communally understood meanings.  Pierre Bourdieu, for 
example, has shown how social and economic class is incarnated in certain characteristic 
ways of carrying the body.  He finds in the France of the 1960s that whole sets of social 
class markers are gathered together in relatively coherent styles of relation to one’s own 
body, and to one’s mouth in particular.  The French lower classes, for example, tend to 
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refuse the various forms by which the “natural” body is stylized.  This is manifested in 
more boisterous forms of expression than one sees among the bourgeoisie and in 
uninhibited expressions of satisfaction in the “natural” pleasures of the body.  The French 
bourgeoisie, on the other hand, are concerned in all things to stylize or to repress the 
naturalness of the body.  Thus, for example, the bourgeois does not so much speak with 
his whole mouth as by articulating his words primarily by means of the lips, which he 
holds at a relatively high degree of tension.266  These styles of inhabiting the body do not 
signify social class externally, in the way for example that a uniform signifies which team 
an athlete plays for.  Rather one lives the meaning of one’s social position through these 
bodily comportments.  The status of Bourdieu’s characteristic French bourgeois becomes 
incarnate right there in the muscular tension of his lips, in the uprightness of his posture, 
and in the dexterity with which he manipulates the silverware at dinner.  Of course this is 
true more generally as well.  One’s masculinity is incarnated right there in the way he sits 
with his legs somewhat splayed and in his throwing the baseball with the force of his 
whole torso.  One’s status as manager at the fast food restaurant is registered right there 
in one’s authoritative tone of voice and in one’s comically self-important bearing.267 In 
short, one’s subjectivity is wholly embodied, and one’s embodiment is meaningful 
through and through. 
 The embodied act of perception, which Merleau-Ponty had articulated in 
Phenomenology of Perception as the most ontologically basic stratum of our being-in-
the-world, comes also to be seen as a function of the more originary dynamic of 
expression.  According to Merleau-Ponty, “perception already stylizes, that is, it affects 
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all the elements of a body or behavior with a certain common deviation with respect to 
some familiar norm that I have behind me.”268  Merleau-Ponty borrows an example from 
Malraux to illustrate what this means.  “A woman passing by is not first and foremost a 
corporeal contour for me, a colored mannequin, a spectacle in a given spot. . . .  She is a 
unique way of varying the accent of feminine being and thus of human being, which I 
understand the way I understand a sentence, namely, because it finds in me the system of 
resonators it needs.”269  My perception is immediately a perception of incarnate 
meanings.  I do not see the woman as a mere exemplar of femininity, but rather as the 
embodiment of a certain style of femininity.  I perceive in her, for example, the style of a 
particular social class, educational level, racial or ethnic group, regional subculture, etc.  
In Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty had discussed the way in which 
perception is drawn quasi-teleologically to focus on an object in the way best suited to 
making that object fully present, “in the flesh.”  The body was able to achieve this 
unchallengeable presence owing to its latent knowledge of the object and of the world of 
which it was a part.  Now we can apply a similar analysis to the body’s direct perception 
of expression.  Our bodies orient themselves to things in the manner necessary to bring 
out the relevant meanings that they bear.  To return to Malraux’s example, I know more 
or less how to pick out women who are compatible with me in terms of such things as 
social class and educational level.  I am able to focus on those elements of their embodied 
being-in-the-world that bring out these social meanings in an especially vivid way.  
Particular ways of walking, of speaking, and of gesturing constitute solicitations to my 
perceiving body.  That is, I perceive the expressions of these women immediately 
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because my own perceiving body belongs to the same community of meaning and 
expresses itself through variations on the same stock of social significations.  I perceive 
expression because my body is always already responsive to the solicitations of the world 
as latent totality of sense. 
 
V. Monism of Sense 
 
 This new conception that presents the dynamic of expression as ontologically 
prior to the level of perception and to the transcendental body that sustains it helps to 
overcome the dualisms that plagued Phenomenology of Perception.  More specifically, 
Merleau-Ponty reconceives the terms of the various dualisms as moments within the 
onefold of the dynamic of expression.  The dualisms of transcendental and ontological, 
unreflected and reflected, and sensible and intelligible are reduced to a monism of sense.  
In what follows we shall examine precisely how Merleau-Ponty uses the insights gained 
from his reading of Saussure to resolve these three dualisms.  In doing so, we shall also 
see how Merleau-Ponty’s work on expression points to a more adequate conception of 
originary sense. 
 The dualism of the transcendental and the ontological emerged from a basic 
ambiguity within the task of Phenomenology of Perception, and indeed of 
phenomenology generally.  On the one hand, the phenomenological reduction revealed 
that the world naively experienced in the natural attitude is more fundamentally a 
presented world.  This insight opened up for phenomenology the task of accounting for 
the constitution of the natural world.  This, of course, gives phenomenology the 
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transcendental orientation that still dominates Phenomenology of Perception.  On the 
other hand, the reduction makes apparent a level of being more originary than the natural 
world, and which therefore cannot be described within the discourses of the natural 
attitude.  This opens up for phenomenology the task of describing on its own terms the 
level of our originary opening out onto the world.  This conception of phenomenology is 
reflected especially clearly in the Preface to Phenomenology of Perception: 
phenomenology is “a philosophy for which the world is always ‘already there’ before 
reflection begins—as an inalienable presence, and all its efforts are concentrated upon re-
achieving a direct and primitive contact with the world, and endowing that contact with a 
philosophical status.”270  This dualism of orientations revealed itself in Merleau-Ponty’s 
account of the body, which he attempted to describe both in terms of its constituting 
function and ontologically as the place of our most originary opening out onto the world.  
By his own admission, Merleau-Ponty was unable to integrate these perspectives, 
articulating only a bad ambiguity of the two. 
 In the works of the 1950s, though, the body loses its central role and is thus no 
longer charged with supporting the dualism of transcendental and ontological 
orientations.  Instead, Merleau-Ponty reconceives this dualism as immanent to the 
dynamic of expression.  More specifically, the relation between ontological and 
transcendental orientations is replaced by the relation between the latent totality of sense 
on the one hand and successfully expressed sense on the other.  We have seen how the 
world that is “always ‘already there’ before reflection begins” is a world of latent sense.  
This latent sense adumbrates a particular, determinate sense that would be its 
achievement.  The movement from latent to achieved sense is the movement that, within 
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a philosophy that prioritizes the transcendental subject, appears to be the movement from 
constituting consciousness to constituted world.  Nonetheless, it remains the case that 
latent sense cannot be conceived adequately in terms of the successfully expressed sense 
that it “constitutes.”  This excess of latent sense over expressed sense corresponds to the 
ontological orientation in Phenomenology of Perception. 
 Let us first examine in detail the movement from latent to determinate, 
successfully expressed sense.  This movement becomes evident, for example, when a 
writer feels vaguely that he has something important to say, and then struggles to bring 
that presentiment to expression.  The writer is certain that language gives him sufficient 
means to express himself.  Indeed, without the linguistic competence already at his 
disposal, he would never have experienced the intimation of something that called to be 
expressed.  Nonetheless, he is at first unable to find the words to express his nascent 
thoughts.  “Then suddenly a flood of words comes to save this muteness and gives it an 
equivalent so exact and so capable of yielding the writer’s own thought to him when he 
may have forgotten it, that one can only believe that the thought had been expressed 
before the world began.”271  That is to say, when the writer finally finds the right words, 
it seems to him as if only those exact words could have given adequate expression to his 
thoughts.  The act of successfully expressing himself retroactively produces the illusion 
that the proper expression was already there, waiting only to be discovered.  According to 
this illusion, “language is there, like an all-purpose tool, with its vocabulary, its turns of 
phrase and form which have been so useful, and it always responds to our call, ready to 
express anything, because language is the treasury of everything one may wish to say—
because language has all our future experiences written into it, just as the destiny of men 
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is written in the stars.”272  In this experience, language appears to have been oriented 
always already toward the determinate expressions that it supports as their ground and 
condition of possibility. 
 But, once again, this exclusively transcendental orientation of language is 
illusory.  It is not the case that language, like God’s intellect, prefigures all the truths of 
the world.  It is not the case “that every signification which enters man’s experience 
carries within it its own formula, as the sun, in Piaget’s children, bears its name in its 
center.”273  In short, it is not the case that language is simply the double of the natural 
world.  While it is certainly true that language tends, quasi-teleologically, toward its 
fulfillment in successful expression, it is equally true that language as latent totality of 
sense always contains more than its expressions.  We mentioned above that no 
proposition, or set of propositions, could gather up the whole of what can be said, leaving 
nothing more to be expressed.  But we can make the case for the inexhaustibility of latent 
sense still more strongly: even if we gathered together all of the propositions that have 
been uttered to date, we will not have said everything.  And this statement will be true at 
any time that it is uttered.  Moreover, it is true, mutatis mutandis, for other, not strictly 
linguistic forms of expression such as music and painting as well.  There is thus always a 
reserve of sense which cannot be thought in terms of the achieved sense of the natural 
world. 
 The excess of latent sense over its expressions has its origin in the differential 
structure of the langue that Merleau-Ponty discovered in Saussurian linguistics.  The 
ability of speakers to express themselves—and not merely to encode their already 
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determinate thoughts—brings to light this differential structure.  If the langue were 
reducible to a totality of positive significations, then the subject could never express, or 
even feel compelled to express, a signification that she did not already know.  Moreover, 
she would be unable to learn from reading or from conversation any significations that 
she did not already know.  But we do not, of course, express ourselves or understand 
others simply by exchanging linguistic tokens.  Rather expression calls upon the 
differences of which the langue is constituted.  Our language “is expressive as much 
through what is between the words as through the words themselves, and through what it 
does not say as much as what it says.”274  “Museyroom,” for example, owes much of its 
expressive power to Joyce’s not having written “museum.”  In any linguistic expression, 
there is any number of other expressions that are virtually present and that contribute 
toward presenting the sense.  “And if we want to grasp speech in its most authentic 
operation in order to do it full justice, we must evoke all those words that could have 
come in its place that have been omitted. . . .”275  It is this insistence of difference right at 
the level of expressed sense that guarantees the irreducibility of language to its particular 
expressions. 
 From this we can see that the langue is able to open onto particular expressions 
only by concealing itself.  Just as the perceptual horizons withdraw in order to make 
room for the foregrounded object, so the differential structure of the langue recedes in 
favor of the positive signification that it enables.  When I read Finnegans Wake and 
encounter the signification “museyroom,” for example, I do not need explicitly to bring 
to mind the neighboring significations “museum,” “to muse,” and “room.”  In fact, 
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insofar as I am occupied with these virtually present significations, I fail to reach the 
museyroom itself, to encounter it “in the flesh.”  In this movement of revealing-
concealing, we encounter the dynamic proper to originary sense.  The two sides of this 
unitary dynamic correspond to the terms of the dualism of transcendental and ontological 
orientations.  On the one hand, latent sense refers beyond itself to the expressed sense 
that it grounds.  On the other hand we see something in latent sense that resists being 
gathered up in expression, and that cannot be adequately conceived in terms of the 
positive significations that it grounds.  But here both orientations are describable in terms 
of sense alone: sense refers both forward and backward only to sense.  We no longer need 
to posit the lived body as the locus and as the mediator for these two orientations.  Insofar 
as the body is indeed describable both in terms of its transcendental function and more 
originarily in terms of its opening out onto the world, this is because, as we have seen, the 
body is more primordially an expressive body, a body given over always already to the 
ambiguous dynamic of originary sense. 
 A very similar analysis will show how Merleau-Ponty resolves the dualism of the 
reflected and the unreflected into a monism of sense.  This dualism arose out of Merleau-
Ponty’s attempt to refute the intellectualist thesis, which takes the fully determinate, 
intelligible significations of the cogito as methodologically first.  These significations, of 
course, are the products of reflection.  In order to refute intellectualism, Merleau-Ponty 
had to demonstrate that reflected significations were built up on the basis of a more 
primordial unreflected being-in-the-world.  In Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-
Ponty articulated this unreflected being-in-the-world as embodied being-in-the-world.  
The problem arose when Merleau-Ponty attempted to describe our unreflected 
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embodiment but could do so only by using the conceptual tools that are the products of 
reflection.  This is similar to the problem that arose when he had attempted to describe 
the ontological level of human embodiment, but could do so only in terms of the body’s 
transcendental function.  Once again, the dualism was not resolved in Phenomenology of 
Perception, but rather localized on the body as another bad ambiguity. 
 The key to resolving this dualism is the insight that the unreflected dimension to 
which the subject is always already given over is the world as infinite arche of latent 
sense.  As we have seen, one becomes a subject only through being subjected to the 
demands and solicitations of this latent sense.  Or, to state the same point from a different 
perspective, the unreflected totality of sense becomes expressed in reflected significations 
through the medium of the subject.  The dynamic of unreflected and reflected, then, is 
most fundamentally a dynamic of sense, and not of the embodied subject. 
 We have already seen, at least in broad outlines, how the unreflected and reflected 
levels of sense can co-exist without the former being reduced to the latter.  Reflected 
sense is articulated into positive, determinate significations; this is true just as much for 
intellectualism as it is for Merleau-Ponty.  But what Merleau-Ponty has discovered, 
through his phenomenologically inspired reading of Saussure, is that reflected 
significations depend on a differential structure that must remain unreflected in order for 
the sense of the significations to be achieved.  Once again, if I intend the differential 
relations among “museum,” “to muse,” and “room,” I cannot at the same time 
successfully intend the signification “museyroom,” which these relations enable.  One 
might object here that by articulating the positive signification “museyroom” in terms of 
a series of differences, we have in fact reduced the unreflected dimension to the reflected.  
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But this objection misses the mark for two reasons.  First, to refer the positive 
signification to the differences that enable it is not the same as to perform a reduction.  It 
is not the case that “museyroom” equals the differential relations among “museum,” “to 
muse,” and “room.”  Rather this set of differences is virtually present in the positive 
signification.  That is to say, the three terms are present in the positive signification, but 
not as positive significations themselves.  Their virtual presence right at the level of the 
positive signification is thus necessarily unreflected.  Second, the terms of the differential 
relations themselves rely on a set of differential relations as their support.  In this regard, 
Merleau-Ponty’s account of perception corresponds to his account of expression.  In 
perception, every foreground requires a background.  If what had been part of the 
background becomes an object in the foreground, then this new foreground will require a 
new background.  Likewise, if we focus on a background signification, then its sense will 
depend on a different background set of differences.  There is, then, no term or set of 
terms to which any reduction could be performed.   The relation between unreflected and 
reflected is accounted for from within the monism of sense. 
 The final, and most important, dualism that Merleau-Ponty’s work on expression 
helps to resolve is that between the sensible and the intelligible.  This dualism, of course, 
is not unique to Merleau-Ponty, but has played a prominent role throughout the whole of 
Western philosophy.  In fact, one of the primary tasks of Phenomenology of Perception 
was precisely to rethink this dualism.  The critique of the philosophies of reflection that is 
carried on throughout that work is concerned almost entirely to show that our knowledge 
of essences is inseparable from the lived, factical world to which those essences refer and 
from which they derive.  Merleau-Ponty brings the sensible and the intelligible, the 
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factical world and the world of essences, together in the lived body, whose sensuous 
opening out onto the world is already informed by the world thesis, i.e., by an orientation 
toward the world as self-consistent totality of intelligible laws.  But insofar as Merleau-
Ponty conceives the perceiving body, plagued by all the bad ambiguities described above, 
as the most ontologically basic level, he fails to reach the level of originary sense and its 
good ambiguity.  In bypassing the embodied subject and taking the phenomenon of 
expression as the true dimension of origin for our being-in-the-world, Merleau-Ponty is 
able to arrive at a more satisfactory resolution of the dualism of the sensible and the 
intelligible. 
 The most important distinction that we can make in approaching this issue is that 
between the “I think” and the “I speak.”  “The ‘I think’ means there is a certain locus 
called ‘I’ where action and awareness of action are not different, where being confounds 
itself with its own awareness of itself, and thus where no intrusion from outside is even 
conceivable.”276  The “I think,” then, is the constituting subject.  Let us examine this 
subject from the perspective that is most relevant here.  If any words, or any signs of 
whatever kind, have meaning for the subject, this can only be because the subject has 
intended the meaning across the signs.  This is the case because, ex hypothesi, the 
contents of this subject’s consciousness could never be alien to it.  All meaning, in short, 
must be actively meant.  We can see clearly how this conception entails the dualism of 
sensible and intelligible.  The sensible sign—the printed or spoken word, the directional 
signal on the car, the blindfolded woman holding the scales of justice, etc.—must have no 
signifying power of its own that it might in some way impose on the subject.  Rather the 
subject must impose the intelligible sense on the sensible sign, thereby constituting its 
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meaning.  Once the meaning is constituted, the sensible sign can have no role except as 
index for an intelligible sense that is entirely self-sufficient. 
 But this conception of the subject is untenable, for reasons that we have discussed 
above.  The thesis according to which intelligible sense is entirely constituted by the self-
identical “I think” fails to account for some of our most basic experiences with meaning.  
It cannot, for example, account for our experience of literature.  I do not understand a 
work of literature solely with my own thoughts.  Rather the work “makes use of 
everything I have contributed in order to carry me beyond it.”277  When I first begin to 
read a novel, I do indeed understand the world that the author portrays in reference to my 
own world.  To that extent, one might rightly say that I constitute the sense of the novel.  
But at some point in the course of my reading there occurs a kind of Gestalt shift, such 
that I now participate in the fictional world on its own terms, and no longer on my own.  
Or, more accurately, I come to transcend my own world and to share a new world with 
the fictional characters who are portrayed in it as well as with others who have read the 
same book.  This perfectly familiar experience would be inconceivable if I were indeed 
this subject who constitutes all the contents of its own consciousness. 
 If this experience of literature is possible, then it must be the case that the words 
themselves exert a kind of power over the reader.278  It must be the case that the subject 
finds herself immersed always already within the language that exercises this strange 
power to draw her outside her own meaningful relation to the world.  This subject is the 
“I speak.”  The language within which this speaking subject is immersed cannot be 
conceived as the set of intelligible significations that she and her community have at their 
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disposal.  Neither can it be conceived as the set of spoken or written words that would 
correspond to those significations.  We cannot maintain any dualism of the sensible and 
the intelligible aspects of language here without losing our ability to account for the kind 
of openness to new meanings that we see exemplified in literature, but also in our most 
common encounters with other speaking subjects.  Just as in music the tones themselves 
convey the musical idea, so too in language the words themselves sustain the ideas that 
they express.  In all forms of expression, then, sensuous sense opens out onto intelligible 
sense, and intelligible sense points back to sensuous sense as its necessary support.  
Neither the sensible nor the intelligible, then, can be thought as originary in their own 
right.  What is first is the divergence (écart) that sets them apart but also unites them 
within the dynamic of originary, ambiguous sense. 
 
VI. The Circular Structure of the Flesh 
 
 The monism of sense that Merleau-Ponty first establishes with regard to the 
dynamic of expression reveals yet another ambiguity proper to originary sense: the 
ambiguity between activity and passivity.  When I follow the sense of the book that I am 
reading, “I am receiving and giving in the same gesture.”279  I must contribute my 
knowledge of the language and of its various stylistic possibilities.  I must also bring to 
the text my understanding of interpersonal relations, historical situations, different 
cultures, and of any number of worldly facts that might pertain to what I am reading.280  
Insofar as I bring my prior knowledge to bear on the text, it would not be entirely 
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inaccurate to say that I actively intend the meaning of the text across the signs of which it 
is composed.  But as long as I stand in this one-sided relation to the text, there can be no 
expression.  “The expressive moment occurs where the relationship reverses itself, where 
the book takes possession of the reader.”281  This happens when the author’s words guide 
me to a thought or to a style of thinking that was not already a part of my repertoire.  This 
passive moment within the dynamic of expression is easy to overlook because, when 
expression is successful, language conceals itself in favor of the signification that it 
presents.  It thus appears to us in retrospect that we possessed the signification all along.  
Our passive relation to the text is concealed by the presentive power of language itself. 
 In his final work, The Visible and the Invisible, Merleau-Ponty develops the 
philosophy of expression established in The Prose of the World into a fully-fledged 
ontology.  In doing so, he takes up once again the set of problems that had occupied him 
in Phenomenology of Perception.  As we have seen, Merleau-Ponty had attempted in that 
work to isolate perception as the level of our most originary opening out onto the world.  
However, owing to the persistence of certain classically phenomenological themes, such 
as subjectivity, intentionality, and constitution, the ontological orientation of that work 
was overshadowed by a predominately transcendental one.  In The Visible and the 
Invisible, Merleau-Ponty brings the insights from the philosophy of expression—
especially the thesis of the monism of sense and the ambiguity between activity and 
passivity that it entails—to bear explicitly on the question concerning our perceptual 
opening out onto the world.  These insights help to eliminate the dualisms that persisted 
in Phenomenology of Perception and thus allow Merleau-Ponty to focus entirely on the 
ontological dimension of our embodied being-in-the-world. 
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 The most basic insight for the thesis of the monism of sense, as Merleau-Ponty 
articulated it in The Prose of the World, was that the subject could apprehend the sense of 
things—of a text, a conversation, a painting, a gesture, etc.—only insofar as that subject 
was immersed always already within the world as infinite arche of sense.  On this view 
the subject does not constitute the sense of the world.  Rather, the subject is itself 
constituted in responding to the teleology proper to sense itself, whereby the virtual 
totality of latent sense opens out onto particular, achieved significations.  These achieved 
significations are then recycled back into the stock of latent sense, so that sense refers 
both forward and backward only to more sense. 
 This same basic insight applies also to our embodied, perceptual opening out onto 
the world.  We saw in Phenomenology of Perception that the perceiving body does not so 
much perceive things as perceive according to them.  This is especially evident in the 
case of those who had been blind from childhood and had had their vision restored 
through surgery.  We saw that it was not sufficient for these patients simply to open their 
eyes in order to see the world.  They had to learn to focus on things in the manner 
necessary to make them visible as the things they were.  In The Visible and the Invisible, 
Merleau-Ponty takes up again a question that he had not answered sufficiently in 
Phenomenology of Perception: how is this remarkable ability to see according to the 
things possible?  “What is this prepossession of the visible, this art of interrogating it 
according to its own wishes, this inspired exegesis?”282  It is not enough to say that the 
subject knows the world in advance, that the perceiving body is more fundamentally a 
knowing body.  This, as we have seen, suggests a transcendental perspective that passes 
over what is originary in our embodied being-in-the-world.  To overcome the dualism 
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entailed by this perspective, Merleau-Ponty must discover a monism of perceiving 
subject and perceived world. 
 The monism of sense that Merleau-Ponty advances in The Visible and the 
Invisible, and particularly in the chapter titled “The Intertwining—The Chiasm,” is 
articulated as “the visible.”  On the one hand, the visible obviously names the totality of 
things that can be seen.  But this does not begin to capture what is at issue here.  To think 
the visible simply as what can be seen is to remain within the dualism of seer and seen, 
subject and object.  The crucial insight that carries Merleau-Ponty beyond these dualisms 
is that the seer, in order to be able to see at all, must himself be among the visibles.  Or, 
more precisely, the perceiving subject must be immersed always already in the visible.  
The subject “who sees cannot possess the visible unless he is possessed by it, unless he is 
of it, unless, by principle, according to what is required by the articulation of the look 
with the things, he is one of the visibles, capable, by a singular reversal, of seeing them—
he who is one of them.”283  Just as one can apprehend particular significations only 
insofar as one is given over to sense as latent totality, so more fundamentally one can 
perceive the visibles of the world only insofar as one is constitutively immersed in the 
visible. 
 We can understand what Merleau-Ponty means by the visible through a 
comparison with the conception of language advanced in The Prose of the World.  
Language is of course composed of words that can be regarded as self-identical 
positivities.  But the successful expression that is reflected in these positivities conceals 
the more originary difference that makes the words’ identity possible.  Words are 
different both from themselves and from other words, and this difference is essentially a 
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presentive difference.  The words themselves gesture beyond themselves toward possible 
expressions.  The word “rogue,” for example, is an open field of expressive possibilities 
that can be actualized in Stendhal’s Rassi from The Charterhouse of Parma, but also in 
any number of other ways.  Words, then, are neither the sensuous sounds and figures that 
represent them nor the purely intelligible significations that they would indicate.  They 
are rather sensibles gesturing toward intelligible significations that they never achieve 
once and for all.  As we have seen, if words did not occupy this middle place between 
sensible and intelligible sense, then the phenomenon of expression would be impossible. 
 Merleau-Ponty’s argument with regard to the visible is very similar.  When we 
look out onto the world we seem to perceive self-identical things.  But this is an illusion 
of the natural attitude.  The given is in fact always given in depth, adumbrated through 
the different perspectives that the perceiving subject’s mobile body can adopt toward it.  
Just like the word, then, the perceived thing is reducible neither to its immediate sensuous 
manifestation nor to its intelligible signification.  The house that I see, for example, is 
never just the color of its paint or the texture of its siding, but neither does this sensuous 
given ever disappear entirely in favor of the intelligible signification “house.”  Rather, the 
visible thing, again like the word, is a fundamentally presentive difference-from-self.  
“Perception is not first a perception of things, but a perception of elements (water, air. . .), 
of rays of the world, of things which are dimensions, which are worlds, I glide over these 
elements and here I am in the world, I glide from the “subjective” to Being.”284  To 
describe the visible as most fundamentally dimensional or elemental is to highlight its 
role in presenting a world whose meaning is promised but never definitively given.  I am 
in the hospital room when somebody brings in a vase of roses.  I notice the vibrant red, 
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which might be conceived as a pure quale, a sensuous this-here-now that I experience 
entirely subjectively.  But the roses are never just that.  As dimensional and as elemental, 
the roses quite literally extend a world.  The vibrant red ensnares the gaze, punctuating 
the otherwise wholly functional space of the hospital room and making of it a more 
human space.  Again, “the redness of the roses functions as the color-level against which 
our arms appear pallid and the faces of visitors vibrant.”285  The roses, by means of their 
differential relation with the rest of the hospital room—the sterile white of the sheets, the 
non-stop beeping of monitors, the persistent groaning, wheezing, and snoring of other 
patients—contributes toward presenting a new variation on the meaning of the situation. 
 This meaning that is presented by the dimensional visible cannot be constituted by 
a transcendental subject.  As we saw with regard to language in The Prose of the World, 
the subject can apprehend the sense of the world only insofar as she is subject to it.  Once 
again we find an originary ambiguity between activity and passivity in our perceptual 
opening out onto the world.  In The Visible and the Invisible this ambiguity is named 
reversibility.  In a working note, Merleau-Ponty writes that “the chiasm, reversibility, is 
the idea that every perception is doubled with a counter-perception (Kant’s real 
opposition), is an act with two faces, one no longer knows who speaks and who listens.  
Speaking-listening, seeing-being seen, perceiving-being perceived circularity. . . Activity 
= passivity.”286  This, of course, is very similar to the unity of touching-being-touched 
that we discussed with regard to Phenomenology of Perception.  In that work, however, 
Merleau-Ponty had retained a trace of dualism within the unity: the experience of 
touching and being touched was conceived ultimately as an experience for the tacit 
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cogito.  The reversibility thesis articulated in The Visible and the Invisible attempts to 
overcome that dualism.287  Instead of the gap that still remains between the perceiving 
body and the tacit cogito, Merleau-Ponty articulates the non self-identity between 
subjectivity and objectivity, activity and passivity, as écart, as a spacing internal to the 
one indivisible Being. 
 We can apprehend what is new in the account of reversibility as it is presented in 
The Visible and the Invisible by returning to the example we used with regard to the unity 
of touching-being-touched that was articulated in Phenomenology of Perception.  I can 
actively touch the guitar only if I am at the same time touched by it.  I actively determine 
the sense of the guitar—is it well crafted? Is it worth the price that is being asked?—only 
by letting the surfaces of my body be subjected to the guitar.  Up to this point, the 
description is the same as the one given previously.  The essential difference here is that 
it is not really I who experience the sensations localized on the surface of my perceiving 
body.  To conceive of the matter that way is to hypostatize the two sides, the active and 
the passive, that are set apart but also gathered together within the écart.  In The Visible 
and the Invisible Merleau-Ponty thinks the touching and the being touched as one 
phenomenon with one locus, which he names the flesh.  This structure of the flesh is the 
structure of the visible as a whole.  It, along with the unity of activity and passivity that is 
proper to it, is “an ultimate notion,” “not the union or compound of two substances, but 
thinkable by itself.”288  There is, then, one phenomenon: the touching of the guitar.  This 
one phenomenon has two orientations—the active touching and the passive being 
touched—but it is impossible to say precisely where one of these orientations ends and 
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the other begins.  And this is because the two orientations are more fundamentally one.  
In the previous chapter we discussed the unity of centrifugal and centripetal orientations.  
But this unity turned out to be yet another bad ambiguity, localized on a body conceived 
primarily with respect to its active, constituting function.  In The Visible and the 
Invisible, Merleau-Ponty reconceives this unity of the flesh as circular: the active 
touching and the passive being touched are “two segments of one sole circular course 
which goes above from left to right and below from right to left, but which is but one sole 
movement in its two phases.”289  It is true, then, to say that I, as embodied subject, 
constitute the sense of the guitar in my act of touching it.  But we must recognize that that 
truth is one-sided.  For it is equally true that I am constituted as subject in being subjected 
to the touch of the guitar.  As the analogy to the circle suggests, neither of these sides 
enjoys the least priority relative to the other. 
 
 
VII. Imperative Vulnerability 
 
 In the previous chapter, we focused on the ways in which the originary sense to 
which we are given over always already extends worlds that are most essentially 
practical.  When I look out onto the assembly line on my first day of work at the factory, 
I perceive it as a set of tasks to which I must learn to adapt the forces of my body.  In 
learning to operate the machines, I take my place within the practical world of the 
factory.  In this opening out of perception onto a world of practical tasks we recognized 
one of the most salient features of the imperative: the demand for lawfulness.  The world 
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that takes form as my body adapts itself to the assembly line is not at all my own private 
world.  Rather I learn to operate the machines as anyone in general would operate them.  
I am a good factory worker to the extent that I do what anyone else would do in similar 
circumstances, and thus to the extent that I bring my own behavior into conformity with 
the practical law of that particular world. 
 But there is another salient feature of the imperative that we have not yet 
addressed.  Lawfulness, of course, does not by itself constitute the whole of the 
phenomenon of the imperative.  The imperative is also necessarily something received, 
addressed to a passivity in us that is irreducible.  It happens, then, as a contestation.  
Unfortunately, the language of contestation suggests all too readily an attitude of piety, 
directed toward a transcendent Other that would be the locus of that contestation.  
Merleau-Ponty’s revised conceptions of sense in The Prose of the World and The Visible 
and the Invisible, however, give us the tools necessary to conceive this passivity and this 
contestation immanently, from within the monism of sense. 
 In The Prose of the World, Merleau-Ponty argues that “there can be speech (and 
in the end personality) only for an ‘I’ which contains the germ of a depersonalization.  
Speaking and listening not only presuppose thought but—even more essentially, for it is 
practically the foundation of thought—the capacity to allow oneself to be pulled down 
and rebuilt again by the person before one, by others who may come along, and in 
principle by anyone.”290  I as subject carry out my life in various worlds that are 
practically meaningful—the world of the factory, of guitar aficionados, of Americans, 
etc.  By participating actively in these worlds, I mold myself into the person I am.  But 
the condition for my living these meaningful worlds and for my consolidating my 
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subjectivity in accordance with them is precisely that I put those worlds and those 
subjectivities perpetually at risk.  Let us look once again at Merleau-Ponty’s example 
concerning Stendhal.  Because I read French, know the history of the Napoleonic Wars, 
and am familiar with the cultures of nineteenth century Europe, I belong, more or less, to 
the world that Stendhal depicts.  And yet my very belonging to that world leaves me open 
to Stendhal’s unique variation and stylization of it.  When I have finished reading the 
book, I am won over to Stendhal’s version of the world.  My active participation in 
Stendhal’s world shades imperceptibly into my vulnerability to it. 
 This vulnerability is imperative.  The circular conception of the flesh that 
Merleau-Ponty worked out in The Visible and the Invisible suggests that the imperative of 
the world happens equiprimordially as the imperative to allow others to contest that 
world.  Let us say, for example, that I know of someone who has developed an addiction 
to some drug.  It is my opinion that drug use and, a fortiori, drug addiction is immoral.  
What I mean by that is that drug use is incompatible with living an orderly, law-governed 
practical life.  Someone who is addicted to drugs is obviously less capable of performing 
the functions that correspond to her various roles in the public world.  In holding these 
moralizing views, I consolidate my own identity as one who sides with the law and with 
the imperative of the world.  And in passing judgment on the addict, I perform a kind of 
Sinngebung, unilaterally determining the sense of the situation in general and of the 
addict in particular. 
 But now let us suppose that the addict is someone I know well, perhaps even a 
friend.  In this case, my ability unilaterally to determine the sense of the situation is 
contested.  When I meet her I can perceive the pain she experiences from the addiction 
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directly in her tone of voice, in her posture, and in the expressions on her face.  Her 
embodiment, along with the story she tells about herself, makes sense.  And my ability to 
apprehend that sense is inseparable from my vulnerability to it.  The sense that she makes 
contests me and my subjectivity.  This, of course, does not entail my renouncing entirely 
the imperative of the world.  Rather it means that right then while I share her world, I put 
that imperative and the identity that corresponds to it in brackets.  In picking up the sense 
of her situation, I find that she has repositioned my subjectivity in ways that I could not 
have predicted.  I find, for example, a capacity for compassion and for understanding that 
I did not know.  I can no longer simply be the partisan for the imperative of the world.  
As Merleau-Ponty says, my friend has, to an extent, pulled my world down and rebuilt it. 
 Of course this imperative vulnerability is not a second imperative, contradictory 
to the imperative of the world.  The encounter with the drug-addicted friend does not 
merely reduce me to passivity.  Rather a new practical world emerges from the 
experience.  I will not be content simply to feel compassion for my friend, but will want 
also to take active measures to ameliorate her condition.  To do that, I need to situate 
myself within a practical world that is new to me: I must learn about addiction and the 
world of addicts in order to act rationally and helpfully.  There is thus no contradiction 
between the demand that I constitute a lawful practical world and the demand that I 
remain perpetually vulnerable to the others’ contestations of that world.  Merleau-Ponty’s 
conceptualizations of expression and of the flesh help us to recognize the imperative as 
one phenomenon with one locus in the ambiguous, originary sense to which we as 
practical subjects are given over always already. 
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I. Singularity and the Monism of Sense 
 
 
 We saw in the previous chapter that the imperative sense to which we are 
constitutively given over contains an irreducible moment of passivity.  In his examination 
of the phenomenon of expression, and later of the flesh, Merleau-Ponty discovered that 
our subjective power of intending sense is inseparable from our being subjected to it.  
The moments of activity and passivity are described as “two segments of one sole 
circular course which goes above from left to right and below from right to left, but 
which is one sole movement in its two phases. . . .”291  This description of sense 
according to the analogy of the circle helped us to revise our conception of the imperative 
developed in Chapter One, which focused too much on the traditionally Kantian motifs of 
lawfulness and subjective mastery.  We saw that our originary anchorage within 
imperative sense demands a kind of vulnerability, a willingness to renounce our mastery 
of the ethical situation and to submit to a meaning that is not already our own. 
 As Jean-François Lyotard shows in Discours, figure, however, Merleau-Ponty’s 
phenomenologically inspired accounts of expression and of our embodied being-in-the-
world fail to capture the passivity of our relation to originary sense in all its radicality.  
For Lyotard, the indispensable contribution of phenomenology toward our understanding 
of sense is its conception of negation as spacing or distancing.292  This spacing—
represented in Husserl as intentionality, in Phenomenology of Perception as corporeal 
intentionality, and in The Visible and the Invisible as chiasm—gives objects in a depth 
that is irreducible to the flat space of signification.  My perception of the house, for 
example, can never be reduced to a particular relation between the house and me, 
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conceived as two positivities.  Because the spacing between the terms is primary, the 
house can only be given in adumbrations, and never all at once; the house as such is 
always further on.  To say that the house is given in depth, then, is to say that the 
perceived house always holds itself in reserve, that it is never given as the pure, self-
identical signification “house.”  This irreducibility of the given to the flat space of 
signification is what Lyotard calls the figural.  The figural character of the perceived 
object makes demands on the perceiving subject, interrupting always already his identity 
and his self-mastery, and subjecting him to the imperative of sense in depth.  The subject 
is who he is only by following the lead of the given. 
 As we saw in the previous chapter, the sense in depth that Merleau-Ponty 
describes in The Prose of the World and The Visible and the Invisible is articulated on the 
basis of a monism of sense.  In The Visible and the Invisible, Merleau-Ponty showed that 
the perceiving subject could perceive according to the things only because both subject 
and object belong more primordially to the same dimension of sense, viz., the flesh.  And 
in The Prose of the World, he showed that I am able to understand the meaning of 
persons, situations, and cultures that are radically foreign to my own experience only 
because the other’s sense is a variant of my own, much as the music of Bach and of Burt 
Bacharach, as different as they are, are nonetheless variants within the wider tradition of 
Western music.  While this thesis of the monism of sense helps to explain how the 
imperative can have its locus right here in the world, and not in some transcendent region 
of being, it cannot account for the way in which we experience the imperative precisely 
as an interruption, as a radical break within the meaningful world.  In the experience of 
the imperative, I am revealed to myself as incommensurable and as singular.  The I that 
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experiences the command is not primarily the one that takes its bearings within the world 
of socially accepted meanings—I as son, as employee, or as citizen.  This singular I that 
is revealed in the imperative cannot be adequately thought on the basis of the monism of 
sense.  Insofar as Merleau-Ponty is able to isolate something pre-personal within the 
subject, that something takes the form of an anonymity, of l’on.  So, on Merleau-Ponty’s 
account, when I find myself compelled to subject myself to the sense of someone whose 
life experiences differ radically from my own—the case of the drug-addicted friend from 
the last chapter, for example—it is not I qua friend or I qua partisan of the moral law and 
of self mastery who feels the force of that imperative.  Rather the I that is addressed is the 
I as the completely generalized, anonymous locus of the circular dynamic of sense.293  It 
is this that seems importantly wrong in Merleau-Ponty’s account and which motivates our 
search for a conception of originary sense capable of accounting for the singularity and 
the break with the ordered, meaningful world that happen with the imperative. 
 In Lyotard’s terms, we require a conception of sense that can help us to think the 
event.  For Lyotard, “the event as disruption is always that which defies knowledge; it 
can defy knowledge articulated in discourse, but it can just as well shake the quasi-
understanding of the body, bringing it into conflict with itself and with other things, as in 
emotion.”294  The event discloses a radical passivity within the structure of subjectivity, 
which Merleau-Ponty attempts to think in terms of the anonymity of l’on.  But this 
conception of passivity “can only operate within the field prepared by phenomenology, as 
the contrary or the correlate of intentional activity, as its layer of support.”295  Since its 
introduction in the works of Husserl, phenomenological methodology has been oriented 
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primarily toward knowledge, i.e., toward achieved significations whose ground it sought 
in the structure of intentional subjectivity.296  The conception of passivity that Merleau-
Ponty introduced into phenomenology still functions within that knowledge-centered 
problematic.  The passivity of the perceiving or speaking subject is conceived as a 
precondition for the worldly significations that are achieved in active intentionality.  So, 
for example, I am able as a contemporary American to understand a French novel from 
the early part of the nineteenth century only because my openness and vulnerability to the 
dynamic of sense in general supports my act of intending the sense of this particular 
novel.  This intimate bond between passivity and active intentionality is expressed in 
Merleau-Ponty’s description of the dynamic of sense in terms of circularity and 
reversibility.  This kind of passivity, oriented always already toward a world conceived as 
essentially meaningful, can never constitute a radical break with that world.  It cannot, in 
sum, account for the imperative in its character as event. 
 I shall attempt in the present chapter to demonstrate that Gilles Deleuze offers a 
conception of sense adequate to a rigorous thinking of the event in his Logic of Sense.  I 
will discuss first how Deleuze isolates a dimension of sense that is irreducible to the 
sense in depth articulated by Merleau-Ponty.  This second, surface, dimension of sense 
challenges Merleau-Ponty’s monism of sense with what might be called an immediate 
duality of the actual and the virtual.297  Second, I will demonstrate that the flat space of 
sense is also the space of the event.  Following Lyotard, we shall take event to designate 
that which disrupts the ordered world of significations within which the practical subject 
takes its bearings.  We will see that the Deleuzian event defies knowledge (the world of 
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good sense and of common sense in Deleuze’s terminology) by showing how it bears 
within it always already a kind of nonsense conceived as excess of sense.298  Finally, I 
will show how the Deleuzian conception of the event helps us to think the singularity that 
is disclosed in the phenomenon of the imperative. 
 
II. Sense in the Sheep’s Shop 
 
 We saw in the Introduction how Saussure’s concept of linguistic value introduced 
a dimension of sense irreducible to the space of things in depth.  For Saussure, the 
signification of a term is in no way grounded in the referent of that term.  The signifier 
“apple,” for example, does not borrow its linguistic value from real, three-dimensional 
apples.  Rather the value “apple” is determined from within the flat space of the langue, 
which is composed of purely differential linguistic elements.  As a speaking subject, my 
relation to the linguistic system is wholly passive.  In order even to intend the 
signification “apple,” I must submit to the constraints imposed by the system.  Indeed, if I 
were to disregard the langue entirely, I would be unable even to intend myself as the one 
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who would like to intend “apple.”  This demonstrates that the locus of sense is not 
primarily in things, nor in the subject who intends them, nor even in any kind of circular 
relation that may obtain between them.  Sense in depth, we saw, presupposes a flat space 
of sense that must be conceived as autonomous. 
 In The Logic of Sense, Deleuze offers a different, and for our purposes more 
fruitful, demonstration of the irreducibility of the flat space of sense.  In the “Third Series 
of the Proposition” Deleuze examines “the circle of the proposition,” attempting to 
discover therein the locus of sense.  The circle here consists of the three relations 
generally recognized by linguists within the proposition: denotation, manifestation, and 
signification.  Deleuze attempts to discover whether sense can be localized in any one of 
these relations or within the system of their mutual references. 
 Let us begin with the relation of denotation.  Denotation “is the relation of the 
proposition to an external state of affairs (datum).”299  From the perspective of the natural 
attitude, the denotative function of the proposition appears to be the most important and 
most fundamental.  The proposition as denotation is understood as pointing to a world 
that is already there, providing the measure for truth and falsity.  I say “there is Paul.”  If 
it is indeed Paul whom I see when I utter the proposition, then I have spoken truly; if not, 
I have spoken falsely.  Or, at a more abstract level, I might say “a bachelor is an 
unmarried man.”  This proposition is not only true, but necessarily true, which means that 
nothing in the world will ever appear that fails to correspond to my denotation: I will 
never encounter a bachelor who is not an unmarried man.  It seems, again from within the 
natural attitude, that there is nothing more to determine than the truth or falsity of 
                                                
299 Deleuze, LS, 12; LS-Fr, 22. 
  
 160 
propositions considered as denotations.  The whole of sense seems to be captured in this 
relation of the proposition to the states of affairs that it denotes. 
 We have known, however, at least since Descartes, that the whole of sense cannot 
be captured within the denotative relation, which leaves out of account the very ground 
of that relation, viz., the subject for whom the denoted world appears.  This realization 
forces us to recognize manifestation as a second relation within the proposition.  
Manifestation “concerns the relation of the proposition to the person who speaks and 
expresses himself.”300  All propositions, whether explicitly or not, contain a reference to 
the subjects that utter them.  I might, for example, utter the proposition “this is a piece of 
wax,” but as Descartes has shown, this proposition would be stated more accurately as “I 
judge that this is a piece of wax.”  This addition to the proposition is not superfluous: the 
reference to the speaking subject shifts the focus from truth and falsity to the subject-
centered criteria by which these can be determined.  The proposition “this is a piece of 
wax” opens inevitably onto the question, “how do you know that this is a piece of wax?”  
Contrary to the thesis of the natural attitude, this question cannot be answered simply by 
reference to states of affairs in the external world, since it is precisely the speaking 
subject’s representation of that world that is being called into question.  The role of 
subjectivity in helping to clarify the epistemological status of our relation to the external 
world, then, is irreducible.301 
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 But, as we saw in our discussion of Saussure in the Introduction and briefly in the 
present chapter, the I that is manifested in the proposition itself depends on its having a 
place marked out within the system of language.  Descartes had already recognized this 
phenomenon in his Meditations on First Philosophy: “What then did I formerly think I 
was?  A man, of course.  But what is a man?  Might I not say a ‘rational animal’?  No, 
because then I would have to inquire what ‘animal’ and ‘rational’ mean.  And thus from 
one question I would slide into many more difficult ones.”302  Descartes, of course, 
attempted to avoid this problem by identifying himself with the cogito, which was 
supposed to be understood as soon as it was uttered.  We have already seen why this 
solution fails, though: the cogito is less an immediately graspable denotation that the 
conclusion to the argument that constitutes Book Two of the Meditations.303  This 
dependence of manifestation on a series of determinations that it entails requires us to 
recognize a third relation within the proposition, which is called signification.  
“Signification is defined by this order of conceptual implication where the proposition 
under consideration intervenes only as an element of a ‘demonstration,’ in the most 
general sense of the word, either as premise or as conclusion.”304  It seems now that the 
relation of signification must be the most originary locus of sense, since all denotations 
and manifestations presuppose it.  As we have seen, I cannot denote an apple in the 
external world without calling upon the langue as system of significations.  Nor can I 
                                                                                                                                            
see how Deleuze undermines that image from within, along with its characteristic turn to the grounding 
function of subjectivity.  Deleuze, DR, 131; DR-Fr, 172. 
302 René Descartes, Philosophical Essays and Correspondence, ed. Roger Ariew (Indianapolis: Hackett, 
2000), 108. (In the marginal pagination to Meditations on First Philosophy, page 25.) 
303 Merleau-Ponty, PP, 401-2; PP-Fr, 459-60. 
304 Deleuze, LS, 14; LS, 24.
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even isolate myself as the one who would denote the apple.  The primacy of the cogito, 
then, seems to be replaced by that of the langue. 
 But this return to signification as the most originary locus of sense is only 
apparently decisive.  Although it is indeed the case that both denotation and manifestation 
presuppose signification, it is just as much the case that signification presupposes 
denotation.  The system of language exists not for its own sake, but to point beyond itself 
to the worldly states of affairs that it denotes.  Even propositions that articulate the theory 
of signification as prior to denotation presuppose the phenomenon of signification as their 
own denotatum.  This suggests, once again, that we should regard denotation as the most 
fundamental locus of sense.  This development brings into view the circularity that 
characterizes the three relations within the proposition.  We see how sense is perpetually 
displaced within this circle, from denotation to manifestation, from manifestation to 
signification, and finally from signification back to denotation, where the circular course 
begins again. 
 I would like to emphasize two similarities between the circle of the proposition 
and the circular dynamic of sense articulated by Merleau-Ponty.  The first similarity is 
that in both cases, sense is presented as irreducible to any of its positions within the 
circle.  Within the circle of the proposition, sense can never be localized within 
denotation, manifestation, or signification, but is rather perpetually displaced from itself 
within the circuit.  Likewise, we saw that for Merleau-Ponty sense could not be localized 
within the subject or the object, within the active or the passive relation, or within the 
intelligible or the sensible.  Merleau-Ponty’s name for this perpetual displacement of 
sense was ambiguity: when the displacement was thought on the basis of the various 
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positions within the circle, it was called the bad ambiguity, whereas when the dynamic of 
displacement was thought on its own terms, it was called the good ambiguity. 
 The second similarity that I would like to emphasize is that in both cases, the 
circle of sense is closed.  And in both cases, the closed space of the circle serves to 
contain the perpetual displacement of sense within the limits of good sense.  The 
reference of denotation back to manifestation, for example, does not undermine the 
natural image of thought, with its characteristic focus on the truth or falsity of recognition 
(is this really a piece of wax?).  It rather serves to ground that image of thought.  My 
judgment about the wax is rendered more secure by the criterion of clearness and 
distinctness that derives solely from my certain knowledge of myself as subject.  Or 
again, Hume’s skepticism about the external world is overcome in Kantian subjectivity, 
which prepossesses the categories that will apply to anything that can be denoted.  The 
same effect can be seen in Merleau-Ponty’s circle of sense.  The passive relation to sense 
that Merleau-Ponty comes to emphasize in The Prose of the World and The Visible and 
the Invisible does not open us out onto a sense that is incommensurable with the world as 
ordered system of significations.  In terms of the analogy, it does not open us to anything 
outside the circle.  Rather, my passive relation to sense is assimilated to the process by 
which I as subject intend good, achieved significations.  For example, my vulnerability to 
the other’s narrative is inseparable from my successfully intending its sense.  This 
intention will extend a new, orderly practical world where I will be able once again to be 
master.  This closure of the circle of sense—which is another way to describe the monism 
of sense—is what prevents Merleau-Ponty from thinking the event as incommensurability 
with any world of ordered significations.  For this reason, it will be especially important 
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to see how Deleuze proposes to open the circle to an outside that it will never be able to 
re-appropriate. 
 The most important move in Deleuze’s attempt to open the circle of the 
proposition to the outside is to repeat the conditioning operation that first set the circle in 
motion.  We saw that denotation, with its characteristic concern for truth and falsity, 
presupposed manifestation as its condition of possibility.  Manifestation, in turn, 
presupposed signification, and finally signification presupposed denotation.  But there is 
something essential that is presupposed by the circle as a whole, and this is what Deleuze 
calls sense:  
When I designate something, I always suppose that the sense is understood, that it is 
already there.  As Bergson said, one does not proceed from sounds to images and 
from images to sense; rather, one is established “from the outset” within sense.  Sense 
is like the sphere in which I am already established in order to enact possible 
denotations, and even to think their conditions.  Sense is always presupposed as soon 
as I begin to speak; I would not be able to begin without this presupposition.305 
 
Sense, then, is originary.306  When I denote something, for example when I say “this is a 
piece of wax,” my act makes sense both to myself and to others: it occurs in response to 
the sense of a particular situation, such as providing an example to show that acts of 
perception are more adequately described as acts of judgment.  Without this presupposed 
sense, the I that is manifested in the proposition would have nothing to say.  Even 
signification, which seems to be the highest condition, presupposes sense: when I attempt 
                                                
305 Deleuze, LS, 28; LS-Fr, 41. 
306 Deleuze writes explicitly that “sense is essentially produced.  It is never originary but is always and 
derived.”  This does not contradict the point the point being made here, however.  What Deleuze means in 
this context is that the sense of things does not pre-exist the things themselves, as their model or normative 
ideal.  Rather, the sense of things is produced as a kind of surface effect by the actions and passions of the 
things themselves.  The things, in a manner of speaking, are prior to their senses.  And yet we can speak of 
the things—denote them—only because we and they are already established within sense.  It is this feature 
of sense that I am referring to when I say that sense is originary.  As we will see shortly, sense names the 
originary difference that both separates and unites words and things, giving at once the possibility of 
language and the possibility of its referents.  Deleuze, LS, 95; LS-Fr, 116. 
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to understand myself as rational animal, I do so in response to the question of the sense of 
my being. 
 Is this not really just to introduce a distinction without a difference, though?  Is 
there really a distinction to be made, for example, between a denotatum and the sense of 
the denotatum?  When I say “this is an apple,” is the sense of the proposition really 
something different from the apple that I denote?  Or, at a higher level, is the sense really 
different from the belief I have in my own mind that this is an apple?  If so, what 
precisely is the difference?  It is difficulties like these that have made it particularly 
difficult to recognize sense as a separate relation within the proposition.  Language 
suggests to us that there is something called sense and that it is not the same thing as 
denotation, manifestation, or signification.  To speak, for example, of the sense of an 
apple is perfectly intelligible to any native speaker of English.  But what is this sense?  
Does not the very question call for a response that makes of sense just another 
denotatum?  Moreover, where is sense, if not in the things denoted or in the mind of the 
speaker who denotes them? 
 The first step that is necessary in working through these difficulties is to 
recognize that sense, as condition for the kind of representational thinking exemplified in 
the circle of the proposition, cannot itself be represented.  Representational thinking is 
characterized most basically by the subordination of difference to identity.  According to 
what Deleuze calls the natural image of thought, our cognitive faculty is constitutively 
oriented toward the true.  In order to speak the truth about a denoted object, it must be the 
case that the object is a self-identical unity.  As Kant notes, “if cinnabar were sometimes 
red, sometimes black, sometimes light, sometimes heavy, . . . my empirical imagination 
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would never find opportunity when representing red colour to bring to mind heavy 
cinnabar.”307 Indeed, the standpoint of representational thinking is nicely captured in this 
regard by Bishop Butler’s famous maxim: “Everything is what it is, and not another 
thing.”308  The unity of the denoted thing is guaranteed by the unity of the subject’s 
cognitive faculty, and the unity of the subject is in turn guaranteed by the unity of the 
significations of language.  Sense, however, cannot be thought representationally.  The 
attempt to pin down the nature of sense is akin to Alice’s experience in the Sheep’s Shop 
in Through the Looking-Glass: 
The shop seemed to be full of all manner of curious things—but the oddest part of it 
all was that, whenever she looked hard at any shelf, to make out exactly what it had 
on it, that particular shelf was always quite empty, though the others round it were 
crowded as full as they could hold. 
 “Things flow about here so!” she said at last in a plaintive tone, after she had spent a 
minute or so vainly pursuing a large bright thing that looked sometimes like a doll 
and sometimes like a work-box, and was always in the shelf next above the one she 
was looking at.  “And this one is the most provoking of all—but I’ll tell you what—” 
she added, as a sudden thought struck her.  “I’ll follow it up to the very top shelf of 
all.  It’ll puzzle it to go through the ceiling, I expect!” 
 But even this plan failed: the “thing” went through the ceiling as quietly as possible, 
as if it were quite used to it.309 
 
 Sense is, to borrow a phrase from Lacan, pre-eminently that which is “not in its 
place [manque à sa place].”310  It is what defies the requirement of representational 
thinking that every object be determinable within the unifying spaces of good sense and 
common sense, that it be localized unproblematically on its assigned shelf in the Sheep’s 
Shop of knowledge.  We can, like Alice, catch a glimpse of sense in its paradoxical 
presence-as-absence by trying to pin it down to a determinate locus that would be proper 
to it.  Let us begin at the most concrete level by trying to locate sense at the level of 
                                                
307 Kant, CPR, A100-1. 
308 Joseph Butler, Five Sermons (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1983), 20. 
309 Lewis Carroll, The Complete Works of Lewis Carroll (New York: Barnes and Noble Books, 2001), 185-
6. Hereafter Complete Works. Cf. Deleuze, LS, 41; LS-Fr, 56. 
310 Jacques Lacan, Écrits, trans. Bruce Fink (New York: Norton, 2006), 25. Page numbers for this text refer 
to those given in the margin, which correspond to the French original.  Cf. Deleuze, LS, 41; LS-Fr, 56. 
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denoted things.  We see quickly that sense is wholly indifferent to this level: propositions, 
for example, that refer to the golden mountain are no less sensible than those that refer to 
Mount Rushmore.  Perhaps, then, we might try to localize sense within the judgment that 
bears upon these denoted objects.  Once again, though, sense eludes our grasp: “Sense is 
strictly the same for propositions which are opposed from the point of view of quality, 
quantity, relation, or modality.  For all of these points of view affect denotation and the 
diverse aspects of its actualization in a state of affairs.  But they do not affect either sense 
or expression.”311  For example, propositions opposed from the point of view of quality, 
such as “God exists” and “God does not exist” have precisely the same sense, viz., the 
existence of God.312  The problem of denotation, we can now see, is simply to determine 
whether the sense expressed by the proposition—here “the existence of God”—is 
actualized in a state of affairs external to the proposition.  Sense is not in the denoted 
things or in the proposition that states the determinate sense of those things, but is rather 
anterior to both. 
 We might finally attempt to map sense onto signification, which is concerned 
with the conditions under which propositions can be true.  This strategy seems more 
likely than the others to succeed.  If a concept has no possibility whatever of being 
actualized in a denoted state of affairs—if, that is, it lacks signification—then it seems 
appropriate to say that the concept is nonsensical.   Examples of such concepts without 
signification include the square circle, the perpetuum mobile, and the mountain without a 
valley.313  Conversely, it seems appropriate to identify concepts with signification with 
those that possess sense.  This mapping is still not adequate, however.  The square circle 
                                                
311 Deleuze, LS, 33; LS-Fr, 46. 
312 Ibid. 
313 Deleuze, LS, 35; LS-Fr, 49. 
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and the mountain without a valley are indeed absurd: it is impossible that they should 
truly denote any object in the external world.  But the impossible or the absurd is not 
coextensive with the nonsensical.  Although that which is impossible can never have real, 
worldly being, it is nevertheless something, aliquid.314  More specifically, it is that 
something whose most salient property is its impossibility.  That there should be 
something that has the property of impossibility violates the most basic requirements of 
representational thinking.  And yet propositions referring to that something somehow 
make sense.  At this point we witness sense passing “through the ceiling as quietly as 
possible, as if it were quite used to it.”  This passage through the ceiling is the passage 
outside the apparently closed circle of sense. 
 
III. Sense as Virtual Event 
 
 We are attempting here to think sense in its character as event, as disruption of the 
ordered world of good sense and common sense within which the practical subject takes 
its bearings.  We have shown at this point how sense always exceeds this world, but we 
need to show in addition how it actively disrupts it.  In order to do this, we will need to 
describe in more positive terms the relation between sense and things.  In doing so, we 
will see that the relation of sense to the circle of the proposition is not merely one of 
mutual externality, but rather one in which the good sense of the inside is compromised 
by the outside that has contaminated it always already. 
 Let us begin at the apparently most concrete level of corporeal things.  In the 
“Fifteenth Series of Singularities,” Deleuze articulates the specific relation that obtains 
                                                
314 Deleuze, LS, 31; LS-Fr, 44-5. 
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between bodies and their sense with reference to a military battle.  On the one hand, we 
can think about the battle wholly in terms of the bodies that enact it—the soldiers, tanks, 
guns, ammunition, and even the earth on which it is fought.  From this perspective we 
would focus on the physical qualities of those bodies and on their active and passive 
relations with each other.315  The pointed lead bullet, moving through the air at a velocity 
of 5000 feet per second, pierces the skin and destroys the delicate tissues of the heart.  
The bunker busting bomb, with its 650 pounds of explosives, is dropped from an altitude 
of 40,000 feet and penetrates 100 feet into the earth.  But on the other hand, we can think 
about the battle as incorporeal, as indifferent to these bodies acting and being acted upon 
in this particular time and place.  While bodies are either passive or active, the battle 
itself316 is “neutral and impassive in relation to the victor and the vanquished, the coward 
and the brave.”317  These latter categories name potential actualizations of the battle: 
someone = x will be the victor and someone = y will be the vanquished.  The battle itself, 
though, is indifferent with respect to who in particular actualizes someone = x and 
someone = y.  Likewise, while bodies act and are acted upon in a specifiable place and 
time, the battle itself is, to borrow again from Lacan, not in its place and not in its time.  
The battle is not limited to the battlefield where it is most prominently actualized, but is 
also present in the soldiers’ families, in the factories where the weapons are produced, 
and in the newsrooms that report it.  Nor is it limited to the time of active hostilities, but 
is also present in the war games that prepared for it, in the political rhetoric that 
                                                
315 Cf. Deleuze, LS, 4; LS-Fr, 13. 
316 By “the battle itself” I mean simply the battle insofar as it is irreducible to its corporeal actualizations.  
Strictly speaking, of course, the battle as I am articulating it here, namely as an event of sense, lacks an 
“itself.” 
317 Deleuze, LS, 100; LS-Fr, 122. 
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advocated or opposed it, and in the books, patriotic songs, and festivals that 
commemorate it.318 
 What, precisely, is the relation between corporeal things and their incorporeal 
sense?  From the Stoic perspective that Deleuze takes as his point of departure in The 
Logic of Sense, their relation is one of cause and effect.  According to this fundamentally 
anti-Platonic position, corporeal things are conceived not as mere instantiations of their 
Ideas, which would pre-exist them and serve as their measure.  The bed, for example, is 
not what it is through its resemblance to the Idea of a bed.  Rather the idea—the 
incorporeal sense of the bed—is produced by the actions and passions of bodies—by the 
carpenter’s router that mortises the bedpost and by the quilting machine that stitches 
together the mattress pad.  But the cause-effect relation between the actions and passions 
of bodies and their incorporeal sense is unique.  In straightforward, everyday cases of 
causality, both the cause and the effect exist at the same level of being.  The carpenter, 
for example, and the particular bed that he produces are both bodies, which can enter into 
active and passive relations with other bodies.  In the case of bodies’ production of sense, 
however, the effect does not, strictly speaking, exist.  We would not say that the battle 
consists of soldiers, tanks, guns, ammunition, and “the battle.”319  Whereas the bullet can 
pierce the skin and the bomb can penetrate deep beneath the surface of the earth, “the 
battle” can neither cut into bodies nor be cut into by them.  It is thus an effect more in the 
sense of an optical effect320, an “incorporeal event[] which would play only on the 
                                                
318 Cf. Deleuze, DR, 1; DR-Fr, 8. “As Péguy says, it is not Federation Day which commemorates or 
represents the fall of the Bastille, but the fall of the Bastille which celebrates and repeats in advance all the 
Federation Days; or Monet’s first water lily which repeats all the others.” 
319 Whenever I refer to “the battle,” with quotation marks, I mean to denote the battle qua incorporeal 
sense, and not the corporeal state of affairs of which it is the sense. 
320 Deleuze, LS, 7; LS-Fr, 17. 
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surface, like a mist over the prairie (even less than a mist, since a mist is after all a 
body).”321  This superficial, mist-like sense does not exist, but rather only inheres within 
the corporeal states of affairs that produce it. 
 To describe in detail the way in which incorporeal sense inheres in corporeal 
states of affairs is at the same time to illustrate its disruptive force.  From one perspective, 
the mode of inherence seems to be that of the epiphenomenon.  Insofar as sense cannot 
shoot a gun or pilot an F-16, it appears to be sterile and unproductive, powerless to 
intervene in the “real” battle, which is composed of bodies and their relations of force.  
But from another perspective, nothing could be more essential to bodies than their sense-
events.322  “The battle” is why these bodies and their forces are set into relation, why the 
bullet pierced the flesh and the bomb destroyed the factory.323  But for “the battle,” this 
body would not be a soldier’s body and this lump of lead would not have become a 
bullet.  Sense—this incorporeal event that is constitutively missing from its place and 
time, present everywhere and nowhere, that hovers indifferently over the good sense and 
common sense of determinate bodies and their determinate relations—somehow exerts a 
force of its own over the corporeal being that produced it. 
 The event of sense, considered as generative of determined bodies and states of 
affairs, must be conceived as an immediate duality.  The two sides of this duality are 
what Deleuze calls the actual and the virtual, which are reflected in the distinction we 
have been making between the battle and “the battle,” respectively. 
With every event, there is indeed the present moment of its actualization, the moment 
in which the event is embodied in a state of affairs, an individual, or a person, the 
moment we designate by saying “here, the moment has come.”  The future and the 
past of the event are evaluated only with respect to this definitive present, and from 
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323 Deleuze, LS, 101; LS-Fr, 122. 
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the point of view of that which embodies it.  But on the other hand, there is the future 
and the past of the event considered in itself, sidestepping each present, being free of 
the limitations of a state of affairs, impersonal and pre-individual, neutral, neither 
general nor particular, eventum tantum. . . . It has no other present than that of the 
mobile instant which represents it, always divided into past-future, and forming what 
must be called the counter-actualization.324 
 
The event as actualized belongs to the world of good sense and common sense.  It is a 
unity that is recognizable by reference to its spatial and temporal localization and to its 
determinate qualities.  The Battle of Waterloo that we all learned about in history class is 
an example of an actualized event.  The battle took place on June 18, 1815 just south of 
the town of Waterloo, in present-day Belgium.  It was fought by recognizable and 
determinate groupings of men: the English, Dutch, and Prussian armies on one side and 
the French army on the other.  These armies were commanded by well-known, 
determinate persons: the Duke of Wellington and Napoleon.  And finally, the relations 
that obtain between these persons are fixed and irreversible: Wellington was the victor 
and Napoleon was the vanquished.  The event as virtual, or “the Battle of Waterloo,” on 
the other hand, is the transcendental field from which the actual Battle of Waterloo 
emerged.  Importantly, this transcendental field must not be conceived in the image of 
what it grounds, as its bare form of possibility.325  Rather, for reasons that we have 
already seen, the virtual sense-event must be conceived as impersonal and as indifferent 
to the unities of good sense and common sense, “free of the limitations of a state of 
affairs.”  So, for example, in the actual Battle of Waterloo, Napoleon was defeated.  But 
in the virtual event, Napoleon is both the great French national hero who secured the 
Revolution and extended its benefits to all the peoples of Europe, twice bringing the 
reactionary governments of the Continent to their knees, and the tragic figure who came 
                                                
324 Deleuze, LS, 151; LS-Fr, 177. Ellipsis in original. 
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so close to bringing about a new era in European political culture but who was ultimately 
defeated in one of the most disastrous and momentous battles in military history. 
 Why, though, should we think of the virtual sense-event as a transcendental field 
from which actual states of affairs derive?  From the standpoint of common sense and its 
representational orientation, this seems to reverse the real order of priority.  It seems that 
what is ontologically basic, and thus what ought to serve as the beginning point for our 
thinking about the battle, is the actual event, the so-called fact of the matter.  The fact of 
the matter is that Wellington and his Anglo-Allied forces defeated Napoleon and his 
French forces.  All of the various determinations that we gather together in the virtual 
event would represent merely what might have happened.  This enumeration of the states 
of affairs that might have been actualized belongs, from this perspective, to reflection and 
thus exists only in the minds of those who think about the real battle.  As such, the virtual 
event cannot account for the genesis of the actual and ought not therefore to be conceived 
as a transcendental field in the specific sense that Deleuze intends.326 
 Michel Serres offers a powerful image that helps to render more intuitive this 
non-representational idea of the virtual event as transcendental field: 
Have you ever tended goal for your team, while an adversary hurries to take a clean, 
close shot?  Relaxed, as if free, the body mimes the future participle, fully ready to 
unwind: toward the highest point, at ground level, or halfway up, in both directions, 
left and right; toward the center of the solar plexis, a starry plateau launches its virtual 
branches in all directions at once, like a bouquet of axons.327 
 
                                                
326 In more specifically Deleuzian terms, this objection reflects a confusion of the virtual with the possible.  
To think the transcendental as possibility is to think it wholly on the basis of what it conditions.  Within the 
world of representation, we recognize certain unities—persons, nations, battles, etc.  The transcendental as 
possible would merely double the represented world in the mind of the subject.  Cf. Deleuze, DR, 211-12; 
DR-Fr, 272-4. 
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The event depicted here is a shot on goal within a soccer game.  “Soccer” is an 
enormously complex meaning, a sense-event in our vocabulary.  Its meaning, of course, 
comprises all the rules of the game.  But it comprises much more as well.  It comprises a 
psychological meaning: the fans identify with their favorite teams, celebrating their 
victories as if they were their own and likewise lamenting their defeats.  It also comprises 
an economic meaning: the various teams sell millions of dollars worth of tickets and 
merchandise to the fans, who indirectly pay the extraordinarily high salaries of the 
players.  The more famous players will appear in advertisements that help to sell 
everything from candy bars to high-end athletic apparel.  All of this virtual sense is 
present right there in the soccer game.  It is why these twenty-two players are gathered 
together on this rectangular field of grass, approximately 120 meters long and 90 meters 
wide, and more particularly, why one of the players is about to kick a ball in the direction 
of the net that is being guarded by our goalkeeper.  This sense is not merely present in the 
minds of the various participants; it is directly immanent to their bodies.  “Soccer” has 
formed this goalkeeper’s body into a very particular set of skills and dispositions, 
different from the skills and dispositions that characterize a “basketball” body or a 
“cycling” body.  If this point is not self-evident, it is because the sense-event as such is 
never wholly and clearly expressed in a corporeal state of affairs.  The event as 
actualized is limited by the constraints of good sense and common sense, whereas the 
virtual event gathers together what from the perspective of representation are 
incompossible states of affairs.  In the example of the imminent shot on goal we can say, 
simplifying somewhat, that there are fourteen possible actualizations: the attacker could 
kick the ball to the upper right or left, the middle right or left, the lower right or left, or in 
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the middle.  For each of these possibilities he could either score or fail to score.  Of 
course, only one of these will actually happen.328  But at certain privileged, highly 
sensitive points like the one that Serres describes, we can feel the virtual co-presence of 
incompossibles.  The goalkeeper virtually occupies seven different spatial positions in 
seven different futures.  Five seconds later, one of these virtual possibilities will have 
been actualized and this state of heightened sensitivity will have passed.  The actualized 
event will dominate our awareness of the soccer match and the virtual transcendental 
event will once again recede. 
 It is this immanence of virtual, transcendental sense to its actualizations that 
accounts for the disruption to the ordered world of representation that characterizes the 
event.  The virtual is not an abstract representation of an actual that would be conceived 
as ontologically prior; it is, rather, the metastable element, the real difference-from-self 
from which the actual is produced.329  It follows that “the virtual must be defined as 
strictly a part of the real object—as though the object had one part of itself in the virtual 
into which it plunged as though into an objective dimension.”330  Thus, wherever there is 
an actual object, determinable within the limits of good sense and common sense, there is 
also, right there with it, a virtuality that radically exceeds those limits and that never 
ceases to exert its force over the object and the orderly world of which it is a part. 
 
 
                                                
328 This is a simplification because there are, of course, other possibilities that could be actualized.  The 
attacker might strike the ball very poorly, so that it flies far away from the goal.  Or it might be the case that 
the attacker is offside and that the referee will whistle the play dead before the shot is attempted.  These 
possibilities, however, would not very greatly affect the goalkeeper’s virtual position, since there is little 
that he could do about them. 
329 Deleuze, LS, 103; LS-Fr, 125. 
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IV. The Serial Structure of Superficial Sense 
 
 The account that we have given up to this point of the relation between the virtual 
and the actual has been somewhat simplified.  Specifically, we have artificially 
represented it as merely a two-term relation: on the one hand there are actual states of 
affairs, characterized by the good sense and common sense of representation, and on the 
other hand, immanent to these states of affairs are virtual sense-events that exceed the 
limits of representation and thus disrupt the unity of the actual.  We have simplified in 
this way in order to bring out as clearly as possible the event character of the immediate 
duality of sense and to emphasize the contrast with the monism of sense that we saw in 
Merleau-Ponty.  In order, though, to understand the imperative force of the event of 
sense, it will be necessary to take into account the more complex, serial structure of sense 
that Deleuze articulates in The Logic of Sense. 
 We have seen that sense does not properly exist, but rather inheres in states of 
affairs.  The sense “bed,” for example, has no independent existence, but is rather that 
which is attributed to the actual bed.  Sense, in other words, is always the sense of 
something.  But this is only half of the story.  Sense stands in relation not only to states of 
affairs, but also to propositions.  More specifically, sense is inseparable from the 
proposition that expresses it.331  The proposition, then, is the third term that we must 
introduce in order more adequately to account for the relation between the virtual and the 
actual.  To see how this three-term relation works, let us examine a very simple 
proposition: the tree is green.  We can easily recognize here the two terms that we have 
been discussing.  On the one hand, there is an actual state of affairs about which we are 
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speaking: the tree that is green.  On the other hand there is the sense that is attributed to 
the tree: the being-green-of-the-tree.  The being-green-of-the-tree inheres in the tree, but 
is not actually in the tree or a part of the tree.  It hovers over the tree like a mist over the 
prairie.  The third term of the relation is easy to overlook owing to a fundamental 
prejudice that phenomenology calls the natural attitude.  Specifically, we overlook the 
circumstance that the being-green-of-the-tree is presented as the attribute of the actual 
tree.  It is the proposition that presents, or in more Deleuzian terms, expresses, the sense.  
Without this element of presentation, we would never experience the being-green-of-the-
tree that we attribute to the tree.  The apparent two-term relation between states of affairs 
and their sense thus requires the proposition as a third term. 
 Of course we could re-establish the simpler two-term relation if we could show 
that sense is coextensive with the proposition.  However, Deleuze shows that this 
reduction of sense to the proposition is impossible by drawing our attention to the 
circumstance that a proposition can never state its own sense.332  It is never nonsensical to 
inquire about the sense of a proposition, precisely because the proposition and its sense 
are not the same thing.  If someone were to ask, “what is the sense of ‘the tree is green’?” 
it would be entirely unhelpful to reply, “the tree is green.”  The sense of the proposition 
“the tree is green” must be stated by another proposition.  And this process could 
continue indefinitely: the sense of a proposition becomes the object of another 
proposition, whose own sense in turn becomes the object of a further proposition, ad 
infinitum.  In Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland, Lewis Carroll highlights this paradox of 
the infinite regress of sense in a scene involving the Duchess, who loves to discover the 
morals of things.  She is unable, however, to begin the process of discovering the moral 
                                                
332 Deleuze, LS, 28; LS-Fr, 41. 
  
 178 
herself, and so she demands that Alice utter a proposition—any proposition at all—so 
that she can extract its sense, or moral. 
 “The game’s going on rather better now” she said, by way of keeping up the 
conversation a little. 
 “’Tis so,” said the Duchess: “and the moral of that is—‘Oh, ’tis love, ’tis love that 
makes the world go round!’” 
 “Somebody said,” Alice whispered, “that it’s done by everybody minding their own 
business!” 
 “Ah well! It means much the same thing,” said the Duchess, digging her sharp little 
chin into Alice’s shoulder as she added “and the moral of that is—‘Take care of the 
sense and the sounds will take care of themselves.’”333 
 
In each of these cases the Duchess’ proposition expresses the sense of Alice’s 
proposition.  That the sense of a given proposition is always deferred to another 
proposition has important consequences for the conception of imperative that we are 
developing here.  Before we can show precisely how this is the case, however, we will 
need to complete our account of the relation between propositions, states of affairs, and 
sense. 
 We can see from the examples of the green tree and of the Duchess’ quest to 
discover the morals of things that the event of sense happens in an encounter.  More 
specifically, sense happens in the resonance that is established between two 
heterogeneous series.  These series can be constituted in many different ways.  The most 
intuitive way to think the heterogeneity of the series is exemplified by our proposition, 
“the tree is green.”  Here we can recognize an encounter between the series of words and 
the series of things, or the series of propositions and the series of states of affairs.  We 
saw that the green tree does not contain its own sense within itself, and that its sense 
emerges only when the proposition is brought to bear on it.  The sense is neither in the 
tree nor in the proposition, but rather emerges as an event right at the surface that both 
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separates and joins the two.  This relation, of course, obtains not only for trees and 
propositions about them, but for the series of things and the series of propositions 
generally.  We might say then, at least in a very provisional way, that sense happens at 
the point of encounter between the series of words and things. 
 But the heterogeneity of the series takes other forms as well.  In our example from 
Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland, we saw that the Duchess’ propositions were brought 
to bear not on things and their states of affairs, but rather on Alice’s propositions.  Here 
the event of sense emerged at the surface that separated and joined the series of the 
Duchess’ propositions, which expressed a moral, and the series of Alice’s propositions, 
whose moral was expressed.  Does this not violate the basic requirement of the 
heterogeneity of series, leaving us with two homogeneous series of propositions?  It does 
not because, just as in the example of the green tree, we see that one series presents the 
sense that is attributed to the other.  It does not strictly matter that the two series are of 
propositions, as long as the more essential heterogeneity between a presenting series and 
a series whose sense is presented obtains.  Indeed, one could even produce sense by 
constituting two heterogeneous series, both of which were composed of things.  The 
classic example of this kind of constitution of series is given by Lacan in his seminar on 
The Purloined Letter.334  Deleuze sums up the serial organization of Poe’s story as 
follows: 
First series: the king who does not see the compromising letter received by his wife; 
the queen who is relieved to have hidden it so cleverly by having left it out in the 
open; the minister, who sees everything and takes possession of the letter.  Second 
series: the police who find nothing in the minister’s hotel; the minister who thought of 
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leaving the letter in the open in order better to hide it; Dupin who sees everything and 
takes possession of the letter.335 
 
The sense of the story emerges in the resonance between these two series.  The story is 
not about any of the actual characters—the king, the queen, the minister, or even Dupin, 
who eventually solves the case.  Rather what holds the story together is the letter, which 
belongs to neither series but which becomes manifest only at the surface where the two 
series meet.  In this respect, the letter functions in the same way as the complex meaning 
“soccer” from the example of the goalkeeper preparing for a shot on goal.  It is the letter, 
which is never something actual, that positions the actual characters in the relations that 
are depicted: the queen fears the minister and the minister fears Dupin, all because of 
their relation to the letter.  Once again we see that sense is at once derivative of the series 
that “cause” it and originary, in that it makes of the series what they actually are. 
 We can express what is common to all these different kinds of relation between 
heterogeneous series by returning to some explicitly Saussurian themes.  Most basically, 
the event of sense requires the encounter of two series, one of which is determined as 
signifier and the other of which is determined as signified.  “We call ‘signifier’ any sign 
which presents in itself an aspect of sense; we call ‘signified,’ on the contrary, that which 
is defined in a duality relative to this aspect.”  The signified is thus “any thing which may 
be defined on the basis of the distinction that a certain aspect of sense establishes with 
this thing.”336  So, for example, the proposition “the tree is green” belongs to the series of 
the signifier and the tree upon which the proposition bears belongs to the series of the 
signified.  The signifier presents a sense of something, here the tree.  The tree is 
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determined as signified in this relation with the sense presented by the signifier.  At the 
surface between the two series there emerges a sense that cannot be reduced to either, 
viz., the being-green-of-the-tree.  But we must not suppose that the proposition is 
determined as signifier owing to any characteristics that would be proper to it.  Rather 
signifier and signified are determined differentially.  Thus we could easily constitute the 
series in such a way that our proposition “the tree is green” would be determined as the 
signified.  To do so, we need only produce a signifier that would present the sense of the 
proposition.  (This is possible, once again, because a proposition can never state its own 
sense.)  So, for example, we might say that “when we look at the tree, we perceive a 
phenomenon of color that corresponds roughly to the wavelength of 510 nanometers.”  
The structure here is isomorphic to the structure involving the proposition and the tree: 
the signifier presents a sense that is the sense of the signified, which cannot contain its 
own sense within itself.  Finally, we can show by means of an entirely commonplace 
occurrence how two series of things or states of affairs enact the serial structure of 
signifier and signified.  At the nightclub one person makes eye contact with another.  The 
other person responds with a smile.  Here we have an encounter of a signified (the eye 
contact) and a signifier (the smile) that presents and consolidates its sense.  The sense in 
this case is obviously an erotic sense and belongs to neither of the two series, but rather 
hovers at the surface where they meet. 
 A second explicitly Saussurian theme that reappears here in Deleuze’s articulation 
of the logic of sense is the differential character of the elements that belong to each 
series.337  We saw in our discussion of Saussure that the phonemes that belong to a 
particular langue are determined through their differential relations with the other 
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phonemes.  For example, b is a determinate phoneme because it is not-p: without the 
difference that determines them, we would hear these phonemes as having the same 
value, much as we English speakers in fact hear the phonemes b and bh as having the 
same value.338  The differential determination of the elements of the two series is 
especially important for the project being undertaken in this dissertation because it entails 
that the terms of any encounter must be conceived outside the limits of representation, 
i.e., as excessive to the unities of good sense and common sense.  In sum, no term that 
enters into an encounter “is what it is, and not another thing.”  Claude Lévi-Strauss has 
demonstrated this point on a larger scale in his studies of societies that are divided into 
totemic clans.  We can recognize in these societies two heterogeneous series, one of 
nature and the other of culture.  The natural series is composed of animals, plants, 
minerals, etc., while the cultural series is composed of clans that correspond to these 
terms.  One might suppose that the clans are associated with their natural totems through 
the representative relation of resemblance.  Members of the eagle clan, for example, 
would have the characteristics of nobility and boldness, while members of the bear clan 
would be characterized by strength and ferocity.  But such an understanding overlooks 
the differential determination of the elements of the series.  In fact, the eagle clan is not 
determined by the resemblance of its members to eagles, but rather by their difference 
from members of the bear clan, which differences are homologous with those between 
natural eagles and bears.339  As a member of this society, then, I am never simply who I 
am; rather my identity is scattered over a whole system of differences among all of the 
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Bhagavad Gita has the same value as Bagavad Gita because in our language b is not determined through its 
difference from bh. 
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totems that exist in the society.340  In short, I am never a unity, but always already a 
multiplicity. 
 The values that correspond to the differentially determined elements of the series 
are singularities.341  A singularity is pre-personal and pre-individual, anterior the unities 
of good sense and common sense in terms of which we habitually think about the world 
and about ourselves.342  We must be careful not to think of a singularity as the true being 
of a thing, as that which would somehow underlie the thing’s publicly observable 
qualities.  To conceive singularity in this way is to conceive it on the basis of the unities 
that it would underlie: my own singularity, for example, would be conceived as the 
singularity of me, a determinate person with determinate and recognizable qualities.  We 
have already seen that the unities of good sense and common sense are effects, in the 
sense of optical effects, and that the condition for these unities does not resemble the 
unities at all.  Singularity, then, must be thought on its own terms as the condition for 
actual unities.343  Once again, Saussurian linguistics provides a good example of this.  In 
the English language, we have the phoneme b, but b does not actually exist as a 
phoneme.  Rather b exists only in its actualizations, which in principle can never be 
complete.  To borrow the language of complexity theory, we can say that the phoneme b 
functions as an attractor toward which particular actualizations tend but which they can 
never equal.  The actualization can never equal the attractor because the latter is not a 
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model that the actualization would attempt to copy.344  The attractor—the phoneme b—
does not exist at all, but rather inheres in the langue as a virtuality.  Thus while the b’s 
that are actualized when we say things like “baseball” or “barbeque” can be localized 
within a determinate space and time, the phoneme b exceeds these actualizations, 
hovering indifferently over all of them.  To speak somewhat loosely at this point, the 
phoneme b functions as a very basic imperative addressed to anyone who would 
pronounce an actual b.  The singular phoneme, then, is necessarily anterior to its 
actualizations, but does not resemble them.  
 Deleuze writes in the “Twenty-First Series of the Event” that “either ethics makes 
no sense at all, or this is what it means and has nothing else to say: not to be unworthy of 
what happens to us.”345  In light of what we have just discussed, we could modify this to 
say: do not be unworthy of the singularity that is revealed in the event of imperative 
sense.  In the example from Saussurian linguistics, we saw that the actualized sound “b” 
is inseparable from the phoneme b that functions as its condition.  The singularity and the 
actualization constitute an immediate duality, where the two “halves” do not resemble 
each other at all.  We could say, then, that Saussurian linguistics discovers an 
incommensurable singularity right at the level of the actualized unity.  This structure of 
immediate duality of two incommensurable halves, one a singularity and the other its 
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actualization, obtains also at the level of persons and their practical relations with the 
world.  The most vivid illustration of immediate duality at this level is given in the event 
of death.  Like any event, death can be described from two different perspectives.  First, 
the event of death can be described as actual.  From this perspective, death sustains an 
intimate relation with me, with the self of good sense and common sense.  My death will 
have its basis in my body.  Its coming will be expedited or delayed depending, in part at 
least, on the choices that I make throughout my life.  Whenever my death does happen, it 
will be a determinate, publicly verifiable event that can be situated in a particular place at 
a particular time. 
 But there is another, incommensurable side of death that is wholly indifferent to 
me and to the world of good sense and common sense in which I take my practical 
bearings.  This second half of the immediate duality can be called the moment of counter-
actualization.346  From this perspective, my death is that which can never be actualized, 
which can never be a possibility for me.  Death, in other words, is that which is never in 
its place: it is everywhere and nowhere, at all times and at no time.  Maurice Blanchot 
describes this second, singularizing face of the event of death as “the abyss of the present, 
the time without present with which I have no relation, toward which I am unable to 
project myself.  For in it I do not die.  I forfeit the power of dying.  In this abyss one 
dies—one never ceases to die, and one never succeeds in dying.”347  This one (l’on) that 
is revealed most vividly in the event of death must not be confused with the one that we 
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encountered in the work of Merleau-Ponty.  There we discovered the one as an 
anonymity conceived as anterior to the known, represented world, but not as radically 
heterogeneous to that world.  Merleau-Ponty’s anonymous one was constitutively 
oriented toward the good sense that it conditioned, and was therefore unable to account 
for the alterity of the event.348  For Blanchot, on the other hand, the one names a 
singularity that is revealed in the event right at the level of the actualized self.  The 
singular one is manifest as a felt indifference that weighs on the self, challenging its 
actualization with the force of counter-actualization.  Singularity thus happens as a 
dynamic opposition to the self and to the actualized world, much as in Freud’s later work 
the death drive happens as a dynamic principle in opposition to the unifying tendencies of 
Eros.  With this we might finally restate Deleuze’s definition of the ethical imperative as 
follows: do not be unworthy of the force of counter-actualization that accompanies every 
actualization.  Or alternatively, do not flee the singularity that is revealed in the event and 
establish your practical orientation solely with reference to the actual. 
 
V. Singularity and Dignity 
 
 In Chapter Two I addressed the circumstances of my father’s death, showing how 
an imperative emerged through the corporeal Sinngebung appropriate to the process of 
dying.  I showed there how that Sinngebung at once extended a practical world and also 
constricted it, limiting the applicability of the kind of rules that are typically associated 
with the imperative.  But this account, formulated in the terms of Merleau-Ponty’s 
phenomenology of perception, failed to account for the event-character of death and for 
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the singularity that is revealed in the event.  Given the resources of Deleuze’s logic of 
sense, with its emphasis on the encounter between the heterogeneous series of the 
signifier and the signified and on the event of sense that happens at the surface where 
they meet, I believe we can account for the moment of singularity that is inseparable from 
the phenomenon of imperative. 
 Let us begin by completely redescribing the situation using the broadly 
Saussurian terminology of The Logic of Sense.  First, we can distinguish here between the 
series of the signifier and of the signified.  In this case my dying father belonged to the 
series of the signified, while my brother and I belonged to the series of the signifier.  
How can we determine who or what, in any encounter, belongs to which series?  There is 
certainly nothing in the nature of things that situates them within one or the other of the 
series.  As we saw with regard to the proposition, “the tree is green,” the same thing—the 
same proposition, object, or person—can function equally well as signifier or as 
signified.  In each case, the determination of the series will depend entirely on the facts of 
the situation.  In this particular case, my father knew that he was dying, but could not 
contain within himself the sense of his own death.  The sense of his death was deferred 
onto the series of the signifier—my brother and me—who had the power in this very 
particular case to present and to consolidate that sense.  To explain precisely why this is 
the case will require some autobiographical detail, which I will keep to a minimum.  Our 
parents were divorced when we were quite young, with my mother retaining sole custody 
of us.  Even before that, though, we rarely saw our father, owing to his being a truck 
driver and thus being away from home for long stretches of time.  As a result, neither of 
us ever developed a strong relationship with him.  He was certainly our father, and we 
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were his sons, but that relationship was never really actualized.  By the time he became 
terminally ill, we had long since fallen out of communication with him.  When he entered 
the hospital for what he must have known would be his final weeks, he wanted his sons to 
be there with him.  He was genuinely afraid, though, that we would refuse to see him, 
owing to his not having been very involved in our childhood years.  He was, then, going 
to die either completely alone or as the father of two sons.  It fell to my brother and me to 
function as signifiers, determining which of these would be the actual sense of his death. 
 All of this, of course, is a retrospective reconstruction; it takes the result of an 
encounter between a signifier and a signified and reads it back into the context of that 
encounter, giving it a sense that it could not have had at the time.  The encounter itself 
only happened when I spoke with my father on the phone for the first time since he had 
entered the hospital.  He wanted very badly to express his regret about our falling out of 
communication and to know whether I would be able to drive out to Wisconsin to visit 
him.  Because his lung cancer and emphysema were so far advanced, he could speak only 
with the greatest difficulty.  Nonetheless, the regret, the uncertainty, and the hope in his 
voice came through perfectly clearly.  In hearing this man speak, I knew immediately that 
I must drive out to see him as soon as possible.  In the event of this encounter, I found 
myself obligated unconditionally.  But who, exactly, was this “I”?  It would not be 
entirely accurate to say that I qua son felt the weight of this obligation.  At no point did I 
explicitly link my feeling of obligation to this actual relation.  Of course the fact that he 
was my father was a salient feature of the situation, but it was not by itself determinative.  
In many important ways, my father and I had never actualized the father-son relationship 
at all.  It had therefore never been an important part of my moral identity that I was this 
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man’s son.  In fact, even “father’s son” as a general moral category had never played an 
important part in my moral understanding.  How, then, could I experience an obligation 
to be binding on me as my father’s son?  The answer, of course, is that I did not.  Rather 
the encounter between us produced an event, a sensitive point where for a moment all the 
already actualized meanings and identities are held in suspense, and where a wholly new 
sense has the chance to come into the world.  In this respect the situation resembles that 
of the goalkeeper who, in a brief moment of heightened sensitivity, simultaneously 
occupies seven different positions in seven different futures.  This state of heightened 
sensitivity is the moment of counter-actualization that accompanies every actualization.  
In the encounter, I am not the determinate person that I actually am, with the determinate 
relation (or non-relation) that I actually have with my father.  In counter-actualizing me 
and my relation with my father, the imperative event commands me as a pre-personal, 
pre-individual singularity.  The imperative, then, did not command me as son; rather in 
response to the imperative, this singular I actually became my father’s son at the same 
time that he actually became my father.  There was, then, what Deleuze calls an 
“incorporeal transformation.”  Incorporeal because, from a perspective oriented toward 
the actual, nothing at all changed.  The same determinate person would die from the same 
determinate diseases whether he died reconciled with his sons or not.  Likewise, the 
determinate persons who were his sons would have lost their father, whether that 
relationship was meaningful to them or not.  From this perspective my father might have 
said, had he ever read any Deleuze, that an incorporeal transformation plus ninety-five 
cents will buy you a cup of coffee.  From another perspective, however, the incorporeal 
transformation changes everything.  In an instant, when an incorporeal sense flashed 
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across the space of the encounter between a signifier lacking its sense and the signifier 
that could supply it, all that was wrong in that sphere of our lives was set right.  In an 
infinitesimal present, the sense that I had of my past was uprooted and the sense that I 
had of myself looking into the future became open for something genuinely new and 
unexpected. 
 The event of sense that happens in the encounter reveals the singularity not only 
of the one who feels the weight of its imperative force, but also of the other term or terms 
of the relation.  The other is revealed imperatively as incommensurable and irreplaceable, 
as absolutely irreducible to the kinds of practical universals that we discussed in Chapter 
Two.  “Father” is such a practical universal; it names a more or less well established set 
of role requirements that perhaps my own father never quite lived up to.  From one 
perspective, these universals are enormously important.  They help to orient us within the 
practical world, rendering determinate what is morally required of us and what we have 
the right to expect from others.  But from another, equally valid perspective, they count 
for almost nothing at all.  From this angle, it does not matter in the least that my father 
never successfully actualized the moral meaning “father.”  In the highly sensitive, 
metastable instant of the encounter, it is his singularity that stands out most prominently, 
and that I am commanded by the imperative sense-event to respect.  This singularity that 
remains indifferent to the kind of value we assign to persons with reference to moral 
universals is figured in Kant’s moral philosophy by the concept of dignity, which he 
contrasts with price: “What has a price is such that something else can be put in its place 
as its equivalent; by contrast, that which is elevated above all price, and admits of no 
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equivalent, has a dignity.”349  Dignity, or the irreducible singularity of the other, becomes 
manifest only in the movement of counter-actualization.  In order “not to be unworthy of 
what happens to us,” we must allow ourselves to undergo this movement.  We must 
maintain ourselves in that heightened state of sensitivity that opens us to the 
incommensurability and irreplaceability of the other, whether he be our own father, our 
waiter at the restaurant, or a random passer-by. 
 We thus arrive, once again, at the idea of immediate duality, but this time in its 
explicitly moral guise.  We find ourselves obligated to orient ourselves within a practical 
world characterized by the unities of good sense and common sense, but also to counter-
actualize that world, to relate to others as singularities and as deserving of our 
unconditional respect.  There is no either/or here: we must not comport ourselves toward 
others whom we conceive either according to the practical universals of good sense and 
common sense or according to their irreducible singularity.  All of us are immediately 
both.  The singularity of the other (and of oneself) is given within the event of originary 
imperative sense right at his or her practical universality. 
 
VI. Harlequin, Emperor of the Moon 
 
 There is, of course, no way to gather together the incompossible demands of this 
imperative sense in a moral rule or law.  This is because the imperative happens precisely 
as an event, as a disruption to the orderly, lawful world of representation.  Owing to this 
event-character of imperative sense, we can never have mastered our morally challenging 
situations in advance.  How, for example, do we judge the woman who has been trapped 
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for years in an emotionally or physically abusive relationship and who finally one day 
reaches her limit, lashing out in violence against her partner?  Or how do we judge the 
doctor who, sympathizing with the patient’s painful condition and determining there to be 
no likelihood of recovery, arranges with her to administer a lethal dose of medication?  
We certainly would not want to have a rule to the effect that any woman who judged 
herself to have been abused retained the right to injure or kill her partner.  Likewise, we 
would not do well to allow doctors and patients to work out assisted suicide arrangements 
completely ad hoc, without the intervention of neutral third parties who could limit the 
very real potential for abuse of these arrangements.  But neither would we want 
indiscriminately to condemn all of these abused women and all of these doctors.  There 
can be no rules or protocols that determine in advance how we must deal with cases like 
these.  Despite the efforts of philosophers and moralists throughout history, there have 
never been any such effective rules or protocols. But this circumstance does not reduce us 
to moral chaos.  In the Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant warns us against 
deviating from the purity of the moral law, taking our bearings instead from the empirical 
givens of the particular case: “One cannot be given too many or too frequent warnings 
against this negligent or even base way of thinking which seeks out the principle among 
empirical motivations and laws. . . .”  Such a procedure “supplants the place of morality 
with a bastard patched together from limbs of quite diverse ancestry, which looks similar 
to what everyone wants to see, but not to virtue, for him who has once beheld it in its true 
shape.”350  But perhaps, in light of the immediate duality and the non self-identity that are 
revealed in us by the imperative event, such a bastard morality is precisely what is called 
for. 
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 Michel Serres presents such a bastard morality not as a system of rules or laws, 
but rather in the image of Harlequin.351  Harlequin, of course, is a stock character from 
the tradition of Commedia dell’Arte, recognizable most readily by his multi-colored 
patchwork costume.  He is usually depicted as a comically unintelligent and unscrupulous 
servant in love with Columbine, whom he attempts incompetently to court.  In his 
Troubadour of Knowledge, Serres draws particularly on the seventeenth-century popular 
farce titled Arlequin Empereur dans la lune.352  Columbine is depicted here as a servant 
to Dr. Balouard, who is obsessed with the idea that the moon is inhabited by people 
whose civilization resembles our own.  In the first scene, Harlequin overhears the doctor 
saying that three different men—an apothecary, a farmer, and a baker—have asked him 
for Columbine’s hand in marriage.  Recognizing that his window of opportunity is 
closing rapidly, Harlequin adopts a succession of disguises, hoping to gain entry into Dr. 
Balouard’s home and thus to gain access to Columbine.  In one scene, he disguises 
himself as a woman, trying to convince the doctor’s wife to take him in as her 
chambermaid.  He also attempts unsuccessfully to impersonate the apothecary and the 
farmer who had requested marriage with Columbine.  And most comically, he announces 
himself to Dr. Balouard as an ambassador from the Emperor of the Moon who, impressed 
by the doctor’s erudition concerning lunar government, requests his daughter’s hand in 
marriage.  In the final scene, Harlequin arrives in the guise of the Emperor of the Moon 
himself, but his illiteracy betrays him and his trick is revealed. 
                                                
351 That this morality is presented by means of an image already entails, of course, that it is a bastard 
morality. 
352 Arlequin Empereur dans la lune was first performed by the Comediens Italiens du Roy at the Hostel de 
Bourgogne in March of 1684.  The text is traditionally attributed to Nolant de Fatouville.  The play became 
popular in England at around the same time when it was translated and considerably revised by Aphra Behn 
as The Emperor of the Moon.  All references to the play in what follows pertain to the French version. 
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 In the Preface to The Troubadour of Knowledge, Serres gives a variation on the 
theme of Harlequin as comical Emperor of the Moon.  Harlequin is giving a kind of 
lecture to report on the recent tour of inspection he has made of his lunar territories.  The 
audience ask excitedly about the wondrous differences that must exist between lunar life 
and life here on earth.  But Harlequin has nothing wondrous to report: “everywhere 
everything is just as it is here, identical in every way to what one can see ordinarily on 
the terraqueous globe.”353  This corresponds to the well-known scene in Arlequin 
Empereur dans la lune where Dr. Balouard enthusiastically queries the Emperor about 
life on the moon.  Because his powers of imagination are so limited, Harlequin is able 
only to envision circumstances that correspond to those he already knows from life on 
earth.  Each time Harlequin describes a particular feature of lunar life, his interlocutors 
respond with amazement, “c’est tout comme icy!”, “it’s just like here!”  In the original 
farce, the characters are excited to hear about the similarities between the two worlds.  In 
Serres’ retelling, though, the audience are incredulous.  It cannot really be the case that 
everywhere everything is the same.  Rather, it must be the case that the Emperor has lost 
his ability to see anything genuinely new and different.  The Emperor here is quite 
literally the legislating subject.  The point that Serres draws from this depiction is that 
legislating “reason never discovers, beneath its feet, anything but its own rule.”  Or, in 
the words of the decidedly un-comical King Solomon, “there is nothing new under the 
sun.”354 
 The audience in Serres’ retelling quickly recognize the contradiction—or we 
might better say, immediate duality—between Harlequin’s words and his appearance.  
                                                
353 Serres, Troubadour, xiii. 
354 Ibid. 
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His costume is a “motley composite made of pieces, of rags or scraps of every size, in a 
thousand forms and different colors, of varying ages, from different sources, badly 
basted, inharmoniously juxtaposed, with no attention paid to proximity, mended 
according to circumstance, according to need, accident, and contingency. . . .”355  In his 
appearance, Harlequin is a multiplicity of relations and encounters, each of them singular.  
Indeed, it is not at all obvious how we would answer the question, who is Harlequin 
himself?  In Arlequin Empereur dans la lune he is presented always in disguise; he is, in 
Lacan’s terms, not in his place.  But Harlequin does not recognize this about himself.  He 
tries to prove to the audience that he is indeed a self-same unity by removing his motley 
garment.  But underneath it is another just like it.  Harlequin continues to remove layer 
after layer of multi-colored garments, but there is always still another beneath.  He is, it 
soon becomes clear, multiplicity all the way down. 
 The motley appearance of Harlequin, Emperor of the Moon brings out a second, 
more primordial sense of what it is to be a subject. “Wasn’t the word subject itself an 
adjective that belatedly became a noun?  First dependent, submitted, compelled, exposed, 
indeed obliged, just as I can say to whomever I am speaking to: thank you, I am much 
obliged to you. . . before taking myself for the point of departure of a logical and 
grammatical statement where this individual being becomes a person and the basis for 
acts and knowledge.”356  As legislating subject, Harlequin, Emperor of the Moon finds 
himself subjected to his subjects.  In fact, to be the emperor is to be subjected to others to 
a greater degree than anyone else.  Everybody desires to occupy his place, and there are 
more than a few who would take is life in order to do so.  He will remain emperor only 
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by maintaining a high degree of sensitivity—again like the goalkeeper—to the needs and 
aspirations of his many subjects.357  Harlequin is this virtuality, this heightened state of 
sensitivity.  His costume, then, conceals nothing at all, but rather reveals his multiple 
nature for all to see.  Harlequin spoke more truly than he knew when he insisted that 
everywhere everything is the same, c’est tout comme icy.  Everywhere, everything is 
multiple, everything is constituted of relations and encounters, each of them singular. 
 Eventually, the audience tires of Harlequin’s striptease; they had long since 
figured out that he would continue indefinitely to reveal himself as multiple.  As the 
audience began to walk out of the hall, however, some took a final look back toward the 
stage and noticed a startling transformation: Harlequin had become Pierrot.358 
 “How can the thousand hues of an odd medley of colors be reduced to their white 
summation?” 
 “Just as the body,” the learned responded, “assimilates and retains the various 
differences experienced during travel and returns home a half-breed of new gestures 
and other customs, dissolved in the body’s attitudes and functions, to the point that as 
far as it is concerned nothing has changed, so the secular miracle of tolerance, of 
benevolent neutrality welcomes, in peace, just as many apprenticeships in order to 
make the liberty of invention, thus of thought, spring forth from them.”359 
 
Pierrot figures the state of heightened sensitivity, of perpetual counter-actualization, that 
helps us to see what is occluded, or even excluded, by the law, and that opens us to the 
very singular demands of singular events.  The secular miracle of tolerance that Serres 
evokes here entails just the kind of bastard morality that Kant warned us so importunately 
against.  But only with the help of such a bastard morality can we genuinely aspire to be 
worthy of what happens to us, “to will and release the event, to become the offspring of 
one’s own events, and thereby to be reborn, to have one more birth, and to break with 
                                                
357 Ibid., 145. 
358 Pierrot is another of the stock characters of the Commedia dell’Arte.  He is most recognizable by his all 
white costume, which is the feature that Serres plays on here. 
359 Ibid., xvii. Emphasis mine. 
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one’s carnal birth—to become the offspring of one’s events and not of one’s actions, for 
the action is itself produced by the offspring of the event.”360 
 
  
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
360 Deleuze, LS, 149-150; LS-Fr, 175-6. 
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 In the Introduction we presented Jean-François Lyotard’s distinction between the 
profound sense of designation and the flat sense of signification.  These two senses of 
sense, according to Lyotard, are not merely different, but are rather heterogeneous and 
even incommensurable.  The profound space of designation, we saw, is unthinkable 
within the flat space of signification, where meaning is reduced to value.  And 
conversely, linguistic value and the negation that sustains it are invisible to the intentional 
act wherein the space of designation is made manifest.  Despite the fact that we cannot 
cognize either sense within the space of the other, however, we feel their co-presence in 
the experience of the event.  Once again, the event for Lyotard is “always that which 
defies knowledge; it can defy knowledge articulated in discourse, but it can just as well 
shake the quasi-understanding of the body, bringing it into conflict with itself and with 
other things, as in emotion.”361  We experience this event only in the feeling of a 
difference that we cannot assimilate to the spacing of designation or to the negation of 
signification.  In the feeling of the event we are presented with the blocking together of 
the two senses of sense.  Blocking together here names a co-presence of the two spaces of 
sense that is not a synthesis: there is no third space of sense in which the spaces of 
designation and signification would be sublated.  Rather, in blocking together the two 
spaces remain incompossible in their co-presence.362  For Lyotard, the non-representable 
space of this blocking together is a libidinal space. 
                                                
361 Lyotard, DF, 22. 
362 An example of the blocking together of the two spaces of sense is the dream of the Autodidasker, 
discussed in the Introduction.  On the one hand, the word belongs to the flat space of signification: one can 
recognize in it the value, albeit disguised, of autodidact.  But the meaning of the term, especially in the 
context of the dream in which it figured, is obviously irreducible to its value.  The extra dimension of 
meaning in the term comes from the presence of designation within the space of signification.  The two 
spaces are blocked together, but they do not surpass themselves in a synthesis.  The word Autodidasker, 
just like the things in depth described in Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of perception, is never given all 
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 In this concluding chapter I will show how the two spaces of sense, represented in 
the previous chapters by Merleau-Ponty and Deleuze, can be thought as blocked together.  
In doing so, I will follow Lyotard in articulating the non-representable space of their co-
presence as a libidinal space.  I will redescribe the profound space articulated by 
Merleau-Ponty in terms of the Freudian secondary process and the flat space articulated 
by Deleuze in terms of the primary process.  Finally, I will show how blocked-together, 
libidinal sense constitutes the space of our most originary opening out onto the world and 
how the happening of this originary sense is determinative for our experience of the 
imperative. 
 
I. Ambiguity of Desire in Freud: Wish and Libido 
 
 In order to commence with this libidinal-economic re-articulation of imperative 
sense, it will first be necessary to determine precisely the meaning of the term libido as 
Lyotard understands it.  The best place to begin here is with an ambiguity that Lyotard 
finds in Freud’s conceptualization of desire: 
There are two poles: a pole desire-Wunsch, desire-wish, which implies a negativity, 
which implies a dynamics, which implies teleology, dynamics with an end, which 
implies object, absence, lost object, and which also implies accomplishment, 
something like a fulfillment of the wish.  All of this forms a set-up that implies the 
consideration of meaning [sens] in desire.  The other pole of the category of desire in 
Freud is desire-libido, desire-process, primary process.363 
 
Desire as Wunsch is oriented within what we called in the previous chapter the world of 
good sense and common sense, or the world of representation.  It is oriented toward 
                                                                                                                                            
at once, but always with sides that give themselves as hidden.  The two spaces are given together in the felt 
experience of the dream, but cannot be represented together within a third space that would contain them 
both. 
363 Jean-François Lyotard, Des Dispositifs Pulsionnels (Paris: Christian Bourgois Éditeur, 1980), 228.  
Hereafter DP.  All translations from DP are my own. 
  
 201 
things or persons as unities that straightforwardly are what they are.  This kind of desire 
is founded on a lack, on the absence of an object that it strives to reappropriate.  A classic 
example of desire as wish is given by Freud in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, where he 
describes the fort-da game staged by his grandson.  The boy invented the game to help 
ameliorate the painful experience of his mother’s departure.  When his mother was away, 
the boy would repeatedly take a reel with a string attached to it and “very skillfully throw 
it over the edge of his curtained cot, so that it disappeared into it, at the same time 
uttering his expressive ‘o-o-o-o’.”364  According to Freud, this expression corresponded 
to the German fort, away.  Following this, the boy would pull the reel back toward 
himself and exclaim “da”, there.  In this game we can recognize the dynamic of loss and 
reappropriation that is proper to desire as wish, a dynamic set in motion by the boy’s 
painful experience of missing his mother.  The reel thrown out of sight straightforwardly 
represents, and thus means, the missing mother and its retrieval represents, and thus 
means, the fulfillment of the boy’s wish for her return. 
 Freud’s tendency to treat desire as displaceable quantity of excitation or libido, on 
the other hand, is best exemplified in the metapsychological paper “The Unconscious.”  
The most important characteristic of desire as libido, from Lyotard’s perspective, is its 
operating according to a dynamic that is unthinkable from within the space of 
representation.  Libidinal impulses, as opposed to wishes, are not understood as oriented 
toward unified objects that are represented as lacking.  Rather libidinal cathexis is mobile: 
“By the process of displacement one idea may surrender to another the whole volume of 
its cathexis; by that of condensation it may appropriate the whole cathexis of several 
                                                
364 Sigmund Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle in The Standard Edition  of the Complete Psychological 
Works of Sigmund Freud Vol. XVIII, trans. James Strachey (London: The Hogarth Press, 1955), 15.  
Hereafter BPP. 
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other ideas.”365  In Freud’s dream of the Autodidasker, for example, the word 
Autodidasker is the “object” of cathexis.366  I put the word object between quotation 
marks because the cathected word is in fact a condensation of things and significations 
that are incompossible from the perspective of representation.  The final two syllables of 
the word condense the ideas of Freud’s brother Alex and a German political figure named 
Lasker who had died of syphilis.  The first two syllables figure an author (Autor in 
German) who was a friend of Alex’s and whom Freud recalled as having once made a 
remark about marriage.  In the world of representation, of course, Alex, Lasker, and the 
author are discrete persons.  For someone to be Sigmund Freud’s brother Alex, it is 
necessary that he not be Lasker, the author, or anyone else.  Alex is who he is and not 
another person.  But desire as libido is indifferent to the negations that are necessary to 
sustain the unities of good sense and common sense.  Libidinal impulses “are coordinate 
with one another, exist independently side by side, and are exempt from mutual 
contradiction.  When two wishes whose aims must appear to us incompatible become 
simultaneously active, the two impulses do not detract one from the other or cancel each 
other, but combine to form an intermediate aim, a compromise.”367  For the unconscious, 
then, Alex is not yet a discrete object of representation, but is indifferently Lasker, the 
author, Freud himself, marriage, women in general, dream interpretation, The 
Interpretation of Dreams, and in principle anything at all.  From this perspective 
according to which desire is understood more as displaceable quantity of excitation than 
                                                
365 Sigmund Freud, General Psychological Theory, ed. Philip Rieff (New York: Touchstone, 1997), 134. 
Hereafter GPT. 
366 I discussed the dream of the Autodidasker in detail in the Introduction. 
367 Freud, GPT, 134. 
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as wish, libidinal cathexis is always only the cathexis of such incompletely individuated 
and even contradictory patchworks. 
 What interests Lyotard most is not to determine which of these conceptions of 
desire is correct, but to understand the relation between them.  In certain texts—
especially in Project for a Scientific Psychology, The Interpretation of Dreams, and 
Beyond the Pleasure Principle—Freud seems to derive the kind of mental functioning 
that is oriented toward the orderly, regular world of representation from the dynamic of 
pre-representational, freely mobile quantities of libidinal excitation.  In fact, Freud often 
refers to the latter dynamic as the primary process and the former as the secondary 
process.  For Freud, the primary process is primary in the straightforwardly chronological 
and genetic senses of the term: “the primary processes are earlier in time; at the 
beginning of mental life there are no others. . . .”368  Let us take as an example the case of 
a hungry infant.  The infant’s hunger makes itself manifest as an unpleasurable 
excitation.  This excitation can be discharged only in the experience of a satisfaction, 
which in this case necessarily involves the presence of food.  In the experience of 
satisfaction, a libidinal connection is established between the unpleasurable excitation 
and the cathected memory-image of the food that discharged it.  The next time the infant 
feels the same unpleasurable excitation, it will simply re-cathect the memory, essentially 
hallucinating a satisfaction.  In doing so, the infant aims at what Freud calls a perceptual 
identity, i.e., a simple repetition of the perception associated with the earlier satisfaction.  
Because the goal of the primary process is to discharge excitation by the shortest route 
possible, the infant is never concerned to determine the perceptual identity very precisely.  
The infant does not, for example, connect the satisfaction of his hunger to the cathected 
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memory-image of Gerber Simple Recipe pears and chicken dinner.  Rather the cathexis 
established with the memory-image associated with the first satisfaction is readily 
transferable to any other memory-images that can be related to it in any way.  That is just 
to say that cathexes at the level of the primary process are unbound and freely mobile. 
 The secondary process emerges as a modification and corrective of the primary 
process, supplementing its rather obvious shortcomings as a method for achieving 
satisfaction.  When the hungry infant re-cathects the memory-image of the original 
satisfaction, the unpleasurable excitation remains.  The attempt to discharge the 
excitation fails and thus necessitates a more reliable procedure for achieving satisfaction, 
which Freud calls reality-testing.  Instead of establishing a merely perceptual identity, the 
mental apparatus must aim at a thought-identity, determining more precisely the 
“connecting paths between ideas without being led astray by the intensities of those 
ideas.”369  Only at the level of the secondary process does the mental apparatus come to 
concern itself with determinate, self-identical objects and with the regular relations 
between them, or in short, with the world of representation.  But it would be wrong to 
suppose that the orderly, determinate world of the secondary process comes simply to 
replace the “world” of the primary process.  Rather the secondary process continues to 
pursue the goal of the primary process, viz., to discharge excitation as efficiently as 
possible.  “All the complicated thought-activity which is spun out from the mnemic 
image to the moment at which the perceptual identity is established by the external 
world—all this activity merely constitutes a roundabout path to wish-fulfilment which 
has been made necessary by experience.”370  The difference, then, is that the secondary 
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process more consistently achieves its aim, but at the price of requiring the mental 
apparatus to renounce its claim to immediate satisfaction. 
 The relation between the two different conceptions of desire in Freud’s work can 
be stated rather simply according to Lyotard: “the quanta of energy (= desire as force) 
that cannot be discharged in a specific action relative to reality, have themselves 
represented on a stage open ‘to the interior’ of the mental apparatus (or of the 
subject?)—and open by this impossibility, by this lack itself.”371  In this transformation, 
desire tout court—desire “as work, metamorphosis without end, functioning without 
memory”—becomes significant desire, desire of or for something that is presented as 
absent.372  Once again, the fort-da game that Freud describes in Beyond the Pleasure 
Principle serves as an especially clear example.  At first, Freud’s grandson relates to his 
mother not as a self-identical person, but rather as a patchwork of heterogeneous, pre-
personal and polymorphously perverse connections.  There is a connection between 
breast and mouth, loving voice and ear, caressing hand and skin, but not yet any 
connection between “baby” and “mother.”  At this stage of his development, the baby’s 
mental apparatus is nothing but primary process.  The transition to the secondary process 
and to desire as wish happens when mother ceases to be constantly available to the baby 
and the satisfying connections are broken.  Mother’s departure leaves the baby helpless: 
he does not yet know how to take action in the external world that will achieve the 
discharge of the unpleasurable excitations he experiences.  Indeed, at this stage the baby 
does not yet have the sense of an external world at all.  The baby’s only option, then, is to 
bind the freely mobile excitations and thereby to master them, at least to a degree.  This 
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he does by representing his desire, making it play a meaningful role in the newly 
hollowed-out theater of his mind.  All of the various excitations that are no longer 
satisfied by mother’s breast, voice, hand, etc. are gathered together in the reel, which 
plays the role of mother.  The reel thrown over the cot and the proto-word ‘o-o-o-o’ 
gather together and thus represent the absent mother and the pain that her absence causes.  
The reel pulled back and the joyful ‘da’ represent mother’s reappearance and the 
satisfaction that is sure to result.  Of course this theatrical representation of mother’s 
departure and return can never recapture the intensity of satisfaction characteristic of the 
primary process.  It does, however, give the baby a measure of mastery over his own 
libidinal impulses and allows him at least to ameliorate the painful effects of separation. 
 But Lyotard believes that this Freudian account of the transition between the 
primary process and the secondary process begs the question by treating freely mobile 
cathexes as already oriented toward wish fulfillment.   For Freud it is the pain of 
separation from the mother that accounts for the representative space of desire that we see 
exemplified in the fort-da game.  But if the infant really experiences himself as the 
subject of this pain and experiences his mother as the missing object, then his desire must 
already have taken the form of a wish.373  According to Lyotard, “the nipple, the swelling 
breast, the shoulder, arm and eyes, already had to be instantiated on a person, a unity, the 
mother, in order that this present-absent bobbin could take her place, substitute itself for 
her.”374  Desire tout court, the singular, intense, pre-personal satisfaction experienced in 
                                                
373 Lyotard, LE, 23.  “Pain as caesura, as fissure, split and disconnection, only hurts unitary totality.  In 
conceiving pain as the motor of theatricality, Freud gives it the metaphysical consistency of the negative, 
he is therefore a victim of that theatricality, since only representation of a unitarist calling is hurt by fissure 
and disconnection, only through the already proper, proprietary body is loss felt as aggression, only for an 
already organized consciousness is death a horror.” 
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the coupling of breast and mouth, voice and ear, is treated already in the primary process 
as desire of the baby for the mother.  That is, the coupling is understood by Freud as one 
between the breast of the mother and the mouth of the baby, the voice of the mother and 
the ear of the baby.  If the baby’s desire is oriented always already toward self-identical 
wholes, as Freud’s genetic account implies, then the baby could never really have been 
that polymorphous perversity that the account posits him as having once been.  This 
petitio principii is so important for Lyotard because it marks a place where Freud betrays 
the radicality of one of his most revolutionary innovations, viz., a conception of desire as 
intensity, as productive investment that knows nothing of lack.  This wholly positive 
libido, according to Lyotard, “never fails to invest regions, and it doesn’t invest under the 
rubric of lack and appropriation.  It invests without condition.”375  That libido invests is 
for Lyotard an ultimate fact, a kind of factum libidinis not unlike Kant’s factum rationis.  
This factum of investment without condition, without orientation toward the ordered 
world of knowledge and representation, is essential to the character of libido as event.  In 
presenting desire as always already representational, Freud obscures the event along with 
its ethical and political import. 
 
II. The Flat Space of Libidinal Sense: The Libidinal Band 
 
 How, then, does Lyotard himself account for this transformation of freely mobile 
cathexes into wishes that are oriented toward wholes that are experienced by the desiring 
subject as lacking?  He doesn’t.  Moreover, he rejects the very possibility of giving an 
account of this transformation, since any attempt to do so could not help but to smuggle 
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representation and lack into the full positivity of the primary process.  With regard to the 
factum of libidinal investment, “there is no answering the question why, which implies 
precisely nihilism and thought.”376  To conceive cathexis as always a cathexis for the 
sake of . . .  or cathexis in order to . . . is to conceive desire as oriented always already 
toward a represented or representable content.  It is to treat desire tout court as if it were 
only a disguised or provisional form of desire as wish.  The very attempt, then, to supply 
the reason for cathexis necessarily obscures its character as event, as disruption of the 
order of representation and knowledge, and reduces its alterity to the order of the same. 
 Instead of giving an account of libidinal investment, Lyotard provides an image 
of its functioning in the libidinal band, a one-sided Moebius strip without depth, without 
the theatrical space necessary for the appearance of represented objects.  This libidinal 
band is precisely the body, conceived not as an integrated and unified totality, but as a 
flat surface, a patchwork of pre-personal cathexes. 
Open the so-called body and spread out all its surfaces: not only the skin with all of 
its folds, wrinkles, scars, with its great velvety planes, and contiguous to that, the 
scalp and its mane of hair, the tender pubic fur, nipples, nails, hard transparent skin 
under the heel, the light frills of the eyelids, set with lashes—but open and spread, 
expose the labia majora, so also the labia minora with their blue network bathed in 
mucus, dilate the diaphragm of the anal sphincter, longitudinally cut and flatten out 
the black conduit of the rectum, then the colon, then the caecum, now a ribbon with 
its surface all striated and polluted with shit. . . . 
 And this is not all, far from it. . . .  Against the palm, all latticed with nerves, and 
creased like a yellow leaf, set potter’s clay, or even hard wooden handles encrusted 
with jewels, or a steering wheel, or a drifter’s sail are perhaps required.  Don’t forget 
to add to the tongue and all the pieces of the vocal apparatus, all of the sounds of 
which they are capable, and moreover, the whole selective network of sounds, that is, 
the phonological system, for this too belongs to the libidinal “body”. . . .377 
 
We can see how this image denies the theatrical space of representation.  Most basically, 
there is in this image no distinction between inside and outside, between me and not-me.  
                                                
376 Lyotard, LE, 25.  By nihilism, Lyotard means the tendency of thought to subordinate the intensity and 
positivity of cathexis to a lack, a non-presence that provides its meaning and orientation. 
377 Lyotard, LE, 1-2. 
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Lyotard asks us to think the depths of our organic bodies—that depth within which 
representation takes place, in which the outside becomes manifest as an outside for me, 
the phenomenologists’ immanent transcendence—as the complex enfolding of surfaces.  
And these surfaces include not only “my” body but all those things, persons, words, 
sounds, capacities, sensations, etc. with which “my” body has linked up.  At the level of 
the libidinal band, there is no I that has as its properties the ability to speak English, an 
ear for the music of Boulez, or the capacity for pleasure in good food.  Rather the I 
emerges only as a surface effect of the coupling of tongue and food, ear and music, vocal 
apparatus and the English language. 
 This is just to say that “in the beginning, at the core of life, there are 
excitations.”378  Originarily, there is the fact of cathexis.  We can understand this cathexis 
on the model of the encounter between the series of the signified and the series of the 
signifier articulated in the previous chapter with regard to Deleuze’s Logic of Sense.  Like 
the encounter of signified and signifier, the libidinal encounter is never an encounter 
between pre-existing, self-identical terms.  We saw in the previous chapter that, owing to 
the differential structure of sense, things and propositions could not contain their 
meanings within themselves.  Their sense only became consolidated, i.e., they only 
became what they were, in the space of the encounter.  The encounter, then, was the 
event of the production of sense.  This same structure characterizes the libidinal 
encounter.  Perhaps the clearest example of this in the literature of psychoanalysis is that 
of Judge Schreber and his relation to the physician in charge of his care, Dr. Flechsig.  
Flechsig is for Schreber the object of a very important cathexis.  But this Flechsig is not 
                                                
378 Alphonso Lingis, Libido: The French Existential Theories (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
1985), 75.  Emphasis mine. 
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at all to be equated with the “real” Dr. Flechsig, the one who can be localized within the 
space and time of representation and the facts of whose life can be known according to 
public standards of evidence.   Of the Flechsig of the libidinal encounter we can say at 
once “that he is a cop, that he is God, that he is a lover seduced by Schreber’s feminine 
charms, that he does everything he can to prevent the president [Schreber] from shitting, 
that he is a member of a noble family of long standing which was involved with 
Schreber’s family.”379  This cathected Flechsig is manifestly not the “real” Flechsig, who 
of course was not God, a cop, an aristocrat, or seduced by Schreber’s femininity.  The 
cathected Flechsig is much more like the being-green-of-the-tree or being-a-father and 
being-a-son.  All of these are flat surface effects.  Being-a-father is not so much a 
property of the real man who is a father as it is a kind of mist over the prairie, an 
incorporeal, ungraspable sense.  This sense, as we saw, is in one way indifferent to the 
man whose sense it is, but in another way it is more his own than anything else.  In the 
case of Schreber, Flechsig names a kind of free-floating surface effect that can never be 
appropriated or reduced to a property.  Flechsig, like the being-green-of-the-tree or being-
a-father, is indifferent to good sense and common sense.  Despite not being “real” 
though, the cathected Flechsig constitutes the meaning of Schreber’s existence in a much 
more intimate way than do the things and persons of the world of representation.  
Schreber is the one who is persecuted by God, who is being turned into a woman so that 
he might redeem the world and restore a lost state of bliss.  That is the incorporeal 
meaning of his existence in the same way that being-a-father is the meaning of a father’s 
existence.  Schreber’s cathexis of Flechsig, then, is a cathexis of this complex meaning. 
                                                
379 Lyotard, LE, 55. 
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 We can also understand these libidinal surface effects in terms of the special 
characteristics of the primary process that Freud articulates in the essay “The 
Unconscious.”  First, the processes of the unconscious are indifferent to reality.380  What 
is originary are libidinal excitations and not their reference to an independent reality.  
One morning, in a state between waking and sleeping, Schreber had the idea “that after 
all it really must be very nice to be a woman submitting to the act of copulation.”381  
Based on what Freud calls the anaclitic deviation of the organ-function, there emerges in 
the region of Schreber’s anus a felt intensity.  This intensity is a surface effect, a kind of 
by-product of the functioning of his digestive system.382  The intensity is not meaningful 
in that it does not refer beyond itself to that for which it would be an intensity.  It is not a 
wish.  The delusional narrative in terms of which Schreber verbalizes these excitations is 
not an account of them, but is rather another libidinal surface that extends and intensifies 
the libidinal surface of the anus.  Flechsig, then, does not name the man who would really 
be responsible for the excitations in Schreber’s anus.  He is in no way the product of any 
reality testing on Schreber’s part.  Flechsig-God names and intensifies the glorious and 
miraculous character of Schreber’s excitations; “for nerves in a condition of great 
excitement, as his were for a long time, have precisely the property of exerting an 
attraction upon God—though this is touching upon matters which human speech is 
scarcely, if at all, capable of expressing, since they lie outside the scope of human 
experience and, indeed, have been revealed to him alone.”383  But Flechsig-God also 
                                                
380 Freud, GPT, 135.  
381 Daniel Paul Schreber, Denkwürdigkeiten eines Nervenkranken (Leipzig, 1903), 36.  Hereafter 
Denkwürdigkeiten.  Quoted in Sigmund Freud, Three Case Histories: The “Wolf Man,” The “Rat Man,” 
and The Psychotic Doctor Schreber (New York: Collier Books, 1963), 108. Hereafter Three Case 
Histories. 
382 Lingis, Libido, 82. 
383 Freud, Three Case Histories, 112. 
  
 212 
names the humiliation and the feeling of violation associated with the excitations: “Rays 
of God not infrequently thought themselves entitled to mock at me by calling me ‘Miss 
Schreber,’ in allusion to the emasculation which, it was alleged, I was about to 
undergo.”384  Or again, “So this sets up to have been a Senatspräsident, this person who 
lets himself be f----d!”385  We see clearly from these passages that Flechsig is not an 
intelligible sign, referring beyond itself to something that has its place in the real world.  
Flechsig is not an element in the real world that accounts for Schreber’s excitations, but 
is, as cathected, another patch added on to the patchwork that is Schreber’s libidinal 
body.386 
 Closely related to this indifference to reality are two other special characteristics 
of the primary process that we can see demonstrated in Schreber’s cathexis of Flechsig.  
First, the cathexis is mobile.  We have seen how readily Schreber’s cathexis slides from 
Flechsig to God and from God to Flechsig.  In addition, the normal intensities that 
accompany the functioning of the digestive system can shift readily from being a 
particularly feminine kind of voluptuousness that Schreber himself enjoys to a 
humiliating assault on his masculinity that God enjoys.  On the one hand, defecation for 
Schreber “is always accompanied by the generation of an exceedingly strong feeling of 
spiritual voluptuousness.  For the relief from the pressure caused by the presence of 
faeces in the intestines produces a sense of intense well-being in the nerves of 
                                                
384 Schreber, Denkwürdigkeiten, 127.  Quoted in Freud, Three Case Histories, 116. 
385 Schreber, Denkwürdigkeiten, 177.  Quoted in Freud, Three Case Histories, 116. 
386 Lyotard, LE, 60. “And so it is the alleged frontier of Schreber’s body which finds itself violated by the 
name of Flechsig (just as much as the alleged frontier of the body of Flechsig).  This limit itself is 
pulverized by the vertiginous rotation, the President’s body is undone and its pieces are projected across 
libidinal space, mingling with other pieces in an inextricable patchwork.  The head is now simply any 
fragment at all of the skin.” 
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voluptuousness.”387  But on the other hand, it is God who “demands a constant state of 
enjoyment,” and if Schreber happens to take a little pleasure himself from this, then he 
“can feel justified in accepting it as some slight compensation for the inordinate measure 
of suffering and privation” that he has had to endure.388  At the level of the primary 
process, it is not essential to determine very precisely who experiences the enjoyment or 
who is the agent of persecution.  As we have seen, what is essential is that these cathexes 
successfully extend a libidinal surface.389 
 The other special characteristic of the primary process that is exemplified by the 
Schreber case is its atemporality, or perhaps better, its omnitemporality.390  Of course 
Schreber’s delusion develops over time.  In the earliest stage, the agent of persecution is 
determined unambiguously to be Flechsig, who aims to have Schreber declared incurable, 
to have his body transformed into that of a woman, and then to sexually abuse him/her.  
At this stage, Schreber thinks of God as allied with him against Flechsig and his 
unnatural designs.  Only later does Schreber come to see God as the being ultimately 
responsible for his emasculation.  This new determination is accompanied by a new 
affective relation to the situation: assuming the role of a woman is no longer an 
intolerable affront to his noble and masculine station in life, but is rather a duty 
undertaken for the sake of redeeming the entire world.  At the level of Schreber’s 
unconscious, though, this development happens entirely in the present tense.  At the basis 
of the delusion, according to Freud, is Schreber’s homosexual libidinal cathexis of 
                                                
387 Schreber, Denkwürdigkeiten, 225.  Quoted in Freud, Three Case Histories, 123-4. 
388 Schreber, Denkwürdigkeiten, 281.  Quoted in Freud, Three Case Histories, 131. 
389 Cf. Lyotard, LE, 59.  “If Flechsig, like our previous example Roberte, is a tensor sign, and not merely 
‘meaningful’, it is not through the polysemia of statements which are attached to her name, it is through the 
vertigo of anal eroticism which grips the libidinal Schreberian body of which the name of Flechsig is the 
extension.” 
390 Lyotard, DF, 337. 
  
 214 
Flechsig, which is itself a displacement of a similar cathexis of his own father.  Because 
this cathexis is unacceptable, it is repressed and disguised by a reversal of affect: 
Schreber does not love Flechsig, but rather hates him.  And this disguised content is 
again transformed into Schreber’s hating Flechsig because Flechsig hates him.391  This 
final variation is what gives Schreber’s delusion its specifically paranoid form.  While 
these three propositions, representing three different libidinal relations, can only be stated 
and understood consecutively, they are felt in the unconscious as simultaneous.  Schreber 
hates Flechsig only because he simultaneously loves Flechsig.  And Flechsig hates 
Schreber only because Schreber simultaneously loves and hates him.  These three 
libidinal relations are inextricable and exist as superimposed in a kind of perpetual 
present tense.392 
 These special characteristics of the primary process—its indifference to reality, 
the mobility of cathexes, and omnitemporality—suggest a flat space of libidinal sense 
that is inconceivable within the space of representation.  To describe this space of the 
primary process as flat or two-dimensional is to contrast it with the profound, three-
dimensional space of Merleau-Pontean phenomenology.  We have seen how for Schreber 
the cathexis of his father was easily transferable to Flechsig and to God, and how this 
transfer took place within a perpetual present tense.  This means that at the level of the 
primary process, Schreber’s father is Flechsig and that both of these are God.  It is not 
the case that Schreber’s father adumbrates Flechsig, or presents him by setting him into a 
                                                
391 Freud, Three Case Histories, 165-6. 
392 Another example of the superimposition of incompossible states is given in Schreber’s affective relation 
to his own emasculation.  We have seen that at first Schreber is humiliated by his condition, but is later 
exalted by it.  Again, for the unconscious these states are simultaneous.  What seems to come last, viz., 
Schreber’s enjoyment of the feminine sexual position, is in fact there all along as the repressed and 
disguised content.  Schreber is angry and humiliated by his emasculation only because he simultaneously 
enjoys it and desires it.  The humiliation and the enjoyment are inextricable and, once again, superimposed 
in a perpetual present. 
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distance.  Neither, of course, does Flechsig adumbrate God.  This distancing that is 
characteristic of the phenomenology of perception opens a three-dimensional space or 
depth of field within which real things, persons, properties, etc. can be distinguished from 
each other.393  At the level of the primary process, though, Flechsig is not a discrete, self-
identical person who merely represents or means Schreber’s father.  He occupies the very 
same libidinal space as Schreber’s father, and both occupy the same libidinal space as 
God.  Locations within the space of the libidinal band, then, are not partes extra partes, 
but rather each part is, or at least can be, superimposed on any other.394  That Schreber’s 
relation to his father took place in a different time than his relation to Flechsig, or that all 
three men occupy a space incommensurable with the space of God, is no obstacle to the 
functioning of the primary process.  In its non-representational, two-dimensional space, 
incompossibles co-exist in a manner wholly indifferent to the essentially three-
dimensional space of reality. 
 
III. Desire as Phenomenon: A Three-Dimensional Libidinal Space 
 
 One would miss the sense of Libidinal Economy if one took it primarily as 
advancing a thesis about desire and about the two-dimensional space of the libidinal 
                                                
393 Lyotard, DF, 338. 
394 Ibid.  In Civilization and its Discontents Freud gives an especially helpful image of the kind of 
superimposition that happens at the level of the primary process.  Freud asks us to imagine Rome during 
the various periods of its history, to visualize all of the buildings and the city walls in their proper locations 
and in their proper times.  He then asks us to imagine all of the different periods of Roman history, with all 
of their different architectural features, co-existing in one time and one place, so that, for example, the 
Coliseum and Nero’s Golden House could be seen together in the very same space.  Of course we cannot 
really represent this state of affairs to ourselves, since in reality “the same space cannot have two different 
contents.”  Nonetheless, this coexistence of different contents within the same space is precisely what 
characterizes the space of the unconscious.  Sigmund Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents, trans. James 
Strachey (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1961), 17-20. 
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band.  The book is not primarily about the libidinal band, but is itself an extension of the 
band, a “Harlequin’s costume of libidinal fragments.”395  It is not so much about singular 
intensities as it is itself a singular intensity.  In Peregrinations, a book based on a series 
of lectures he gave in 1986, Lyotard states that his task in Libidinal Economy was “to 
destroy or deconstruct the presentation of any theatrical representation whatsoever, with 
the goal of inscribing the passage of intensities directly into the prose, without any 
mediation at all.”396  To represent desire theatrically, to present it within a theoretical 
discourse as something absent or set at a distance, would necessarily be to falsify it.  
Desire is figural; it happens as an event that is felt immediately as a disruption of the 
order of discourse.  Thus one will have caught the sense of Libidinal Economy, according 
to Lyotard, only if one experienced it directly in its character as event.397 
 And yet the third dimension constituted by the text’s reference outside itself, to an 
absence that it represents within its own theatrical space, is irreducible.  Desire and its 
two-dimensional space are never really given to us entirely without mediation; we have 
no access to these except insofar as they are presented in language.  And with this 
presentation we find ourselves once again within the space of representation that Lyotard 
had hoped “to destroy or deconstruct.”  We can also make this point in more explicitly 
Freudian terms: although we conceive the primary process as originary both 
chronologically and genetically, it nonetheless remains the case that this originary status 
is affirmed only within the orderly, regular world of the secondary process.  We can 
imagine the superimposition of all the eras of Roman history within the same space only 
                                                
395 Lyotard, LE, 261. 
396 Jean-François Lyotard, Peregrinations: Law, Form, Event (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1988), 13.  Cf. Jean-François Lyotard, Just Gaming, trans. Wlad Godzich (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1985), 3-5. 
397 Cf. Lyotard, DF, 18. 
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on the basis of our reality-tested knowledge of Rome and, more generally, of space.  
Lyotard, of course, was aware of this contamination of the flat space of the libidinal band 
by the three-dimensional space of representation.  “All speech is endowed with a truth-
value, whatever this expression means.  Even for us libidinal economists, and not just for 
you, theoreticians, what is said here counts as true. . . .  One could even show that 
Nietzsche was a Platonist.”398 
 All of this is to say that desire, in addition to being a freely mobile, pre-
representational libidinal excitation, is also a phenomenon, in the strictly 
phenomenological sense of the term.  A phenomenon, we will recall, is that which is 
revealed by means of the phenomenological reduction, i.e., by the suspension of the 
natural attitude’s fixation on the objects that appear and its consequent inattention to the 
various modes in which those objects appear.  The phenomenon, then, is neither the real 
object “out there” in the world nor the idea of that object that would be somehow “in” the 
mind of the subject.  The phenomenon, rather, is irreducibly correlational.  It is given 
only within a spacing that, from the phenomenological perspective, is originary.  For 
Husserl, this spacing is the spacing of intentionality, the extension of the phenomenon 
across the noetic and noematic poles.  Merleau-Ponty thinks this spacing in 
Phenomenology of Perception as the phenomenal field, and later in The Visible and the 
Invisible as flesh.  In all of these conceptions, the phenomenon appears as the in-itself 
                                                
398 Lyotard, LE, 262; LE-Fr, 310-11.  Translation modified.  Cf. Lyotard, LE, 50; LE-Fr, 64-5. “We know 
your objection, semioticians: whatever you do or think, you tell us, you make a sign of your action and 
reflection, you cannot do otherwise, due to the simple perspective it provides on the referential axis of your 
action-discourse, hollowed out into a two-faced thing, meaningful/meaningless, intelligible/sensible, 
manifest/hidden, in front/behind; whenever you speak, you tell us, you excavate a theatre in things.  Fair 
enough, we don’t deny it, we’ve been through it and go through it all the time, it is in no way a matter of 
determining a new domain, another field, a beyond representation which would be immune to the effects of 
theatricality, not at all, we are well aware that you are just waiting for us to do this, to be so ‘stupid’. . . .” 
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for-us or as an immanent transcendence.399  The condition of its being present is that it be 
given only as set into a distance. 
 The irreducibility of spacing in the structure of appearance entails that the 
phenomenon can never be given immediately.  It is given, rather, only in adumbrations.  
To see this, we can turn once again to Husserl’s example from Ideas I of the experience 
of seeing a table.400  At no point do I ever hold the entire table in my gaze.  I see it only 
from perspectives that necessarily conceal other perspectives that I could take on it.  But 
these perspectives are never given as self-sufficient and as closed in on themselves; my 
consciousness does not lose itself in each discrete sensation or content of consciousness.  
Rather each perspective is given precisely as a perspective of the table.  The perspectives, 
in other words, adumbrate the table, which is never given immediately, but is always 
present as set into a distance.  This same kind of description could be given for desire, 
which, as phenomenal, would correspond to desire as wish.  The desire that is manifest in 
the fort-da game staged by Freud’s grandson provides an especially clear example of this 
phenomenal desire.  There is, no doubt, a mobile, pre-representational excitation that 
happens at the surface of mouth and breast, ear and voice.  And no doubt there is a stage 
in the infant’s development at which these excitations do not refer to the baby as an 
organic unity who would be their subject or toward “mother” as a self-identical whole 
who would be their object.  And yet these excitations cannot be understood exclusively as 
displaceable quanta of libidinal energy.  If they were nothing more than this, then the 
development of the fort-da game and of the profound, theatrical space that it presupposes 
would be unthinkable.  The excitations that the infant experiences must adumbrate 
                                                
399 Merleau-Ponty, PP, 322; PP-Fr, 372. 
400 Husserl, Ideas I, 73-76 (§41).  This example was discussed in the Introduction. 
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something, however dimly this “something” is conceived.  The infant experiences this 
something that the excitations adumbrate as present in the mode of absence, or in other 
words, as the object of a wish.401 
 But does this account not recreate the petitio principii that Lyotard had pointed to 
in Freud’s discussion of the fort-da game in Beyond the Pleasure Principle?  Does it not 
present freely mobile libidinal excitations as if they were already wishes?  And does it 
not therefore conceal the event-character of the primary process by conceiving of it 
within the three-dimensional, representational space of the secondary process?  Not 
necessarily.  Freud’s petitio principii, according to Lyotard, consisted in his isolating the 
pain of separation as the point of transition from the primary to the secondary process.  In 
conceiving pain as fission and as negation, Freud treated the primary process as if it were 
already the secondary process, rendering superfluous his account of the transition from 
the one to the other.  The petitio principii, then, does not consist in Freud’s having 
posited an imbrication of the secondary process within the primary process, but rather in 
his having conceived the imbrication from the perspective of the former.   An account 
that articulated the imbrication from the side of the primary process, on the other hand, 
would not beg the question, as it would not presuppose the priority of what it itself 
posited as secondary.  Thus “it is necessary that the attempt be made to describe the 
circumscription of a theatre where there had been flat skin, affirmatively, energetically, 
without presupposing lack, when this would be under the name of pain.”402 
                                                
401 For a much more detailed discussion of the irreducible phenomenal character of desire and of its relation 
to the kind of distancing that happens in the presentation of phenomena through adumbrations, see Renaud 
Barbaras, Desire and Distance: Introduction to a Phenomenology of Perception, trans. Paul B. Milan 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), 108-127. 
402 Lyotard, LE, 24. 
  
 220 
 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari offer a description that seems to meet these 
requirements in Anti-Oedipus.  This description is not an explanation: it does not attempt 
to tell us why or for what purpose the freely mobile quanta of excitation of the primary 
process come to be oriented toward objects that are present as lacking.  As we have seen, 
Lyotard believes that the question why already presupposes the theatrical space of 
representation.403  Rather their description begins with something like the factum libidinis 
that we saw in Libidinal Economy.  In the beginning is desiring-production which, like 
Lyotard’s wholly positive cathexis, is not oriented or governed by any representational 
order.  It invests without condition.  But this “production is immediately consumption and 
recording, and the recording and consumption determine production directly, but from 
within production itself.”404  That is, production or cathexis immediately is the production 
of the space of recording, the theatrical space of representation in which what is given is 
present as absent, as a sign for something that is lacking.  This account thinks negation 
and spacing on the basis of positive cathexis, and not vice versa.  For Deleuze and 
Guattari, “desire is not bolstered by needs, but rather the contrary; needs are derived from 
desire: they are counterproducts within the real that desire produces.”405 
 To show more explicitly how this is the case, we can reconstruct the example of 
the fort-da game from a Deleuzo-guattarian perspective.406  Just as in Freud’s account, 
                                                
403 Lyotard, LE, 25.  Cf. Deleuze and Guattari, AOE, 24; AOE-Fr, 31.  “The great discovery of 
psychoanalysis was that of the production of desire, of the productions of the unconscious.  But once 
Oedipus entered the picture, this discovery was soon buried beneath a new brand of idealism: a classical 
theater was substituted for the unconscious as a factory; representation was substituted for the units of 
production of the unconscious; and an unconscious that was capable of nothing but expressing itself—in 
myth, tragedy, dreams—was substituted for the productive unconscious.” 
404 Deleuze and Guattari, AOE, 4; AOE-Fr, 9-10.  Translation modified.  Emphasis mine. 
405 Deleuze and Guattari, AOE, 27; AOE-Fr, 34. 
406 A similar, though longer and more detailed, version of this example is given in Eugene W. Holland, 
Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus: Introduction to Schizoanalysis (London: Routledge, 1999), 26-36.  
My own account borrows considerably from Holland’s. 
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we can begin with a conception of the infant as polymorphously perverse, as libidinally 
coupled with his mother not as a molar whole (as “mother”), but rather in terms of 
various partial objects (mouth to breast, ear to voice, eye to smile, etc.)  And just as in 
Freud’s account, we must posit that these couplings, along with the satisfactions that 
accompany them, are broken.  According to Freud, as we have seen, these breaks are 
painful.  Unable to obtain satisfactions in his accustomed ways, the infant binds his 
unpleasurable excitations by representing them in the theater of his mind.  The transition 
to the secondary process is thus accounted for in terms of lack and negation.  For Deleuze 
and Guattari, on the other hand, the breakings of couplings are affirmative.  The cathexis 
that joins mouth to breast is a production of consumption or of consummation, of the 
feeling of satisfaction.  Once the product is produced, i.e., once the satisfaction is 
experienced, the infant himself breaks the connection.  Moreover, the infant breaks the 
connection in the interest of more production, of making more and more connections.407  
But as we saw, the products of cathexis do not simply disappear when a new investment 
is made.  They are timeless, co-existing incompossibly on the flat space of the primary 
process.  There remains, then, a record of the couplings, even when these are not present 
sources of satisfaction.  In short, they become signs, referring to satisfactions that are 
present as absent.  The three-dimensional space of the theater, then, is the product of 
wholly positive cathexis and exists, in a geometrically non-representable way, within the 
two-dimensional space of the libidinal band.  
 
 
                                                
407 Deleuze and Guattari, AOE, 8; AOE-Fr, 14.  “Desiring machines work only when they break down, and 
by continually breaking down.” 
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IV. Dissimulation  
 
 To say that the profound theatrical space of representation exists on the flat space 
of the libidinal band is to say that these two spaces are blocked together.  Within the non-
representable space of this blocking together, profound space and flat space co-exist in 
such a way that each dissimulates the other.  With his concept of dissimulation, Lyotard 
brings into play simultaneously the senses of dissimulate and dissimilate, to conceal and 
to alter.408  The theater within which the reel and string represent the absent mother, 
within which they present her as a unity whose absence is painful and whose return 
would bring satisfaction, dissimulates the flat space of pre-personal, freely mobile 
cathexes.  Desire as wish conceals desire as displaceable quantum of excitation, such that 
we are able to catch sight of the latter only in seemingly non-rational phenomena like 
dreams, parapraxes, jokes, neuroses, and psychoses.  In the case of Freud’s grandson, it is 
not at all easy to recognize the multiple, mobile cathexes of partial objects in the more 
manifest wish for the mother’s presence.  The theater of representation functions as a 
dispositif, an apparatus that alters libidinal excitations by conducting them into regular 
channels, enabling the repetition of determinate, representable satisfactions in accordance 
with the principle of constancy and, more generally, the pleasure principle.409  The 
                                                
408 Lyotard, LE, 52; LE-Fr, 66.  Cf. James Williams, Lyotard : Towards a Postmodern Philosophy 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998), 97-100. 
409 Lyotard, DP, 227-231.  Lyotard’s dispositif is generally translated by “set-up.”  This, it seems to me, 
fails to capture what is most important in the concept.  What is most important about the dispositif is that it 
functions; it gathers together and channels otherwise disorderly (i.e., freely mobile) quanta of excitation and 
renders them regular and repeatable.  “Set-up,” it seems to me, does not sufficiently capture the active, 
dynamic sense of Lyotard’s dispositif.  In what follows, I will leave the word untranslated. 
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dispositif, in short, functions according to the demands of the reality principle, rendering 
the mobile, disorderly cathexes of the primary process literally unrecognizable. 
 Importantly, the dispositif is a dispositif of the libido in both the objective and 
subjective senses of the genitive.  On the one hand, the dispositif is the apparatus that 
organizes, or dis-poses, libidinal energy.  But as we saw in Deleuze and Guattari’s 
description of the immediate unity of production, recording, and consumption, it is also 
the case that the dispositif is itself a disposition of libido.  This corresponds broadly to 
Freud’s insight that thinking and its orientation toward reality are ultimately in service of 
the same end as the primary process.  The duplicity of the genitive in dispositif of libido 
entails that there are neither two kinds of desire—wish and quantum of excitation, Eros 
and Thanatos—nor two discrete spaces of desire—the theater and the libidinal band.  
There is one libido that operates simultaneously according to two incompossible but 
inextricable dynamics and within two incompossible but inextricable spaces.410 
 Lyotard offers an example of dissimulation in the case history of Dora, first 
presented by Freud in his Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria.411  Dora 
suffered from, among other things, a nervous cough (tussis nervosa) and hoarseness, 
which Freud diagnosed as a hysterical conversion, i.e., a detachment of libido from a 
repressed idea and its transformation into a symptom that expresses, but also conceals, 
the idea in a bodily way.  Dora’s persistent cough and hoarseness tended to appear when 
Herr K, a friend of the family and the husband of Frau K, with whom Dora’s father had 
                                                                                                                                            
For more on the relation between the pleasure principle and the principle of constancy, see Freud, BPP, 75-
78.   
410 Lyotard, LE, 52-3; LE-Fr, 68. 
411 Sigmund Freud, Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria, in The Standard Edition of the 
Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Vol. VII, trans. James Strachey (London: The Hogarth 
Press, 1953), 3-122.  Hereafter Dora. 
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been carrying on an extra-marital affair, was away.  This condition had its origin in one 
of Dora’s earliest experiences, at age fourteen, with the world of adult sexuality.  Herr K 
had arranged to meet Dora at his place of work, where they would have a good view of a 
religious festival.  When Dora arrived at the office, Herr K kissed her on the lips.  Her 
response to this was a feeling of disgust.  According to Freud, this feeling was a disguise 
for Dora’s true feeling of sexual excitement, which she could not acknowledge.  The 
strong cathexis of the area of the mouth, then, functioned to maintain Dora’s repression 
of her unavowable sexuality.  The cathexis was reinforced by the circumstance that Herr 
K was often away for long periods of time and that during these periods he 
communicated with Dora in writing.  When Herr K was away, Dora’s voice was useless 
for communicating the thoughts she most wanted to convey, and this was expressed in 
her somatic condition.412 
 We can easily recognize Dora’s cough as a libidinal sign with a relatively 
straightforward meaning.  The cough intends Herr K, who is absent and whose return 
would bring about a satisfaction.  We can, then, unfold the meaning of the sign into a 
series of propositions that are perfectly sensible from the perspective of the secondary 
process and thus of reality: Dora loves Herr K.  Herr K’s absence is painful to Dora and 
his presence would make her happy.  This interpretation of the meaning of the cough is 
further supported by the fact that Dora herself tended to associate other people’s illnesses 
with their attempts to get something that they wanted.  She had noticed, for example, that 
when Herr K was away traveling, Frau K was generally in good health, but when he 
returned, her health deteriorated.  “Dora realized that the presence of the husband had the 
effect of making his wife ill, and that she was glad to be ill so as to be able to escape the 
                                                
412 Ibid., 40. 
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conjugal duties which she so much detested.”413  Moreover, Freud points out that it is 
common for young children to experience as painful the arrival of younger siblings and 
the consequent requirement that they renounce their exclusive claim on their parents’ 
affections.  Children tend to learn quickly that they can direct their parents’ attention 
back toward themselves by the simple expedient of being ill.414  All of this suggests that 
Dora’s cough functions like the reel and string in the fort-da game: both represent at once 
the painful absence of a loved one and the promise of satisfaction that would accompany 
that person’s return. 
 And yet Dora’s cough as sign, as reference beyond itself to Herr K and his 
present-absent love, also dissimulates a multitude of cathexes that are incompossible 
within the space of representation.  During the course of the analysis, Freud came to 
understand the cough as grounded ultimately in Dora’s love for her father, who had 
suffered for most of his life from tuberculosis and whose cough had made a strong 
impression on Dora.  From this perspective, the libidinal meaning of Dora’s cough 
consisted in her sympathetic identification with her father.  At a later stage in her life, 
however, this original cathexis took on a very different sense.  According to Freud, Dora 
often spoke of Frau K in ways that only thinly disguised her homosexual attraction.415  
This homosexual current of feeling represented a reversion to the kind of same-sex 
identifications that characterize that stage of children’s libidinal development just prior to 
their taking an interest in the opposite sex.416  When Dora’s investments in men—
specifically Herr K—failed to yield satisfactions, she reverted to earlier channels of 
                                                
413 Ibid., 58-9.  Dora also reported having judged both her father and her cousin to be malingerers. 
414 Ibid., 44-5. 
415 Ibid., 61-2. 
416 Ibid., 60. 
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investment that had once met with greater success.  These two cathexes are joined 
together in Dora’s identification with Frau K qua lover of her father.  Freud concluded 
that “with her spasmodic cough, which, as is usual, was referred for its exciting stimulus 
to a tickling in her throat, she pictured to herself a scene of sexual gratification per os 
between the two people whose love affair occupied her mind so incessantly.”417  Dora’s 
cough, then, constitutes a libidinal identification with her father, which is subsequently 
displaced into and disguised as a libidinal identification with Frau K.  Because 
investments are omnitemporal and occupy the same libidinal space, Dora’s identification 
with her father is inseparable from her identification with Frau K.  Both of these unstable 
libidinal identifications, and probably many others besides, are dissimulated by the 
cough’s relatively fixed reference to Herr K.  Dora’s cough, then, is a complex libidinal 
dispositif in which the incompossible spaces of the primary and secondary processes are 
blocked together.  The cough functions as a sign of Herr K within the three-dimensional 
space of representation, but it functions just as much as a consumption of singular, non-
representational intensities, as a repetition of innumerable, non-localizable 
satisfactions.418  It is “at the same time a sign that produces meaning through difference 
                                                
417 Ibid., 48. 
418 Lyotard’s emphases in his discussion of the Dora case are slightly different from my own.  Instead of the 
blocking together of the flat space of the libidinal band and the profound space of representation, Lyotard 
focuses on the ways in which Eros and Thanatos dissimulate each other.  We can regard Dora’s cough as an 
example of Thanatos, as unbinding the system of bound cathexes that constitutes Dora’s organic body.  But 
we can just as well understand the cough as an example of Eros: it is not merely an unbinding, but also a 
dispositif that functions perfectly well on its own terms as an apparatus for producing certain satisfactions.  
For Lyotard, there is no choice to make between understanding the cough as Eros or as Thanatos, because it 
is immediately both.  The cough is at once a binding and an unbinding and must thus be understood at once 
in accordance with the secondary process and with the primary process.  These two spaces are blocked 
together in the cough.  Lyotard, LE, 52-54; LE-Fr, 68-70. 
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and opposition, and a sign producing intensity through force [puissance] and 
singularity.”419 
 
V. The Tensor Sign as Immediate Duality 
 
 Dora’s cough, Dr. Flechsig, and the Autodidasker are all tensor signs.  Tensor 
sign is the translation into libidinal terms of the idea of an immediate duality of the actual 
and the virtual that we discussed in the previous chapter with regard to Deleuze’s Logic 
of Sense.  The goalkeeper preparing for a shot on goal, we saw, occupies simultaneously 
at least seven different positions and fourteen different futures.  These spaces and times 
are, of course, incompossible from the perspective of good sense and common sense.  
They co-exist virtually in much the same way that incompossible cathexes co-exist on the 
libidinal band.  But that same goalkeeper is equally one person in a determinate space and 
time.  Even as he prepares for the shot on goal, Gianluigi Buffon can be located at one 
determinate time—the 104th minute of the 2006 World Cup final match on July 9, 2006—
and at one determinate place in the Olympiastadion in Berlin, Germany.  It is not the case 
that the goalkeeper is either virtual or actual; rather he is always immediately both.  
Likewise, Dora’s cough is immediately both a sign of the self-identical person Herr K 
and a felt intensity that joins together numerous incompossible cathexes.  Dr. Flechsig is 
at once the determinate person who is actually responsible for Schreber’s care at his 
clinic in Leipzig and the incompossible feelings experienced by Schreber of humiliation 
and exaltedness, persecution and glory.  Finally, Autodidasker is at once a word that 
appeared at a particular time and place in Freud’s dream and a condensation of numerous 
                                                
419 Lyotard, LE, 54; LE-Fr, 69. 
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affects, including concern for the healthy development of his children, fear for his 
brother’s and sons’ being harmed in their relationships with women, and embarrassment 
at his having misdiagnosed a case of neurosis. 
 From the perspective of Lyotard’s libidinal materialism, anything that can be 
cathected, which is to say, anything at all, can function as a tensor sign.  We have been 
focusing on specifically Freudian examples only because Freud has shown in such detail 
the way in which the primary process is given right at the level of the secondary process.  
What is essential to the tensor sign is not that it is a neurotic symptom, a dream-content, 
or a parapraxis, but simply that it functions as a libidinal dispositif.  Like any libidinal 
dispositif, the tensor sign signifies.  This signification, as we have seen, is the product of 
the binding of cathexis into regular channels.  Dora’s numerous unavowable cathexes are 
rendered meaningful when they are gathered together in her love for Herr K.  The painful 
experiences of Freud’s grandson become significant when they are instantiated onto the 
person of his mother.  But this erotic, binding moment of the libidinal dispositif is 
inseparable from the unbinding moment of Thanatos, which ceaselessly disrupts the order 
of representation.  As itself a disposition of libido, the dispositif never wholly transcends 
the disruptive, disordered, and deconstructing dynamic of the primary process.420  The 
signification of Dora’s affect, the instantiation of her desire onto Herr K, is always 
already destabilized by the ineliminable mobility of her cathexis.  As a result, Herr K is 
always more than he “really” is, where real is understood according to the requirements 
of the reality principle.  Likewise, Dora’s cough, her father, Frau K, and Dora herself are 
                                                
420 Lyotard, DP, 229. 
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more than they really are.  It is this being more than they really are that constitutes the 
objects of cathexis as tensor signs.421 
 This fact that anything at all can be a tensor sign, and can thus be more than it 
really is, has a special relevance for our understanding of the imperative and of what it 
commands.  The ethical import of the tensor sign corresponds broadly to the ethical 
import, described in the previous chapter, of the moment of counter-actualization in every 
actualization.  There we discussed the example of death, which, as Blanchot has argued, 
can never be fully actualized.  To be sure, one’s death always has its place within the 
ordered, regulated world of representation.  One dies at a determinate time and place 
from causes demonstrable according to public, well-established rules of evidence.  But it 
is equally the case that one’s death is never given in the present tense.  It is pre-eminently 
that which is not in its place, that which I can never appropriate by making it a possibility 
for me.  Death, in other words, is always in excess of its actualization.  It was in this 
moment of counter-actualization that we isolated the possibility for an attunement to the 
singularity, and thus to the absolute, unexchangeable dignity of others.  As a formula for 
the imperative that arose from this attunement, we suggested the following: do not be 
unworthy of the force of counter-actualization that accompanies every actualization.  Do 
not close yourself off from the singularity that becomes manifest in the event of the 
encounter.  This formulation resembled the second formula of the imperative that Kant 
                                                
421 We could, of course, also describe the various elements of the Schreber case with reference to the tensor 
sign.  Flechsig is really the doctor in charge of Schreber’s care at Leipzig, but is also obviously much more 
than that, owing to the extreme mobility of Schreber’s cathexis.  Again, the same could be said of God, 
femininity, homosexuality, Schreber’s anus, the process of defecating, and of Schreber himself.  All of 
these are significant, and yet they all exceed themselves in ways that destabilize their significations.  This 
excess is the excess proper to the primary process.  It should also be noted that this experience of an excess 
over the real significations of cathected objects is not at all limited to psychotics and neurotics.  If the 
Schreber case is so valuable for our understanding of the economics of the libido, it is simply because it 
presents the workings of the primary process right at the surface, in the form of his delusions.  These same 
processes are at work, albeit in a considerably better disguised way, in all mental functioning. 
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himself gives in the Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals: “Act so that you use 
humanity, as much in your own person as in the person of every other, always at the 
same time as an end and never merely as a means.”422 
 In as essay titled “A Short Libidinal Economy of a Narrative Set-up: The Renault 
Corporation Relates the Death of Pierre Overney,” Lyotard presents this same insight and 
this same imperative in the language of libidinal economics.423  Pierre Overney was 
among a group of protestors who had gathered at the entrance to the Renault factory at 
Billancourt on February 26, 1972 in order to distribute literature condemning the 
company for its labor practices.  During a confrontation between the protestors and 
Renault’s uniformed security staff, a Renault employee in plain clothes shot and killed 
Overney.  Shortly thereafter, the management of Renault issued a press release whose 
purpose was to contextualize Overney’s death and to consolidate its meaning in a way 
favorable to the company. 
 The death of Overney was an event.  It was not an event because of its playing a 
prominent role in the French political life of the time, because it was the subject of press 
releases of the kind issued by Renault or of editorials in the newspaper, or because it was 
the inspiration for various demonstrations against the Renault corporation and the French 
government.  All of these are rather dispositifs for the channeling of the event into 
regular, repeatable social meanings.  As such, they function not to highlight the event-
character of Overney’s death, but rather to dissimulate it.  Overney’s death is an event not 
because of its significance, but because “it is libidinally linkable neither upstream to 
                                                
422 Kant, GMM, 46-47 [Ak 4:429]. 
423 Keith Crome and James Williams, eds, The Lyotard Reader and Guide (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2006), 200-230. Hereafter LRG; Lyotard, DP, 171-213.  In the title of the essay, set-up 
translates dispositif, which I have been leaving untranslated. 
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causes or precedents nor downstream to effects or consequences.  It is a vain death.  It is 
its inanity that makes of it an event.”424  It is an event because it resists all ready-made 
significations.425  As such, it was experienced by the French people as a tensor, as a felt 
intensity that at once gestured beyond itself toward a consolidated meaning and resisted 
that consolidation.  People experienced their encounters with Overney’s death, whether 
through the newspaper, word of mouth, or with their own eyes, as a shock, as an afflux of 
unbound, and thus non-signifying, cathexis.  The narratives that arose from this event, put 
forward by numerous institutions for numerous purposes, functioned in the same way as 
the reel and string of Freud’s grandson, viz., as dispositifs to channel that unbound affect 
and to give it a meaning within the social theater of representation.  In the vocabulary of 
The Logic of Sense, Overney’s death was an event that, like all events, gestured toward an 
actualized sense, but that was radically destabilized by the force of counter-actualization. 
That counter-actualization, redescribed in the language of libidinal economy as the 
persistence of the mobility of the primary process within the formations of the secondary 
process, or as the blocking together of the flat space of the libidinal band with the 
profound space of the theater, makes manifest Overney’s death as something more than it 
“really” was.  That something more is the singularity and the alterity to which we are 
commanded to remain open. 
                                                
424 Crome and Williams, LRG, 204; Lyotard, DP, 177.  Translation slightly modified. 
425 Cf. Crome and Williams, LRG, 204; Lyotard, DP, 177.  “Deaths on the roads, the deaths in Indo-China 
are not vain; they inscribe themselves, or could easily be inscribed, in a ledger, a register of income and 
expenditure, credits and debits, the sum total of which is calculable, endowing them with meaning and 
direction.  That the accountants might not be in agreement on the bottom-line is not of any interest here; 
they all agree on the principle that there is a bottom-line.”  Deaths on the road or on the battlefield have 
well-established significations.  There is certainly disagreement about what that signification is: is a death 
on the battlefield in Iraq an example of the meaning “noble sacrifice for the sake of the American people 
and their security against the forces of global terrorism” or of the meaning “unnecessary sacrifice for the 
sake of an unjust and ill-conceived war of aggression,” or of some other meaning?  But this does not alter 
the fact that all of those deaths have some ready-made significance, even before they actually happen.  At 
the time it occurred in France, Overney’s death did not have such a ready-made significance, and this is 
what caused it to be experienced as an event. 
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VI. Conclusion: Three Benefits of Describing the Imperative in the Language of 
Libidinal Economics 
 
 In translating the results of the previous chapters into the language of Lyotard’s 
libidinal economics, we enable ourselves to conceive in a rigorous way the intimate 
connection between the two moments of the imperative’s dynamic.  On the one hand, 
there is right at the level of our embodied or incarnated opening out onto the world a pull 
toward a profound, three-dimensional space, hollowed out and oriented toward 
significations adumbrated by phenomena.  This moment of the imperative’s dynamic we 
discovered in the work of Merleau-Ponty.  On the other hand we found in Deleuze’s 
Logic of Sense an articulation of a flat space of sense right at the surface of the space of 
representation.  This superficial sense, we saw, destabilizes the intelligibility of 
representational sense, and thereby makes manifest a kind of pre-representational 
singularity that we find ourselves commanded to respect.  In the discourse of libidinal 
economics we can think the connection between these two moments as their blocking 
together.  As we have seen, we can conceive the two sides of the blocking together in 
different ways, which bring to the fore slightly different aspects of our experience of the 
imperative.  We can speak of the blocking together of the theater and the libidinal band, 
thereby emphasizing the spatial element of our experience.  Or we can speak of the 
blocking together of the primary and secondary processes, which draws attention to our 
affective experience, to intensities that we feel as pleasurable or painful.  Finally, we can 
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conceive the blocking together with respect to Eros and Thanatos, which brings out the 
connection between productive cathexis, the dispositifs that channel it, and consumption.  
But what all of these formulations have in common is an articulation of the divergent, and 
perhaps even contradictory, orientations of the imperative’s dynamic as one complex 
phenomenon. 
 A second benefit is that the discourse of libidinal economics helps to clarify the 
role that feeling plays in orienting us toward singularities in their alterity and their 
dignity.  We saw in our attempt to understand the relation between the primary and 
secondary processes that, although the former is prior chronologically and genetically, it 
can only ever be conceived in terms of the latter.  We saw this specifically with regard to 
Freud’s difficulty in describing the primary process in a way that did not already 
presuppose the functioning of the secondary process.  For the secondary process, there 
are no singularities: the binding of cathexes and the constitution of thought-identities 
makes of everything a sign, and thus a generality.  How, then, can we become aware of 
pre-representational, non-signifying singularities as making any kinds of demands on us?  
Lyotard’s answer is that our access to the figural, to that which exceeds representation, 
happens by means of a feeling of resistance to the ordering operations of the secondary 
process.  These ordering processes can be understood with reference to the fort-da game.  
As we saw, this game represented the transformation of desire as displaceable quantity of 
excitation into desire as wish.  The game served to bind cathexes according to the two 
modes of negation that Lyotard had described in Discours, figure, viz., the spacing that is 
described in the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty and the opposition that is described in 
Saussurian linguistics.  The game hollows out a phenomenological space by making 
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“mother” present as absent, while also establishing the negation proper to the langue in 
the basic opposition between fort and da, absent and present.  The game, then, functions 
as a libidinal dispositif that establishes the conditions for reality, for the reign of good 
sense and common sense.  Singularity is experienced within the space of reality precisely 
as a disruption of that order.426  It is an experience of difference, but of a difference that is 
inassimilable to the kinds of difference that sustain the space of representation.  It is, in 
sum, the experience of a different difference which, precisely because of its difference, 
cannot assume a place within the order of good sense and common sense, but can only be 
felt.427 
 We can take as an example Pierre Overney, whose death is a tensor sign that is 
certainly significant, but that also resists being resolved into its significations without 
remainder.  Overney and his death are rendered significant in various ways by various 
dispositifs.  There is Overney as Maoist revolutionary, as enemy of the French state 
whose death is, if not entirely justified, at least not very regrettable.  There is Overney as 
victim of an unfortunate accident: according to the press release issued by Renault, the 
employee who shot and killed Overney did not mean to do so, as evidenced by the fact 
that he turned himself in spontaneously to the police.428  Then there is also Overney as 
hero of the Maoist revolutionary movement, confirmation of the righteousness of its 
cause and of the inhuman brutality of the capitalist system.  And finally, there is Overney 
                                                
426 Lyotard, DP, 229. 
427 Lyotard, DF, 138.  “It suffices that there be at the heart of these orders negations irreducible to the gaps 
of opposition or to the depth of designation, insane events, i.e., operations or effects of operations requiring 
an ‘order’ that cannot fall under the negativities we have identified, precisely because it is inscribed in 
those negativities only negatively, of an order one is for this reason tempted to assume is positive.” 
428 Crome and Williams, LRG, 208-9; Lyotard, DP, 183. 
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as commodity, as a good story that sold newspapers.429  But Overney was manifestly 
something more than these significations.  In their encounters with the story of his death, 
the French people felt the free mobility or metastability of its sense.  They felt that the 
meaning of his death was not consolidated.  Indeed, it was this very feeling of a 
“something more,” of something beyond the established significations, that spurred the 
furious efforts of various parties to consolidate a sense.  But it was also this same feeling 
that made manifest a singularity and an alterity that resisted signification and that could 
never be resolved into something general. 
 The third benefit follows from the other two.  The description of the imperative in 
the language of libidinal economics helps to bring out the complexity and the uncertainty 
that are ineliminable features of our moral experience.  The case of Pierre Overney 
demonstrates the way in which the formal or significant content of the imperative cannot 
exhaust its imperative force.  In doing so, it demonstrates the broader point that moral 
action can never be reduced to rule-following or to a kind of ethical protocol.  Morally 
charged situations emerge within the spaces opened up by encounters, which are always 
encounters with tensor signs.  We have seen that the tensor sign pulls us in two directions 
at once, one toward the theatrical, representational space of the secondary process and the 
other toward the flat space of the primary process where representations are ceaselessly 
deconstructed.  We can never have mastered this dynamic in advance of the singular 
encounters that set it in motion.  This means that we can never know with certainty the 
content of the imperative’s command.  Or, if the imperative did invariably command a 
determinate content, it would simply be this: maintain yourself always in a state of 
                                                
429 There are, of course, many more possibilities for capturing the sense of Overney and his death.  I have 
limited the number to four only for the sake of simplicity. 
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openness and sensitivity to the ephemeral, inappropriable senses that emerge from 
encounters that are always singular and always new. 
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